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R-E-S-P-E-C-T*: RESPECTING LEGISLATIVE
JUDGMENTS IN INTERPRETIVE THEORY
BERNARD W. BELL**
New textualists argue that judicial refusal to consult legislative
history will ameliorate several pathologies of the contemporary
legislative process, including the increasing imprecision in
legislative drafting and the excessive influence of legislative
minorities, congressional staff members, and lobbyists due to the
ability of these groups to manipulate legislative history. In this
Article, Professor Bell argues that new textualists have failed to
address a fundamental question raised by their approach: whether
courts should attempt to diagnose and remedy legislative
pathologies in the first place. He examines three widely
recognized theories of constitutional jurisprudence that potentially
could justify new textualists' approach to statutory interpretation,
but concludes that these approaches-original intent theory,
process theory, and underenforced norms theory-do not justify
new textualists' disregard for congressional judgments. Professor
Bell proposes an approach to legislative history that accords
legislative history significance because Congress uses such history
to justify its statutes to the public. Such a "public justification"
approach not only possesses normative appeal, Professor Bell
argues, but also accords respect to congressional judgments
regarding the structure of the legislative process.
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INTRODUCTION
Help wanted, immediately!! Guru/babysitter needed to oversee
and discipline unruly organization that produces excessively vague
rules, publishes unreliable documents that frustrate high-level
decisions, allows top personnel to delegate excessive authority to staff,
and allows outsiders undue influence. Judges and law professors
preferred.
This fanciful "Help Wanted" ad seeks a manager to oversee and,
when necessary, discipline Congress. We frequently are told that
congressional judgments deserve respect and that courts accordingly
must defer to those judgments, employ sparingly their authority to
invalidate statutes, and constrain their impulses to infuse their own
value judgments into their decisions. More colloquially, many have
embraced the mantra that judges should enforce, not make, the law;'
1. See 144 CONG. REC. S11,883 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1998) (statement of Sen. Thurmond
regarding the nomination of William A. Fletcher to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals)
("I firmly believe that the role of the judge is to interpret the law as the legislature
intended, not to interpret the law consistent with the judge's public policy objectives. A
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the mantra becomes especially popular when the Senate considers
judicial nominations. Surprisingly, however, some professed devotees
of judicial restraint have already arrogated the responsibilities
outlined in my fanciful "Help Wanted" ad. In particular, new
textualist2 judges, like Justice Antonin Scalia, have assumed the task
of disciplining Congress to correct its inadequacies. These judges
have concluded that Congress produces excessively vague statutes
(reflecting its refusal to make meaningful decisions),3 publishes
explanatory documents that distort the majority's views' delegates
judge does not make the law and is not a public policy maker."); 144 CONG. REC. S646
(daily ed. Feb. 11, 1998) (statement of Sen. Ashcroft regarding the nomination of
Margaret M. Morrow to the District Court for the Central District of California) ("[Tihe
question is ... whether this candidate will say the legislature is the place to make the law,
and whether she will recognize that courts can only make decisions about the law."); 140
CONG. REc. 27,526 (1994) (statement of Sen. Gramm regarding the nomination of H. Lee
Sarokin to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals) ("I believe judges ought to be in the
business of interpreting laws, not making them."); 140 CONG. REc. 27,470 (1994)
(statement of Sen. Hatch regarding the nomination of H. Lee Sarokin to the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals) ("What are judges for other than to implement the laws, to abide by
them, to interpret them, not to make them."); 140 CONG. RFc. 7509 (1994) (statement of
Sen. Hatch regarding the nomination of Rosemary Barkett to the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals) ("[W]e do not need another [judge] who ignores the laws and starts to put his
or her own emotional predilections into the law instead of interpreting the laws made by
elected representatives .... "); 139 CONG. REC. 18,133 (1993) (statement of Sen. Grassley
regarding the nomination of Ruth Bader Ginsburg to the Supreme Court) ("For me,
[judicial restraint] is being very cautious to make sure you only interpret the law and do
not make the law .... "); 137 CONG. REC. 25,264 (1991) (statement of Sen. Specter
regarding the nomination of Clarence Thomas to the Supreme Court) ("Justices are
supposed to interpret the law rather than make the law."); 137 CONG. REc. 23,612 (1991)
(statement of Sen. Specter regarding the nomination of Clarence Thomas to the Supreme
Court) ("[T]he Court is supposed to interpret law, not to make law."). The statement that
judges should not make law has been something of a mantra for conservatives since the
Warren Court. See Address to the Nation Announcing Intention to Nominate Lewis F.
Powell, Jr. and William H. Rehnquist to be Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of the
United States, 1971 PUB. PAPERS 1053, 1054 (Oct. 21,1971).
2. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 623
(1990) (coining the phrase "new textualism").
3. See infra notes 36-39 and accompanying text (discussing new textualists' concerns
that judicial reliance upon legislative history in interpreting statutes encourages sloppy,
imprecise drafting).
4. See infra notes 40-47 and accompanying text (discussing new textualists' concerns
that reliance upon legislative history in statutory interpretation allows legislative
minorities to frustrate legislative majorities by manipulating legislative history). The new
textualists also argue that legislative intent is irrelevant in interpreting statues. See, e.g.,
Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) ("The
greatest defect of legislative history is its illegitimacy. We are governed by laws, not the
intentions of legislators."); In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1343-44 (7th Cir. 1989) ("Desires
become rules only after clearing procedural hurdles designed to encourage deliberation
and expose proposals (and arguments) to public view and recorded vote."). I have
addressed that argument in an earlier article. See Bernard W. Bell, Legislative History
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excessive authority to its staff,5 and allows lobbyists to exercise
inordinate influence.6 New textualists seek to reverse these disturbing
trends by disregarding legislative history altogether.7
Legislative history's defenders challenge the merits of these new
textualist claims.8 These critics of new textualism argue that the new
textualists embrace an oversimplified view regarding the causes of
statutory vagueness while ignoring many other contributing factors.,
They express skepticism about new textualist claims of pervasive
distortion of legislative history by legislative minorities.10 New
textualism's critics also dispute the argument that legislative staffers
and lobbyists hold inordinate power. They argue, moreover, that
Without Legislative Intent: The Public Justification Approach to Statutory Interpretation,
60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 passim (1999).
5. See infra notes 48-51 and accompanying text (discussing new textualists' argument
that reliance on legislative history has allowed congressional staff to establish policies that
were never chosen by the elected representatives whom they serve).
6. See infra notes 52-54 and accompanying text (discussing new textualists' argument
that judicial reliance on legislative history has increased the power of interest groups who
seek to have their policies inserted in the legislative history).
7. The general approach is outlined in Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S.
504, 527-30 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment), and reiterated in Chisom v.
Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404-05 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting). See Bradley C. Karkkainen,
"Plain Meaning". Justice Scalia's Jurisprudence of Strict Statutory Construction, 17 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 401, 406-08 (1994). New textualists argue that courts should interpret
statutes based on the ordinary meaning of the words contained in the statutory text. See
Green, 490 U.S. at 528 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). Such an analysis includes
consideration of various grammar and syntax rules. See Karkkainen, supra, at 407-08,
445-50. If such an analysis does not yield an interpretation, the court should fit the statute
into the larger context of the law. See Green, 490 U.S. at 528 (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment); Karkkainen, supra, at 408-11. For an extensive list of opinions by Justice
Scalia applying the approach described above, see Karkkainen, supra, at 441-45.
Some state judges have begun to echo the skepticism about the propriety of using
legislative history. See Hayes v. Continental Ins. Co., 872 P.2d 668, 673-74 (Ariz. 1994)
(en banc); People v. Bransford, 884 P.2d 70, 75, 80 (Cal. 1994) (in bank) (Kennard, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); Morris v. Franchise Tax Bd., 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d
577, 583 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993), review granted and opinion superseded, 861 P.2d 1107 (Cal.
1993); People v. Vaughan, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 152, 153 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993), review granted
and opinion superseded, 854 P.2d 721 (Cal. 1993) (in bank); Mozo v. State, 632 So. 2d 623,
637 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (Farmer, J., concurring); Marposs Corp. v. City of Troy, 514
N.W.2d 202, 207 n.2 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) (Taylor, J., dissenting), overruled by Bendix
Safety Restraints Group v. City of Troy, 544 N.W.2d 481 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996); Omaha
Pub. Power Dist. v. Nebraska Dep't of Revenue, 537 N.W.2d 312, 320-23 (Neb. 1995)
(Caporale, J., concurring).
8. See Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65
S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 862-64 (1992); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative
Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423, 445-46 (1988); Muriel Morisey Spence, The
Sleeping Giant: Textualism as Power Struggle, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 585,593-615 (1994).
9. See infra note 244 (noting several theorists' explanations for increased statutory
vagueness).
10. See infra notes 276-78 and accompanying text.
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even if the new textualists' claims are true, it is not clear that refusing
to consult legislative history will have any effect on staffers' and
lobbyists' influence." In short, the debate between new textualism
and its critics has focused on whether the new textualists' perceptions
of the pathologies afflicting modem legislatures are correct and
whether refusing to consider legislative history in statutory
interpretation will minimize those maladies.
This Article asks a more fundamental question: are courts the
appropriate institution to identify and remedy legislative
shortcomings? 2 I will explore whether concerns like those raised by
11. Leading scholars have critiqued this position. See Farber & Frickey, supra note 8,
at 445-46; Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes:
Toward a Fact-Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1295, 1302-04
(1990).
12. Others have suggested that new textualists exhibit disrespect toward legislative
judgments by replacing legislators' preferred legislative process with judges' notions about
the ideal process. See Statutory Interpretation and the Uses of Legislative History: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Admin. of Justice of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 7, 67 (1990) (Sup. Does. No. Y4.
J89/1:101/107) [hereinafter Statutory Interpretation and the Uses of Legislative History]
(statement of Chief Judge Patricia M. Wald of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals); Patricia
M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing Statutes in the
1988-89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 277, 306-07 (1990);
see also Statutory Interpretation and the Uses of Legislative History, supra, at 117-18
(statement of Professor Stephen F. Ross) ("[Tihe textualist argument appears to be based
on either a naive understanding of the operation of the modem legislature or a normative
view that Congress should operate in the manner described in high school civics texts.
This view ... should not be imposed on Congress by the courts . i..."); id at 143
(testimony of Professor Stephen F. Ross) ("It strikes me that the new textualists are very
dissatisfied with the way Congress is run.... I find some hypocrisy in this view from those
who are so quick to advocate separation of powers, deference to elected members, and
such concern in other areas of jurisprudence .... "); DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P.
FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 98-99 (1991) ("No
doubt, congressional staff exceed their appropriate role. What that role should be is,
however, surely the primary concern of the legislative rather than the judicial branch."
(citation omitted)); HENRY J. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 216 & n.114 (1967) (questioning
whether policing legislative history to ensure that it accurately reflects the will of the
majority is a judicial responsibility and describing the legislature's own failure to do so as
an "abdication of legislative responsibility"); James J. Brudney, Congressional
Commentary on Judicial Interpretations of Statutes: Idle Chatter or Telling Response?, 93
MICH. L. REv. 1, 45-46 (1994) (arguing that legislative history should be honored because
"considerations of deference toward Congress would seem to warrant respect for its
designated legislative processes as well" (citation omitted)); id. at 40 (noting that
"rejecting or systematically discounting legislative history is countermajoritarian, ... in
declining to consult materials that are integral to Congress's chosen lawmaking process");
George A. Costello, Average Voting Members and Other "Benign Fictions". The Relative
Reliability of Committee Reports, Floor Debates, and Other Sources of Legislative History,
1990 DUKE L.J. 39, 67 ("If Congress chooses to rely heavily on committees in selecting
and shaping legislation, why should courts deny the importance of the committee system
when called upon to give meaning to the product that emerges from that system?"
2000] 1257
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new textualists should be left for congressional resolution, free from
judicial interference. By attempting to diagnose and remedy these
problems through interpretive technique, new textualists may usurp
legislative prerogatives no less than do the "judicial activists" they
regularly excoriate for invalidating government actions on
constitutional grounds.
Part I describes the instrumentalist approach to statutory
interpretation by contrasting it with the traditional intrinsic approach
to interpreting statutes. Then, focusing on new textualism as an
instrumentalist approach, I examine the costs that embracing such an
approach entails by denigrating the principle of majority rule and
sacrificing the interests of individual litigants who invoke the courts'
authority to resolve their disputes.
Part II outlines the conundrum that new textualists face. On the
one hand, new textualism embodies a disrespect for congressional
judgments. Its assessment of the defects of the legislative process-
the production of unnecessarily vague statutes, the drafting of
misleading legislative history, and the dominant role of congressional
staff and interest groups-may be too harsh and does not reflect
Congress's assessment of itself. On the other hand, courts in general
and new textualists in particular purport to defer to congressional
judgments in a wide array of areas. Specifically, when engaging in
equal protection and due process review of statutes, when considering
direct challenges to legislative procedures, and when addressing
claims that the enactment of a statute was procedurally deficient, new
textualists and the courts accord great deference to legislative
judgments.
Part EII examines whether three traditional approaches to
constitutional jurisprudence can save the new textualists from the
tension created by their inconsistent attitudes toward legislative
judgments. Specifically, Part III explores whether original intent
theory, process theory, or underenforced constitutional norms theory
can reconcile the tension between new textualists' disregard of
legislative judgments when interpreting statutes and their embrace of
legislative judgments in other areas.
(citation omitted)); Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at
Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM.
L. REv. 2121, 2207-08 n.233 (1990) ("Justice Scalia's [new textualist] challenge might be
thought to rest on a normative view of the appropriate external constraints on Congress's
legislative process, with such constraints perhaps grounded in controversial
understandings of the structural constraints on lawmaking that the Constitution might be
understood to impose." (citation omitted)).
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Part IV explores the new textualists' major criticisms of the
contemporary legislative process. As the analysis will reveal, each of
the new textualists' claims is contestable. Perhaps just as significantly,
with respect to some of the new textualists' concerns-statutory
vagueness and legislative staff power, in particular-the federal
courts have already proven themselves unable to police the political
process.
Finally, Part V suggests a different interpretive approach that,
unlike new textualism, respects congressional judgments. This
"public justification" approach honors legislative history primarily by
binding Congress to the justification that it publicly provides for a
statute. After describing this approach, I will then apply it in the
context of two United States Supreme Court cases: the Supreme
Court's recent five-to-four decision in Department of Commerce v.
United States House of Representatives," which addressed the legality
of using census figures partially derived from sampling to apportion
representatives between states, and the classic Rector of Holy Trinity
Church v. United States,4 the leading case establishing the legitimacy
of consulting legislative history as an aid in construing federal
statutes. 5
I. INTERPRETIVE TECHNIQUE AND LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
Traditionally, legislative *interpretation has focused on an
intrinsic inquiry; such an inquiry focuses on which interpretive
method produces the most legitimate interpretation of statutes. 6
Legal theorists asked the following types of questions: Should courts
primarily act as agents of the legislature, seeking to effectuate its
intent? Should courts view statutory text as the only legitimate
source of law? Should courts acknowledge the discretion they possess
and proceed accordingly, by giving authoritative weight to neither the
statutory text nor their perception of legislative intent? Recently,
however, scholars increasingly have viewed interpretive techniques as
tools to shape the legislative process-an instrumental approach 7
13. 525 U.S. 316 (1999).
14. 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
15. See Michael C. Dorf, The Supreme Court, 1997 Term-Forewor.- The Limits of
Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 4, 15 (1998); Adrian Vermeule, Legislative
History and the Limits of Judicial Competence: The Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church,
50 STAN. L. REV. 1833,1835 (1998).
16. See, e.g., AMERICAN HERTAGE DICriONARY 946 (3d ed. 1992) (defining
"intrinsic" as "of or relating to the essential nature of a thing").
17. "Instrumental" theories justify actions in terms of their likely consequences. See,
e.g., 7 OXFORD ENGLISH DICrIONARY 1052 (2d ed. 1991).
2000] 1259
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that seeks to justify particular interpretive techniques by their
potential salutary effect on the legislative process. 8 While this
Article focuses on Justice Scalia's approach, such instrumental
approaches abound. 9
Scholars have failed to consider fully the legitimacy of grounding
proposed interpretive techniques in instrumental reasoning.
Instrumental approaches require judges to use statutory
interpretation to impose their own conception of the optimal
18. See John Ferejohn & Barry Weingast, Limitation of Statutes: Strategic Statutory
Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 565,579-82 (1992); Elizabeth Garrett, Legal Scholarship in the
Age of Legislation, TUIsA L.J. (forthcoming 2000); Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy:
The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 593,
608 (1995). In an earlier article, I noted that the prevalence of agency interpretations of
statutes and the deference courts give to those interpretations preclude these new
textualist canons of interpretation from influencing the legislative process. See Bernard
W. Bell, Using Statutory Interpretation to Improve the Legislative Process: Can It Be Done
in the Post-Chevron Era?, 13 J.L. & POL. 105, 128-32 (1997).
19. For example, Professor Sunstein has developed an elaborate set of interpretive
canons to encourage legislative deliberation. See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican
Revival, 97 YALE L.J 1539, 1581-83 (1988) [hereinafter Sunstein, Beyond the Republican
Revival]; Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV.
405, 437-41, 454-60 (1989) [hereinafter Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes]. Professor Sunstein
views deliberation as a key to effective democracy and believes that courts should
encourage deliberation by the manner in which they interpret statutes. See Sunstein,
Beyond the Republican Revival, supra, at 1549-51, 1558-64,1581-83. He seems to base his
interpretive principles both on the instrumental concerns of improving the governmental
process and on the intrinsic concern of identifying the most legitimate interpretation of
statutes within the structure of government. Thus, he might not abandon his interpretive
approach even if it had no prospect of changing legislative behavior. He suggests,
however, that the most important attribute of his approach is its prospect of improving the
manner in which government operates. See Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes, supra, at 412
("Above all, it is important to develop principles that improve the performance of modern
government....").
Professor Macey argues that courts should rely upon legislative history in
interpreting statutes because doing so will reduce interest group domination of the
legislative process. See Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation
Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 226-
27, 253-57 (1986). Macey may view his approach as premised on legitimacy; that is, all
other things being equal, the public-regarding interpretation of a statute is the most
legitimate. Macey, however, also seems to view the courts' role as encouraging the
passage of public-regarding laws and discouraging the enactment of rent-seeking laws. See
id. He reasons that interest groups will ordinarily pursue legislation for selfish, private-
regarding reasons that they do not wish to expose publicly, see id. at 232-33, and that the
judiciary's practice of giving credence to statutes' public-regarding facades makes enacting
private-regarding legislation more difficult, see id. at 238-40. If, however, one views
statutory text as the only legitimate source of legislative commands, adopting Macey's
theory would require adoption of interpretations of questionable legitimacy in the belief
that, over time, Macey's approach would diminish interest group dominance. Later in this
Article I present my own public justification approach, which resembles Macey's. See
infra notes 325-64 and accompanying text. My approach, however, is grounded in an
intrinsic, rather than an instrumental, logic.
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legislative process on legislatures? Yet, the courts eloquently and
frequently assert a lack of both authority and competence to structure
the legislative process.' Such assertions call into question
instrumental approaches to statutory interpretation.
Jurists who adopt new textualism purely for instrumental reasons
impose severe societal costs by frustrating majority rule and
denigrating the traditional role of courts in dispute resolution. Every
time judges refuse to adhere to congressional desires because of
imprecise statutory language or because Congress placed those
desires in legislative history rather than in statutory text, judges
denigrate majority rule. For judges who prize majority rule,2
20. Scholars rarely acknowledge this problem, although, on occasion they do. See
supra note 12.
21. In the area of interpretive methodology, judicial and legislative responsibilities
converge. See Bernard W. Bell, Metademocratic Interpretation and Separation of Powers,
2 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. PoL'Y 1, 27-28 (1999). The judiciary's role as the authoritative
expounder of law, see, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 146 (1803),
implicitly includes the prerogative of determining the methodology used in interpreting
statutes-at least in the absence of a statute purporting to specify the appropriate
interpretive methodology, see, e.g., United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146
(1871). Moreover, courts can hardly resolve questions of interpretive methodology
without at least considering the potential impact such methodologies have upon the
legislative process. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 319-20 (1986). Finally,
legislative practice may sometimes adversely affect the courts. The rampant unreliability
of congressional documents arguably could lead courts to illegitimate interpretations so
that courts would no longer be agents of a majority but, instead, agents of the cleverest
distorter of legislative documents. Alternatively, an unreliable record could require courts
to fill in statutory gaps that they are unsuited to fill. See infra notes 266, 269-70 and
accompanying text.
Nevertheless, legislatures also must have authority to speak to interpretive
methodologies. Legislatures cannot establish statutory rights and obligations if they
cannot exert at least some control over the methodology used to construe those statutes.
See Bell, supra, at 30-31. Perhaps just as importantly, each branch of government must
retain some autonomy, including the power to structure its own procedures. See id. at 31-
33. Congress's legitimate institutional autonomy surely includes deciding matters such as
the need to establish committees to review legislation prior to consideration by the House
or the Senate, the degree of influence any such committees will enjoy, staffing needs and
the influence any staff will possess, and the need for controls to ensure that congressional
documents accurately reflect the majority's views. Congress can hardly remain
independent if another branch of government prescribes its procedures.
The scope of judicial discretion to establish interpretive methodology despite
contrary congressional action largely has been left unexplored, as legislatures tend not to
prescribe interpretive methodology. See Alan R. Romero, Note, Interpretive Directions in
Statutes, 31 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 211, 219 n.38 (1994).
While the above discussion focuses on judicial authority, instrumentalist theories
also raise questions of judicial competence, because the judiciary arguably lacks the
competence to address questions of legislative procedure. See infra notes 157-59 and
accompanying text.
22- See Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49 STAN. L. REV. 181,
243-44,249 (1997).
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determining how a majority of the enacting legislature would have
decided the issue had it arisen is central to proper interpretation. To
them, the text of a statute has little inherent importance-its
importance stems from its reflection of the policy of the enacting
legislative majority. When the text of the statute does not reflect
majority desires, either because of imprecision in the use of language
or the legislature's failure to consider fully the nuances of problems,
citizens are governed not by the policies reflecting majority views but
by random policies that result from the legislature's poor
draftsmanship. In effect, focusing on statutory text despite
convincing evidence that the statute's words inadvertently fail to
reflect the majority's decision exalts form over substance by giving
precedence to Congress's form of expression rather than the ideas it
sought to convey.23
By privileging text, the publicly expressed or otherwise-clear
majority views regarding citizens' rights and responsibilities may be
violated.24 Eventually, the principle desired by the majority may be
established, and Congress may even learn to draft statutes more
precisely. In the meantime, however, costs are imposed upon
individual litigants seeking resolution of their disputes. While the
courts interpret statutes strategically to encourage greater
congressional responsibility, these individual litigants will suffer
unjustly or benefit undeservedly because of poor congressional
drafting. In a sense, individual litigants become pawns in the judicial
effort to force legislative precision, to increase legislative
deliberation, or to decrease dependence upon legislative staff. 5
23. Cf. In re Erickson, 815 F.2d 1090, 1092-93 (7th Cir. 1987). In Erickson, Judge
Easterbrook had to construe the meaning of the word "haybine," a type of farm
equipment that, through technological advancement, had become disassociated from
legislators' understanding of the word when they placed it in the statute. See id. at 1092.
Judge Easterbrook asserted that a statutory word of description, such as "haybine," does
not designate a particular item, but rather a class of items that has some important
characteristic, and that the usage of the word in everyday language cannot be
determinative when language usage is changing. See icL at 1092-93. Using the fanciful
example of an item that comes to be known as a "stereolounger," a piece of furniture on
which to recline which also plays music, Judge Easterbrook argued that a "stereolounger"
may nevertheless be a "chair" for purposes of a statute dealing with chairs. See id.
24. See Steven D. Smith, Law Without Mind, 88 MICH. L. REV. 104, 111-13, 114-15,
117-18 (1989).
25. Judge Ralph K. Winter's dissent in United States v. University Hospital, 729 F.2d
144, 161-63 (2d Cir. 1984) (Winter, J., dissenting), provides an example of this potential
problem. In that case, the Second Circuit considered whether the Rehabilitation Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 701-794 (1994), which prohibits federally funded programs from discriminating
against the handicapped, precludes a federally funded hospital from foregoing surgery to
correct one of two severe birth defects afflicting an infant. See University Hosp., 729 F.2d
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Injuries to litigants who rely on impartial justice to resolve their
disputes are a significant price to pay for a judge's instrumentalism,2 6
particularly if the interpretive strategies used to force change are
likely to prove ineffectiveY
For example, the Supreme Court's insistence upon textual clarity
deprived many litigants of the benefits of policies that congressional
majorities sought to establish by enacting the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA).? The Supreme Court twice
construed the ADEA provision that prohibited employee benefit
plans from requiring mandatory retirement as a means of avoiding
the ADEA.2 9 After each decision, Congress legislatively reversed the
result of the cases by amending the statutory text to include policies
at 146. The congressional majority that enacted the Rehabilitation Act probably did not
envision that their admittedly categorical language would override parental and medical
judgments about the medical treatment to be provided infants suffering from multiple,
severe birth defects. See id- at 157. As the majority noted, Congress did not discuss the
treatment of infants suffering from birth defects when it enacted the statute. See i&2 at 157;
see also American Academy of Pediatrics v. Heckler, 561 F. Supp. 395, 401 (D.D.C. 1983)
("[N]o congressional committee or member of the House or Senate ever even suggested
that [the Rehabilitation Act] would be used to monitor medical treatment of defective
newborn infants or establish standards for preserving a particular quality of life.").
Moreover, Congress and the President previously had expressed concern about interfering
in medical decisionmaking in other contexts. See University Hosp., 729 F.2d at 157, 160.
In addition, requiring operations on infants would have displaced state police power over
such matters, which the court thought Congress likely would not have done without
expressing such an intent explicitly. See id. at 160.
In his dissent, Judge Winter argued that the court should nevertheless construe
the Rehabilitation Act as it would construe Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000d (1994), on which the Rehabilitation Act's categorical language was based, and
require the defendant hospital to treat a child with spina bifida and microcephaly despite
the contrary judgment of the parents and the hospital. See University Hosp., 729 F.2d at
163 (Winter J., dissenting). Such a ruling, he explained, would encourage Congress to
consider seriously all aspects of proposed statutes without expecting courts to save them
from the folly of passing poorly conceived symbolic legislation. See id (Winter, J.,
dissenting). Granted, because Judge Winter's primary argument was that his textualist
approach produced the most legitimate interpretation of the statute, see id. at 161-63
(Winter, J., dissenting), instrumentalist reasoning assumed only a secondary role in his
opinion. Enough such rulings might lead Congress to become more deliberative, but only
at the expense of forcing parents to submit their children to operations that, in the parents'
judgment, will provide little benefit.
26. See Bell, supra note 21, at 8-9.
27. As noted earlier, given judicial deference to agency construction of statutes,
instrumentalist theories of statutory interpretation may accomplish little. See supra note
18; see also infra note 265 (outlining several reasons to doubt that judicial endorsement of
new textualism will produce more precise legislative drafting).
28. Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 621-634
(West 1999 & Supp. 1999)).
29. See Public Employees Retirement Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 168 (1989); United
Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192,203 (1977).
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Congress had previously expressed only in legislative history.30
Unsuccessful plaintiffs, whose cases were decided before Congress
could convert the legislative history into statutory text, suffered. 31
The plaintiffs could not bring actions that a congressional majority
thought it had authorized. While this result is just from an
intrinsically based, new textualist perspective, this series of judicial
decisions and legislative reversals assumes disturbing proportions for
those who view intent as the touchstone of interpretation. Moreover,
the disturbing nature of the harm to the individuals cannot be
justified by the conviction that the courts' interpretive approach will
eventually lead to better legislation for all? 2
In short, as an instrumental technique, new textualism involves
significant sacrifices. It denigrates majority rule and subordinates the
responsibilities courts owe individual litigants to further jurists'
strategic efforts to improve the legislative process. Even if these costs
are arguably justifiable, new textualism embodies a skepticism of
legislative judgments that, in other contexts, courts eschew and new
textualists disclaim.33
II. THE NEW TEXTUALIST CONUNDRUM
Justice Scalia and the new textualists' assault on the use of
legislative history highlights the tension between instrumentalist
interpretive techniques and the deference that courts customarily
accord legislatures. The tension is all the more dramatic because
Justice Scalia ordinarily urges great judicial deference to legislative
judgments34
A. New Textualist Arguments
In addition to arguing that only statutory text should create legal
30. See Brudney, supra note 12, at 15-16.
31. Professor Brudney notes the cost imposed upon Congress by the Court's disregard
of the congressional majority's intent, as expressed in the legislative history. See id. at 16-
26.
32. The phenomenon of a series of judicial decisions followed by statutory
amendments to correct misinterpretations has been addressed by scholars. See, e.g.,
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 284-85 (1994);
John Copeland Nagle, Waiving Sovereign Immunity in an Age of Clear Statement Rules,
1995 WIS. L. REV. 771, 819-35 (1995) [hereinafter Nagle, Waiving Sovereign Immunity];
see also John Copeland Nagle, Corrections Day, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1274 n.25 (1996)
[hereinafter Nagle, Corrections Day] (cataloging the academic literature regarding
congressional responses to apparent judicial mistakes in statutory interpretation).
33. See infra notes 63-103 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 69, 87-103 and accompanying text.
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obligations and that legislative history does not provide a legitimate
source of legal obligations,35  new textualists assert four
instrumentalist arguments for disregarding legislative history. First,
new textualists argue that reliance upon legislative history
discourages legislatures from enacting clear, easily understood
statutes 6.3  Because legislators can use legislative history to address
ambiguities in statutory text, they lack the incentive to eliminate
those ambiguities?7 Accordingly, judicial recognition of legislative
history encourages sloppy drafting. The resulting statutory vagueness
both increases the relevant audience's difficulty in ascertaining the
law and allows legislatures to delegate to the judiciary the task of
resolving difficult policy issues that elected officials should resolve? 8
Indeed, new textualists explicitly acknowledge their desire to compel
more precise congressional drafting.3 9
35. See Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment); Center for Auto Safety v. Peck, 751 F.2d 1336, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1985). See
generally Bell, supra note 4, at 48-59 (describing the assumptions underlying new
textualism).
36. See, e.g., In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1342-43 (7th Cir. 1989) (stating that
legislative history is a "crutch" that allows legislatures to enact imprecise statutes);
Interbranch Relations: Hearings Before the Joint Comm. on the Organization of Congress,
103d Cong. 85 (1993) (Sup. Does. No. Y4.3:OR3/IN8) [hereinafter Interbranch Relations]
(statement of Judge Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals) (decrying the
legislative practice of "purposely leav[ing] ... statutory language vague, and then tak[ing]
every opportunity to salt the legislative record with hints, clues, nudges, and shoves all
intended to influence later judicial interpretations of the statute"); Eskridge, supra note 2,
at 677 (summarizing and criticizing Justice Scalia's view that strictly applied textualism will
lead to clearer statutes); Michael Herz, Judicial Textualism Meets Congressional
Micromanagement A Potential Collision in Clean Air Act Interpretation, 16 HARv.
ENVTL. L. REV. 175,204 (1992) ("One often-cited goal of textualism is to induce Congress
to legislate with great care and precision." (citation omitted)); William D. Popkin, An
"Internal" Critique of Justice Scalia's Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 76 MINN. L. REV.
1133, 1143, 1149 (1992) (discussing how Justice Scalia's technique may coerce legislatures
into more careful drafting); Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a "They," Not an "It":
Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 239, 253 (1992) (arguing that
rigorous judicial application of textualism will probably lead legislators to enact "plainer
and more meaningful" statutes); Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes, supra note 19, at 457
("Clear-statement principles force Congress expressly to deliberate on an issue and
unambiguously to set forth its will...."); Note, Why Learned Hand Would Never Consult
Legislative History Today, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1005, 1022 (1992) ("If Congress is told that
it no longer can communicate through legislative history, it will have an incentive to be
more thorough and precise in the statutory text.").
37. See W. David SIawson, Legislative History and the Need to Bring Statutory
Interpretation Under the Rule of Law, 44 STAN. L. REv. 383,393, 397 (1992) (describing an
instance in which legislative history was inserted in a House debate in lieu of amending the
text of a statute).
38. See infra note 269-72 and accompanying text.
39. For instance, the Office of Legal Policy has suggested that the new textualist
approach "would likely, if adopted, encourage Congress to place a greater emphasis on
2000] 1265
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Second, new textualists have expressed concern about the
unreliability of legislative history as an expression of Congress's
actual desires, noting that legislative minorities can manipulate
legislative history in ways that frustrate the majority will.4" New
textualists posit that members concentrate on the text of statutes and
that legislative majorities express their policy preferences in that
text.' In contrast, legislators never formally vote to approve
legislative history, which assumes a lower profile than text. By
draftsmanship and to specify more carefully in the statute the rules it wishes the executive
and the judiciary to follow." OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT
TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, USING AND MISUSING LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: A RE-
EVALUATION OF THE STATUS OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION v (1989); see also id. at 63-64 ("By forcing Congress to pay greater
attention to draftsmanship, a commitment to the plain meaning rule results in more
carefully drawn legislation.").
40. See Conroy, 507 U.S. at 521 n.3 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing to a
"supposed floor statement [which was] shown by internal evidence never to have been
delivered"); Federal Election Comm'n v. Rose, 806 F.2d 1081, 1090 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
("[The D.C. Circuit] has condemned the well-recognized phenomenon of deliberate
manipulation of legislative history at the committee level to achieve what likely cannot be
won before Congress as a whole." (citation omitted)); OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, supra
note 39, at 53-55 (critiquing judicial reliance on legislative history because it encourages
legislators to manipulate the legislative history); Reed Dickerson, Statutory Interpretation:
Dipping into Legislative History, 11 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1125, 1132 (1983) ("Reliability is
further undermined by the widespread practice, at least in Congress, of allowing legislators
to amend or supplement their remarks in the published version of the Congressional
Record."); Earl M. Maltz, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Power: The Case for a
Modified Intentionalist Approach, 63 TULANE L. REV. 1, 24-28 (1988) (asserting that
unreliability concerns provoked by the use of legislative history suggests that care should
be taken with the use of those materials); Zeppos, supra note 11, at 1310, 1347 (describing
the new textualist position); see also William T. Mayton, Law Among the Pleonasms: The
Futility and Aconstitutionality of Legislative History in Statutory Interpretation, 41 EMORY
LJ. 113, 151-52, 153-54 (1992) ("Special interest litigation is today commonly
acknowledged as a palpable vice of the [legislative history] system."); Spence, supra note
8, at 591-93 ("According to public choice theory, legislation is chiefly the product of deals
made by groups seeking to advance their own economic interests."); Kenneth W. Starr,
Observations About the Use of Legislative History, 1987 DUKE L.J. 371, 376-77
("[T]echnocrats, lobbyists, and attorneys have created a virtual cottage industry in
fashioning legislative history so that Congress will appear to embrace their particular
views in a given statute.").
41. The argument's factual predicate is questionable. First, members and their staffs
may devote more attention to some elements of the legislative history, such as committee
reports or the statements of floor managers, than they do to the statutory text. See Bell,
supra note 21, at 53 & n.195. Second, a legislative majority can convincingly indicate its
disapproval of an explanation in a report despite the absence of a formal ability to amend
the report. See id. The new textualist position more convincingly rests on a normative
proposition that legislators should pay attention to the statutory text, and only the
statutory text, regardless of whether they actually do so. See id. at 52-58. Accordingly,
members' failure to focus on the text of the statute is a failure of the members to fulfill
their responsibilities. I have discussed extensively the reasons for rejecting such a
normative proposition in an earlier piece. See id. at 53 & n.195.
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relying on legislative history, courts give effect to policies that were
not formally considered by all legislators and may even not have
come to the attention of many legislators.
Committee reports provide an illuminating example. The full
membership of the legislative chamber can neither vote on nor amend
a committee report during consideration of a bi1 42-indeed, even the
standing committee that reports the bill does not vote on the report.43
Typically, members do not read committee reports in detail.44 Thus,
clever legislators-or, even worse, clever staff members or lobbyists-
can insert their own policy prescriptions in committee reports, even if
these policies would never garner support from a majority of
legislators.
Likewise, new textualists disdain congressional floor statements.
New textualists note that few legislators even hear floor statements
because few of them attend floor debates4  Moreover, the
Congressional Record, the official record of floor debates, can be
manipulated. Members can revise their remarks to include
statements that they never made and that other members would not
42. See Wallace v. Christensen, 802 F.2d 1539, 1559-60 (9th Cir. 1986) (Kozinski, J.,
concurring in the judgment); 128 CONG. REC. 16,918 (1982) (statement of Sen.
Armstrong); CHARLES TIEFER, CONGRESSIONAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: A
REFERENCE, RESEARCH, AND LEGISLATIVE GUIDE 182 (1989); see also Jerrold Zwirn,
Congressional Committee Reports, 7A GOV'T PUBLICATIONS REv. 319, 326 (1980)
("[Although] reports are formal statements whose importance often rivals the bills they
accompany, the fact that they consist of argument and explanation and do not have the
force of law means that they are not themselves acted upon by the parent body during
floor consideration of a bill.").
43. See Hirschey v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 777 F.2d 1, 7-8 & n.1 (D.C.
Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J., concurring); TIEFER, supra note 42, at 181-82.
44. See Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 620 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98
(1989) (Scalia, J., concurring); Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law
System" The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and
Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 32, 33
(Amy Gutmann ed., 1997); see also Omaha Pub. Power Dist. v. Nebraska Dep't of
Revenue, 537 N.W.2d 312, 321 (Neb. 1995) (Caporale, J., concurring) (discussing Justicd
Scalia's views as expressed in Mortier).
45. See Friedrich v. City of Chicago, 888 F.2d 511, 517 (7th Cir. 1989) ("Floor debates
are not a reliable guide to the meaning of statutes. They are poorly attended and
members of Congress can make additions to the Congressional Record after debate
without notice to their colleagues."), judgement vacated and remanded, 499 U.S. 933
(1991); Omaha Pub. Power Dist., 537 N.W.2d at 321 (Caporale, J., concurring) (arguing
that remarks made during floor debate are unreliable indices of majority intent because
few members attend floor debates); Scalia, supra note 44, at 32 (arguing that if "legislative
intent" exists, it cannot be discerned by examining the records of legislative debates
because "the floor is rarely crowded for a debate").
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have heard even if they had attended the floor debate.46 In short,
legislative history provides a vehicle that legislative minorities can use
to create law without risking defeat by majority vote in the House or
the Senate or veto by the President."
Third, the interpretive use of legislative history increases the
power of congressional staff by allowing staff to set policies in
documents that legislators never review.48  Legislative history,
particularly committee reports-the most prized legislative
history49-are often drafted by staff with little involvement by
members0 Justice Scalia has warned that reliance on committee
46. See Friedrich, 888 F.2d at 517; TIEFER, supra note 42, at 235-36; James Nathan
Miller, Congress's License to Lie, READER'S DIG., Feb. 1983, at 72,72-73.
47. See In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340, 1342-43 (7th Cir. 1989); Federal Election
Comm'n v. Rose, 806 F.2d 1081, 1090 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Wallace v. Christensen, 802 F.2d
1539, 1559-60 (9th Cir. 1986) (Kozinski, J., concurring in the judgment); National Small
Shipments Traffic Conference, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 618 F.2d 819, 828 (D.C. Cir.
1980); Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge Is Not the Primary Official with Responsibility to
Read Agency Interpretation and the Problem of Legislative History, 66 CHI.-KENT L.
REv. 321, 341-42 & n.51 (1990); Zeppos, supra note 11, at 1302-04.
48. See Blanchard, 489 U.S. at 98-99 (Scalia, J., concurring); Sinclair, 870 F.2d at
1342-43; Hirschey, 777 F.2d at 7 (Scalia, J., concurring); Breyer, supra note 8, at 862-64;
see also Roger H. Davidson, What Judges Ought to Know About Lawmaking in Congress,
in JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS: TOWARD INSTITUTIONAL COMITY 90, 101 (Robert A.
Katzmann ed., 1988) [hereinafter JUDGES AND LEGISLATORS] (commenting on the
difficulty of ascertaining when legislative documents "reflect the considered judgment of
the legislators, and to what extent they embody the objectives of unelected staff
members"); id. at 102 ("Staff influence is at its peak in low-visibility products-technical
language, provisions of lengthy omnibus bills, committee reports, correspondence, and
verbal communications with executive agencies.").
Some anecdotal evidence supports this claim. See ROBERT A. KATZMANN,
INSTITUTIONAL DISABILITY: THE SAGA OF TRANSPORTATION POLICY FOR THE
DISABLED 50-54 (1986) (describing how staff-drafted report language went far beyond
the provisions of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, creating confusion in the courts and
administrative process); Robert A. Katzmann, The Underlying Concerns, in JUDGES AND
LEGISLATORS, supra, 7, 11 & n.11 (describing a situation in which Senator Moynihan
asserted that staff placed a comment in a footnote of a conference committee report that
was not discussed by members of Congress).
49. See Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 186 (1969); see also JAMES WILLARD HURST,
DEALING WITH STATUTES 42 (1982) ("Most influential are the reports of the legislative
committees that considered the bill that became the statute. It is an appropriate emphasis,
because the committee is normally the workplace in which members have hammered out
the particular content of the measure." (citation omitted)).
50. In Hirschey v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 777 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir,
1985), then-Judge Scalia popularized a colloquy between two Senators that exemplified
the lack of committee-member involvement in the preparation and review of committee
reports. See id. at 7-8 n.1 (Scalia, J., concurring). In part, the discussion proceeded as
follows:
Mr. ARMSTRONG. Mr. President, will the Senator tell me whether or not
he wrote the committee report?
Mr. DOLE. Did I write the committee report?
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reports is "converting a system of judicial construction into a system
of committee-staff prescription."51 In contrast, if legislative history
were disregarded, policies could gain authoritative recognition only if
set forth in legislation voted on by members of Congress and signed
by the President.
Fourth, courts' use of legislative history allows lobbyists to
smuggle their policies into the law 2 Lobbyists attempt to persuade
staff members to place language favorable to their positions in
committee reports5 3 Because members do not involve themselves in
the drafting of committee reports, they do not review these interest
Mr. ARMSTRONG. Yes.
Mr. DOLE. No; the Senator from Kansas did not write the committee report.
Mr. ARMSTRONG. Did any Senator write the committee report?
Mr. DOLE. I have to check.
Mr. ARMSTRONG. Does the Senator know of any Senator who wrote the
committee report?
Mr. DOLE. I might be able to identify one, but I would have to search. I was
here all during the time it was written, I might say, and worked carefully with the
staff as they worked....
Mr. ARMSTRONG. Mr. President, has the Senator from Kansas, the
chairman of the Finance Committee, read the committee report in its entirety?
Mr. DOLE. I am working on it. It is not a bestseller, but I am working on it.
Mr. ARMSTRONG. Mr. President, did members of the Finance Committee
vote on the committee report?
Mr. DOLE. No.
Id. (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting 128 CONG. REc. 16,918 (1982)).
51. Id at 7-8 (Scalia, J., concurring).
52. See Wallace, 802 F.2d at 1559-60 (Kozinski, J., concurring in the judgment)
(noting that committee reports "are usually written by staff or lobbyists"); National Small
Shipments Traffic Conference, Inc., 618 F.2d at 828 (noting that interest groups that fail to
persuade a majority of Congress can now get language inserted into the legislative history
in an attempt to persuade the courts of their view); ABNER MIKVA & PATri B. SARIS,
THE AMERICAN CONGRESS: THE FIRST BRANCH 216 (1983) ("Staff members use the
language in a [committee] report as a significant bargaining tool. An interest group is
sometimes content to get its language into the report, knowing that somewhere down the
line it can point to the language in a court challenge . .. ."); TIEFER, supra note 42, at 182
(reporting lobbyists' efforts to get staff members to place favorable language in committee
reports); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 327 (1990) ("Interest groups often have their legislative
allies pack committee reports and stage planned colloquies to suggest a meaning for the
statute that they cannot place in the [actual] statutory language." (citation omitted));
Note, supra note 36, at 1005 ("Justice Scalia eschews legislative history for several reasons,
including his doubt about the coherence of the concept of congressional will and his
concern that committee staff members and lobbyists often write these histories." (citations
omitted)).
53. See Robert A. Katzmann, Summary of Proceedings, in JUDGES AND
LEGISLATORS, supra note 48, at 162, 174 (reporting a statement by Michael Remington,
chief counsel for the Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of
Justice of the House Committee on the Judiciary, that "Washington lawyers ... 'spend a
lot of time drafting report language... and trying to plant it' ").
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group policies. Thus, by recognizing committee reports as
authoritative, judges allow interest groups and their lobbyists to
secure the "enactment" of policies that could not garner a majority if
openly debated.54
With respect to the issues outlined above-the vagueness of
statutes, the reliability of congressional documents, and the role of
staff and interest groups-the new textualists appear willing to
impose their own judgments upon legislatures. Significantly, and
overlooked by the new textualists, Congress has not reached the same
conclusions as the new textualists on such issues; in fact, members of
Congress appear to support the continued use of legislative history in
interpreting statutes.' Members of Congress sometimes view
legislative history as a helpful tool in crafting legislation.-6 Moreover,
nothing prevents legislators from addressing either the authority of
legislative history or the manner in which it is compiled, yet, at most,
Congress has made modest changes regarding legislative history.
Despite the vocal statements of new textualist academics and
jurists, members of Congress do not seem to have concluded that the
use of legislative history is problematic. To the contrary, while there
have been some changes in the compilation of Congressional Record57
and a few proposals regarding committee reports," legislative history
has hardly been the central battleground of internal or public
pressure for congressional reform. 9 Congress could address the new
54. These last three points apply to committee reports more than to other valued
legislative history, such as floor manager statements or sponsor statements.
55. Congress has embraced the use of imprecise statutes supplemented by legislative
history; and it frequently enacts legislation in just such a manner. Congress also has
established the procedures for compiling committee reports and the Congressional Record
and seemingly has determined that staff and interest groups do not wield excessive
power-or at least such influence does not warrant changing the significance accorded to
or the manner of compiling legislative history. See, e.g., infra notes 277-83 and
accompanying text.
56. See, e.g., Orrin Hatch, Legislative History: Tool of Construction or Destruction, 11
HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 43, 47 (1988).
57. See infra notes 277-83 and accompanying text.
58. See Statutory Interpretation and the Uses of Legislative History, supra note 12, at
119-21 (statement of Stephen Ross) (proposing that committee members sign committee
reports); id. at 90 (statement of William N. Eskridge, Jr.) (proposing that committees be
required to vote on committee reports as well as the text of statutes).
59. See, e.g., Noman J. Ornstein & Amy L. Schenkenberg, Congress Bashing:
External Pressures for Reform in the 1990s, in JAMES A. THURBER & ROGER H.
DAVIDSON, REMAKING CONGRESS: CHANGE AND STABILITY IN THE 1990s, at 116, 116
(1995). One new textualist concern that has captured the attention of the public, the
media, and some members of Congress is the influence of interest groups in the political
process. Yet reform efforts to address even that concern have not focused on the
influence of special interests in the process of compiling legislative history. See, e.g.,
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textualist concerns about legislative history if it perceived them to be
a problem, yet Congress has not done so.6° Instead, legislators appear
to support the continued use of legislative history in interpreting
statutes.61 New textualists, however, seek to impose their own
judgment about the proper role of legislative history in statutory
interpretation,62 even though their judgment may at times conflict
with the views of legislators.
B. The Conundrum
The new textualist willingness to review legislative judgments
appears to conflict with the deference that the courts in general, and
the new textualists in particular, accord legislative judgments in a
wide variety of contexts. When addressing due process and equal
protection challenges to substantive legislation, federal and state
courts often exhibit great deference to legislative judgments. When
litigants challenge congressional procedures, federal courts show
great deference to legislative judgment, dismissing most such cases
without even considering the challenge's merits. When litigants
challenge certification by the presiding officers of the House and the
Candice J. Nelson, Campaign Finance Reform, in THURBER & DAVIDSON, supra, at 145,
145-48.
60. Congress could abolish committee reports or specify that they no longer be relied
upon. Indeed, Congress has done so in at least one instance. See 5 U.S.C. § 801(g) (1994)
(providing that courts may not draw any inference from Congress's refusal to veto a
statute under a new legislative veto law).
61. See, e.g., Statutory Interpretation and the Uses of Legislative History, supra note 12,
at 2 (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier); id. at 2-3, 65 (statements of Rep. Moorhead);
Hatch, supra note 56, at 43; Katzmann, supra note 53, at 171 (reprinting a statement by
Judge Mikva); Abner J. Mikva, Reading and Interpreting Statutes, 48 U. Prrr. L. Rav. 627,
631,633-34 (1987).
Even Justice Scalia moderated his views on the issue during his Senate
confirmation hearings. See Nomination of Judge Antonin Scalia: Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 65-68 (1986) (Sup. Docs. No.
Y4.J89/2:S.hrg.99-1064) (conversation between Sen. Grassley and then-Judge Scalia); see
also id. at 74-75 (colloquy between Sen. Heflin and then-Judge Scalia) (discussing then-
Judge Scalia's statements that courts should not accord great weight to committee reports
when interpreting statutes); id. at 105-07 (conversation between Sen. Mathias and then-
Judge Scalia) (discussing then-Judge Scalia's position that he will not "utterly ignore" or
categorically refuse to refer to legislative history as a member of the Supreme Court).
Some states have, by statute, authorized courts to refer to legislative history in
interpreting statutes. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2-4-203(1) (West 1999); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 4.6.3 (West 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 645.16 (West 1947); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 1, § 1921(c) (West 1995); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 311.023(3) (West 1998).
62. New textualists may disclaim any desire to tell Congress how to legislate. See, e.g.,
Interbranch Relations, supra note 36, at 95 (testimony of Judge Alex Kozinski of the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals) (denying the charge that new textualists are "somehow ...
telling Congress how to legislate").
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Senate that bills have been adopted in accordance with governing
procedures, the courts do not permit such challengers to proffer
supporting evidence. Each of these doctrines offers a striking
contrast to new textualism's dismissal of congressional judgments.
When a citizen challenges the constitutionality of a statute, the
courts presume that the statute can pass constitutional muster.3
Unless a statute impairs a fundamental interest, such as freedom of
speech, or employs a suspect classification, such as race,64 courts will
uphold any statute that has a rational basis. The requirement that
government action have a rational basis is not a demanding one, and
under it the political branches enjoy a great deal of deference. A
court will hold that a statute has a rational basis if there is any
reasonably conceivable justification for the statute.65 In effect, courts
63. See, e.g., Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993); Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub.
Schs., 487 U.S. 450, 461-62 (1988); New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487
U.S. 1, 17 (1988).
64. When a statute impairs the exercise of fundamental rights or employs suspect
classifications, the Court does not presume the constitutionality of the statute and engages
in more exacting scrutiny. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 357
(1978) (plurality); Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1970);
HURST, supra note 49, at 99-102; LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW §§ 16-6 to -7 (2d ed. 1988). In particular, the Court ordinarily will not uphold such a
statute unless it meets the test for strict scrutiny-that it is narrowly tailored to further a
compelling state interest. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200,235 (1995)
(holding that racial classifications are constitutional only if they "serve a compelling
governmental interest, and [are] narrowly tailored to further that interest"); Bakke, 438
U.S. at 357 (plurality) (stating that under strict scrutiny a governmental action can be
upheld "only if it furthers a compelling government purpose and, even then, only if no less
restrictive alternative is available"); see also JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.3, at 602 (5th ed. 1995) (stating that a statute must be
necessary or narrowly tailored to further a compelling interest to survive strict scrutiny).
The court also engages in intermediate scrutiny, which is more rigorous than that
under the "rational basis" test, but less rigorous than that under strict scrutiny. See TRIBE,
supra, § 16-33, at 1610; Kathleen M. Sullivan, Post-Liberal Judging: The Roles of
Categorization and Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L. REv. 293,297-301 (1992).
65. See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 120 S. Ct. 631, 646 (2000); Central State
Univ. v. American Ass'n of Univ. Professors, 526 U.S. 124, 127-28 (1999) (per curiam);
Heller, 509 U.S. at 320; FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313-14 (1993).
The Court will even uphold a statute on the basis of hypothetical reasoning not thought of
by the legislature or different from that indicated in the legislative history. See McGowan
v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961); H.R. REP. NO. 103-613, vol. 2, at 170 (1993) (Sup.
Docs. No. Y1.1/8:103-613/vol.2) (noting that many times the effect of the Court's
deference in judicial review of statutes "leads the Court to sustain a statute on a basis of
legitimacy that was not at all what underlay congressional action"); TRIBE, supra note 64,
§ 8-7, at 582; id. § 17-2, at 1681; Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term-
Foreword In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer
Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 21, 33, 47 (1972). However, sometimes the Court
is more stringent. See TRIBE, supra note 64, § 17-3, at 1684; Gunther, supra, at 33.
The rational basis test rarely results in the invalidation of statutes. See TRIBE,
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leave Congress free to resolve issues on which reasonable people can
disagree. 6  Such deference minimizes the counter-majoritarian
difficulty. 67  Thus, when deferring to legislative judgments, the
Supreme Court explains that it cannot engage in more aggressive
judicial review without assuming the role of a "superlegislature" or
"Council of Revision" that merely substitutes its own value
judgments for the legislature's.1 In particular, Justice Scalia often
berates his colleagues for failing to accord appropriate deference to
the political branches of government when considering claims that
governmental actions violate the individual rights clauses of the
Constitution.69 Indeed, in these substantive constitutional challenges,
supra note 64, § 16-3, at 1443. The test's lack of rigor can be attributed to a concern that
the courts are not the appropriate institution to determine the proper goals of
government. See Midnight Sessions, Ltd. v. City of Philadelphia, 945 F.2d 667, 682-83 (3d
Cir. 1991); TRIBE, supra note 64, § 8-7, at 582-84; id. § 16-2, at 1440; MARK TUSHNET,
TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 60-61 (1999); Hans A. Linde,
Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197, 207-22 (1976); Lawrence Gene Sager,
Insular Majorities Unabated: Warth v. Seldin and City of Eastlake v. Forest City
Enterprises, Inc., 91 HARv. L. REV. 1373, 1411-12 (1978).
66. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144,154 (1938).
67. For classic statements of the countermajoritarian difficulty, see ALEXANDER M.
BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF
POLITICS 16-23 (Yale Univ. Press 2d ed. 1986); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 7-9, 43-72 (1980); TRIBE, supra note 64,
§ 1-7, at 10-12. For a more recent statement, see JOHN ARTHUR, WORDS THAT BIND:
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE GROUNDS OF MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 48
(1995). One intellectual historian has noted that addressing the countermajoritarian
difficulty has taken a great deal of the attention of many leading constitutional law
scholars. See LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 6, 37-
38,59,232 (1996).
68. See Heller, 509 U.S. at 319 (proclaiming that the Supreme Court is not a
superlegislature); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 731 (1963) (same); Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952) (same). See generally United States v.
Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 188-89 & n.9 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring) (observing that
allowing "[u]nrestrained standing in federal taxpayer or citizen suits would create a
remarkably illogical system of judicial supervision of the coordinate branches of the
Federal Government" that would be worse than the proposal for a "Council of Revision"
rejected by the Constitutional Convention).
69. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 299-301 (1990) (Scalia,
J., concurring) (arguing that there is no constitutional right to die); Burnham v. Superior
Court, 495 U.S. 604, 622-28 (1990) (plurality) (discussing the limits of procedural due
process); Employment Div., Or. Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890
(1990) (resolving a free exercise claim); Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S.
490, 532-37 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(criticizing the Court's abortion jurisprudence); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 377-
79 (1989) (plurality) (analyzing an Eighth Amendment claim); CTS Corp. v. Dynamics
Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 95-96 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) (discussing the Dormant Commerce Clause). See generally Michael J.
Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory, 78 VA. L. REV. 747, 823
(1991) (noting Justice Scalia's "espousal across a wide variety of constitutional contexts of
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the Court refuses to consider claims that the statutory text reflects the
intent of a mere legislative minority or the undue influence of interest
groups.70 The new textualists' willingness to express disapproval of
congressional decisions regarding the reliability of legislative history,
the appropriate level of statutory precision, and the role of staff and
interest groups seems inconsistent with the deference courts-and
new textualists-give to congressional judgments when addressing
due process or equal protection challenges.
Courts also defer to congressional judgments regarding
appropriate legislative procedures when legislators or citizens
challenge the validity of those procedures directly. Such procedural
challenges perhaps more closely resemble the new textualist
challenges than do the substantive constitutional challenges discussed
above. Often, in reliance on the Constitution's Rulemaking Clause,7
the Court refuses to entertain challenges to congressional
procedures.7' Lower courts have refused to consider challenges to the
a radical opposition to judicial superintendence of legislative decision making," but
arguing that Justice Scalia has departed unjustifiably from that approach in addressing
affirmative action).
70. See United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980).
71. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 ("Each House may determine the Rules of its
Proceedings .... "). For discussions of the original purpose of the Rulemaking Clause, see
James E. Castello, Comment, The Limits of Popular Sovereignty: Using the Initiative
Power to Control Legislative Procedure, 74 CAL. L. REV. 491, 529-30 (1986), and Michael
B. Miller, Comment, The Justiciability of Legislative Rules and the "Political" Political
Question Doctrine, 78 CAL. L. REv. 1341, 1357-63 (1990).
72. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 226 (1993) (holding a claim that
challenged Senate impeachment procedures to be nonjusticiable); United States v. Ballin,
144 U.S. 1, 5 (1892) (stating that so long as constitutional constraints are not ignored nor
fundamental rights violated, the House of Representatives has discretion to set its own
rules of procedure, and "it is no impeachment of [those] rule[s] to say that some other way
would be better, more accurate or even more just"); United States v. Durenberger, 48 F.3d
1239, 1243 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (observing "that a federal court may not decide a lawsuit
asking it to impose judicially-formulated rules of conduct on the legislative branch"
because the Constitution provides that each house of Congress may set its own rules);
Gregg v. Barrett, 771 F.2d 539, 549 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (refusing to consider a claim that the
compiling of the Congressional Record resulted in an inaccurate official record of
congressional debates because even attempting to resolve the claim on the merits would
interfere with Congress's constitutional power to manage its own affairs); Moore v. United
States House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946, 956 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("We are reluctant to
meddle in the internal affairs of the legislative branch, and the doctrine of remedial
discretion properly permits us to consider the prudential, separation-of-powers concerns
posed by a suit for declaratory relief against the complainant's colleagues in Congress."
(citation omitted)); Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1182 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Bork, J.,
concurring) (refusing to adjudicate a claim of maldistribution of committee seats in the
U.S. House of Representatives because "[tlhere is a very real problem of a lack of judicial
competence to arrange complex, organic, political processes within a legislature"); Exxon
Corp. v. FTC, 589 F.2d 582, 590 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (refusing to enter an order requiring a
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practice of allocating the majority party more than its proportional
share of seats on congressional committees, 3 the congressionally
authorized practice of concealing Central Intelligence Agency
appropriations in other budget accounts 74 and the establishment of a
rule requiring a three-fifths majority vote to raise federal income tax
rates.75 When courts do not summarily dismiss procedural claims,
they accord extraordinary deference to the legislature. For example,
congressional committee to safeguard the confidentiality of valuable corporate
information that the committee had subpoenaed and explaining that although the court
would protect constitutional rights from infringement by congressional committees, there
was otherwise "no warrant for the judiciary to interfere with the internal procedures of
Congress"); Consumers Union v. Periodical Correspondents' Ass'n, 515 F.2d 1341, 1350-
51 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (holding that an organization's challenge to a refusal to accredit
Consumer Reports to the press gallery of the Congress was nonjusticiable); Skaggs v.
Carle, 898 F. Supp. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1995) (observing that for at least a decade, the D.C.
Circuit has consistently held that "the separation-of-powers principle precludes [courts]
from reviewing congressional practices and procedures when they primarily and directly
affect the way Congress does its legislative business" (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted)). See generally National Ass'n of Social Workers v. Harwood, 69 F.3d
622, 632-33 (1st Cir. 1995) (concerning a challenge to a Rhode Island House of
Representatives rule limiting nonlegislator access to the floor of the chamber); Davids v.
Akers, 549 F.2d 120, 122 (9th Cir. 1977) (concerning a challenge to the maldistribution of
committee seats by the Speaker of the Arizona House of Representatives); French v.
Senate of the State of California, 80 P. 1031, 1032 (Cal. 1905) (noting that the inherent
capacity of a legislative body to control its own proceedings is so basic that "if [the]
provision were omitted [from the California Constitution], and there were no other
constitutional limitations on the power, the power would nevertheless exist, and could be
exercised by a majority").
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has reached the merits of two such
suits. See Michel v. Anderson, 14 F.3d 623, 632 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (allowing delegates from
the District of Columbia and U.S. territories to vote in the Committee of the Whole
House); Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430, 436 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (holding that a U.S.
Senator has standing to challenge the validity of a pocket veto). One of the two cases,
Kennedy v. Sampson, was really an interbranch conflict, not merely a conflict over
legislative procedure.
73. See Vander Jagt, 699 F.2d at 1181-82.
74. See Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 215 (D.C. Cir. 1977); see also United States
v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 180 (1974) (dismissing a taxpayer's suit to compel publication
of the Central Intelligence Agency budget for lack of standing). In Harrington the Court
explained that:
Art I., § 5, cl. 2 of the Constitution provides that "[e]ach House may determine
the rules of its own proceedings." This provision gives a specific constitutional
base-a constitutional status, if you prefer-to the rules that Congress provides
for its own proceedings. In deference to the fundamental constitutional principle
of separation of powers, the judiciary must take specific care to avoid intruding
into a constitutionally delineated prerogative of the Legislative Branch. What
[the] appellant would have us do here is to intervene on behalf of one member of
the Legislative Branch to change "the rules of its proceedings" adopted by the
entire body of the House. This we should not do.
553 F.2d at 214 (citation omitted).
75. See Skaggs, 898 F. Supp. at 2-3.
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the Supreme Court has held that the Senate, in considering articles of
impeachment, has discretion either to hear testimony itself or to
delegate the task to a Senate committee.76 Likewise, the federal
courts uphold revenue statutes against claims brought under the
Constitution's Origination Clause77 after only the most cursory
examination of legislative records.78
Some rejected procedural challenges have raised issues
resembling the complaints offered by the new textualists. For
instance, Gregg v. Barrett79 addressed claims resembling new
textualists' concerns about the Congressional Record's
manipulability.80 In Gregg, the D.C. Circuit dismissed the plaintiff's
challenges to the procedures for compiling the Congressional
Record."' In rejecting the claim, Judge Abner J. Mikva, writing for
the court, explained that "our deference and esteem for [Congress]
and for the constitutional command that [Congress] be allowed to
manage its own affairs precludes us from even attempting a diagnosis
of the problem. "I
Likewise, the courts have refused to address questions of the
proper role of legislative staff, albeit in the context of challenges to
the use of staff for nonlegislative purposes. Thus, in United States ex
rel. Joseph v. Cannon," the D.C. Circuit refused to entertain a qui
tam action seeking to recover from Senator Howard Cannon the
salary his congressional office paid a staff member who allegedly
engaged solely in activities relating to Senator Cannon's re-election.84
In doing so, the court explained that the judiciary must avoid
questions for which it is "fundamentally underequipped" and refused
to "develop standards of conduct for matters not legal in nature."8 5
The court concluded that a "challenge to the interworkings of a
Senator and his staff member raises at the outset the specter that such
a question lurks.8s6
76. See Nixon, 506 U.S. at 238.
77. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 1. The Origination Clause requires that all bills
raising revenue originate in the House of Representatives.
78 See United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 387-88 (1990); Texas Ass'n of
Concerned Taxpayers, Inc. v. United States, 772 F.2d 163, 165, 168 (5th Cir. 1985).
79. 771 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
80. See id at 540-41.
81. Id at 549.
82. Id
83. 642 F.2d 1373 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
84. See id at 1385, 1386.
85. Id. at 1379-80.
86. Id- at 1380; see also Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1181 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(Bork, J., concurring) (speculating that once courts began reviewing legislative process,
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New textualists agree with the judiciary's refusal to entertain
challenges to the legislative process. For example, Justice Scalia,
perhaps the premier new textualist, has argued that legislative
judgments about legislative and electoral procedures deserve great
deference. In Moore v. United States House of Representatives,' then-
Judge Scalia wrote a separate opinion concurring in the dismissal of a
suit challenging a statute as violating the Origination Clause 88 In
arguing that the suit should have been dismissed on standing grounds,
he reasoned that the courts must refrain from supervising the internal
workings of the political branches of government-at least until an
individual who suffers a concrete injury brings suit.89 Otherwise, he
argued, the courts would exceed their judicial authority. In McIntyre
v. Ohio Elections Commission,9° when the Court held that states
could not constitutionally prohibit anonymous leafletting, Justice
Scalia lamented the lack of deference given to legislative judgments.91
He accused the majority of following its own views rather than those
of "state legislatures and the Federal Congress" on a "practical
matter that bears closely upon the real life experiences of elected
politicians and not upon that of unelected judges." 2
Even with respect to the validity of legislative documents, courts
do not second-guess legislative bodies. The federal courts have long
employed the enrolled bill rule, which precludes them from
questioning presiding legislative officers' certification that the
they would have to address questions of staff allocation). The D.C. Circuit took a similar
approach with respect to the use of staff in the executive branch in Winpisinger v. Watson,
628 F.2d 133 (D.C. Cir. 1980), by refusing to entertain a claim that members of the Carter
Administration were using federal funds to pursue the re-election of the President because
it would "unquestionably bring the court and the executive branch into conflict [as] the
court would be placed in the position of evaluating every discretionary consideration ...
for traces of political expediency." Ik at 140.
Admittedly, the concerns raised in these cases are somewhat different than the new
textualist concerns. In Cannon and Winpisinger, the challenged practices threatened to
distort the political process by giving incumbents the special privilege of relying on
government resources during election campaigns. The new textualist concerns focus on
staff members' ability to make law in the legislative process. See supra notes 48-51 and
accompanying text. Nevertheless, the courts probably would not entertain a suit seeking
to limit staff involvement in the legislative process. Indeed, if anything, courts have more
reason to limit legislators' use of their legislative staff in connection with an election than
the use of such staff in connection with their legislative duties.
87. 733 F.2d 946 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
88. See idL at 956-65 (Scalia, J., concurring).
89. See ici at 958-59 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing for according deference to
legislatures in direct challenges to congressional procedures).
90. 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
91. See id. at 370 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
92. Id- at 381 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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respective legislative chambers have passed a bill pursuant to proper
procedure. 3 Several justifications have been offered for this rule,94
however, the justification most relevant for our purposes is that the
courts would show disrespect for legislatures if they questioned the
certification that the bill had been properly enacted. 95
In United States v. Munoz-Flores,96 Justice Scalia endorsed the
enrolled bill rule, arguing that courts should not independently
93. See 1 NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 15.03,
at 748-53 (5th ed. 1994); J. A. C. Grant, Judicial Control of the Legislative Process: The
Federal Rule, 3 W. POL. Q. 364, 380-84 (1950). See generally I SINGER, supra, §§ 15.01-
.18, at 743-74 (providing an overview of the enrolled bill rule). Such certifications appear
on enrolled bills, which are bills that have been formally printed for presentation to the
President. See Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 672 (1892). These certifications are not voted
on by the relevant chamber, but are signed solely by the presiding officer. The First
Congress established rules requiring the presiding officer of each House to sign the
enrolled bill in open session. See 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 57 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789);
Grant, supra, at 366. By 1947, however, the presiding officers of both houses had
abandoned the practice. See Grant, supra, at 366, 381 n.99. For a description of the
enrolling process, see id. at 365-68. For a novel approach to claims that a statute was not
properly enacted, see NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 1:7-1 to -5 (West 1992). The statute gives the
Attorney General (at the Governor's direction) or any citizen one year to challenge a
statute's procedural validity. See id. §§ 1:7-1, -4. See generally J. A. C. Grant, New Jersey's
"Popular Action" In Rem to Control Legislative Procedure, 4 RUTGERS L. REv. 391
(1950) (discussing the New Jersey statute).
In Field, the Court refused to entertain a claim that Congress had not voted upon
part of the Tariff Act of 1890, ch. 1244, § 30, 26 Stat. 567, 619, because the Justices refused
to question the Speaker of the House's certification that the bill had been properly
enacted. Field, 143 U.S. at 668-72; see also Harwood v. Wentworth, 162 U.S. 547, 557-62
(1896) (applying the enrolled bill rule to a bill enrolled by a territorial legislature); United
States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1892) (stating that, even assuming that the journal of
Congress could be referenced to support an argument that a duly enrolled bill was not
enacted lawfully, a court may not consider evidence outside the journal to impeach the
matters recorded in the journal). In Field, the Court explicitly acknowledged that the
presiding officer of each chamber has a legal obligation to refrain from falsely certifying
compliance with proper procedures, explaining:
There is no authority in the presiding officers of the House of Representatives
and the Senate to attest by their signatures, nor in the President to approve, nor
in the Secretary of State to receive and cause to be published, as a legislative act,
any bill not passed by Congress.
Field, 143 U.S. at 669. The Court noted, however, that the judiciary simply was not the
proper institution to police legislative leaders. See id. at 670-73.
94. Several justifications have been offered for this rule. One justification focuses
upon citizens' reliance interests in bills that have been enrolled. If enrolled bills were
subject to the attack that procedural requisites had not been met, citizens would have to
inquire extensively into the legislative process before they could rely on the statute. See
United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 408-10 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring). See
generally D & W Auto Supply v. Department of Revenue, 602 S.W.2d 420, 423 (Ky. 1980)
(discussing four historical rationales for the enrolled bill rule).
95. See Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. at 408-10 (Scalia, J., concurring); Field, 143 U.S. at
672.
96. 495 U.S. 385 (1990).
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investigate the origins of revenue raising measures notwithstanding
the constitutional requirement that all bills raising revenue originate
in the House of Representatives.' He suggested that if the bill
number indicated that it had originated in the House, the Court
should end its inquiry.98 To do otherwise, he argued, would require
that the courts "manifest a lack of respect due a coordinate branch [of
government] and produce uncertainty." 99
New textualists' deference to legislative judgments when
legislative procedures are directly challenged clashes with the
antipathy for legislative judgments reflected in their interpretative
approach.100 New textualists, however, do seek some consistency
between their constitutional jurisprudence and their approach to
statutory interpretation. For example, Justice Scalia not only
criticizes judicial imposition of substantive values divorced from the
Constitution during substantive review of statutes for
constitutionality, but he also questions judges' reliance on their own
notions of good substantive policy in interpreting statutes.'0' In a
recent essay, he explains that "[it is simply not compatible with
97. See id. at 408-10 (Scalia, J., concurring). He began his opinion by reference to
Field v. Clark and the enrolled bill rule. See id. at 408 (Scalia, J., concurring).
9& See id. at 408-10 (Scalia, J., concurring).
99. Id at 409-10 (Scalia, J., concurring).
100. The new textualists' approach perhaps could be defended by asserting that the
two contexts are so different that comparison is irrelevant. Such an assertion is
unjustified, however, and surely even new textualists would ultimately reject it.
101. See Scalia, supra note 44, at 18-22. For example, Justice Scalia questions the
legitimacy of interpretive theories advanced on this basis by then-Professor Guido
Calabresi and Professor William N. Eskridge, Jr. See id. at 21-22 (discussing GuIDo
CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 80-83, 101-15,163-66 (1982)
(arguing that courts should exercise the power to overrule statutes more than twenty years
old just as they exercise the power to overrule judicial decisions); ESKRIDGE, supra note
32, passim (arguing that that statutory interpretation should be dynamic and should not
necessarily be tied to the interpretation that the enacting legislature would have preferred,
especially when enactment and interpretation are separated by long periods of time)). For
similar reasons, Justice Scalia questions courts' authority to establish substantive canons of
interpretation. See Scalia, supra note 44, at 28-29. Justice Scalia, however, favors some
"clear statement" rules, see infra note 228, although most of those appear to be quasi-
constitutional. Thus, one can imagine Justice Scalia's and other new textualists' responses
to metademocratic theories that advocate interpreting statutes in favor of groups not likely
to enjoy political power. Cf Schacter, supra note 18, at 622-26 (describing such theories).
Surely new textualists would argue that a court should no more use statutory
interpretation to further such goals than to use the Carolene Products' "discrete and
insular" minority analysis for heightened constitutional review. See United States v.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). For instance, among the canons that
Justice Scalia criticizes as evidencing judicial usurpation of legislative authority is the
traditional canon of construction that statutes regarding Native Americans should be
construed in favor of Native Americans. See Scalia, supra note 44, at 27-29.
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democratic theory that laws mean whatever they ought to mean, and
that unelected judges decide what that is."102  Justice Scalia also
criticizes the use of many substantive canons of interpretation,
asserting that such judicially created, substantive presumptions usurp
legislative authority.10 3 Thus, we need to explore the new textualists'
readiness to disregard legislative judgments when crafting their
theory of statutory interpretation. Three popular theories of
constitutional jurisprudence could justify the difference in the new
textualists' approach to constitutional jurisprudence and statutory
interpretation: originalism, process theory, and underenforced norms
theory. In the next Part, I examine whether any of these theories
justify the aggressive review of congressional procedural decisions
implicit in new textualism.
III. JUSTIFYING NEW TEXTUALISTS' HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY
A. Original Intent
New textualists could invoke original intent jurisprudence to
justify their implicit disregard of legislative judgments. Some have
argued that courts should construe the Constitution in accordance
with the intent of the Framers and give great weight to evidence of
the Framers' intent.'°4 The original intent school contends that
practices the Framers engaged in cannot be considered
unconstitutional, at least absent some compelling justification. If, for
example, the early Congresses, which included many alumni of the
Constitutional Convention, began legislative sessions with a prayer,
then the contemporary practice of beginning legislative sessions with
similar prayers cannot offend the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment. 0 5 Likewise, current narcotics forfeiture laws, which
102. Scalia, supra note 44, at 22.
103. See idL
104. See, e.g., OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ORIGINAL
MEANING JURISPRUDENCE: A SOURCEBOOK 1-5 (1987) (Sup. Docs. No. J1.95:J97)
(advocating that judges decide cases according to the original meaning of the
Constitution). Indeed, the Court has on occasion relied on an original intent argument to
uphold practices that apparently enjoyed the Founding Fathers' approval, but would
otherwise be difficult to justify under contemporary constitutional jurisprudence. See, e.g.,
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 786-92 (1983) (upholding the start of legislative sessions
with a prayer); see also OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, supra, at 50-57 (describing 15
Supreme Court cases in which a majority or dissenting opinion employs an original intent
approach).
105. Indeed, this reasoning was precisely the basis of the Supreme Court's decision in
Marsh, in which the Court failed to even mention three-prong test from Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), that has served as the starting point for analysis in virtually
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allow the government to seize property used to violate drug laws,
would not compromise the right to due process because when the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments were adopted such forfeitures
were an accepted practice.10 6
New textualists could rely on original intent to justify their
rejection of congressional judgments by arguing that the Framers'
intent regarding the use of legislative history and the procedural
issues calling into doubt the use of legislative history is clear, while
the Framers had no clear intent with respect to the practice of
homosexuality,1°7 the right to die,08 or the distribution of committee
seats between political parties. Justice Scalia, at least, does embrace
originalism.10 9 Moreover, he has noted the relative modernity of
every Supreme Court establishment case since Lemon. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 786-92. The
result in Marsh would have been hard to reach under Lemon. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 796-
801 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("I have no doubt that if any group of law students were
asked to apply the principles of Lemon to the question of legislative prayer, they would
nearly unanimously find the practice to be unconstitutional.").
106. See Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442,453-55 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring).
107. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 626 (1996) (invalidating a provision of
Colorado's Constitution prohibiting any state or local governmental entity from
recognizing homosexuality as entitling any person to a "protected status").
108. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990) (asserting
that the logic of Supreme Court precedent suggests that a competent person has a
constitutionally protected right to refuse administration of lifesaving medical treatment,
hydration, and nutrition); Scalia, supra note 44, at 39; Antonin Scalia, Response, in A
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 44, at 129.
109. See Board of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 686-90 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 517-18 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S.
62, 95-97 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Scalia, supra note 44, at 37-47; Antonin Scalia,
Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 863 (1989). See generally Mark D.
Greenberg & Harry Litman, The Meaning of Original Meaning, 86 GEO. L.J. 569, 572-82
(1998) (discussing Justice Scalia's original intent jurisprudence); Arthur Stock, Note,
Justice Scalia's Use of Sources in Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation: How
Congress Always Loses, 1990 DUKE L.J. 160, 177 (discussing Justice Scalia's approach to
constitutional interpretation, in which he ordinarily "seeks to interpret the Constitution as
the Framers would have understood it," and contrasting Justice Scalia's nonoriginalist
textual approach to interpreting statutes). Justice Thomas, another new textualist, is also
a devotee of originalism. See Bennis, 516 U.S. at 454-55 (Thomas, J., concurring);
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 360-69 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring); Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72
WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 363-64 (1994); see also Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 687 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(hailing Justice Thomas' arrival as "the addition to the Court of another Justice who
believes that we have no basis for proscribing as unconstitutional practices that do not
violate any explicit text of the Constitution").
Originalism has been subjected to cogent attacks. See, e.g., ARTHUR, supra note
67, at 31-38; ELY, supra note 67, at 11-41; Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the
Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 229-38 (1980). See generally PETER M.
SHANE & HAROLD H. BRUFF, SEPARATION OF POWERS LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
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reliance on legislative history and the practice's poor historical
pedigree."0
Three problems, however, undermine an original intent
justification for new textualists' rigorous scrutiny of legislative
judgments in the course of justifying their interpretive approach.
First, the basis for arguing that original intent should preclude any of
the legislative practices that new textualists wish to deter is tenuous at
best. Second, even Justice Scalia acknowledges that original intent,
by itself, does not justify intrusion into legislative prerogatives. Third,
new textualists seem to ground their approach on quite contemporary
political theory rather than on a devotion to the Framers' intent."'
1. Absence of Original Intent
Reliance on original intent confronts new textualists with a
difficult task. In the typical original intent argument, the advocate
seeks to demonstrate the permissibility of a practice by tracing its
ancient roots. New textualists seeking to craft an originalist challenge
to legislative history face a more daunting task-deriving an
"original" intent to prohibit a practice from the Framers' failure to
engage in that practice. Making such an original intent argument is
particularly difficult because the Framers may have had many reasons
for failing to adopt, or even for rejecting, practices that have since
become popular. Thus, those who pursue originalist arguments must
show that the Framers intended the Constitution to prohibit future
generations, facing different challenges, from adopting such practices.
Any attempt to uncover original intent regarding statutory precision,
staff responsibility, legislative record reliability, lobbyist influence, or
the use of legislative history to construe statutes produces no clear
answer. Moreover, the Constitution as a whole, unlike some state
constitutions, appears to leave unresolved virtually all issues of
legislative procedure.12
11-12 (1996) (briefly describing the original intent approach to constitutional
interpretation).
110. See Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 622 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
concurring); Note, supra note 36, at 1008.
111. New textualists do not attempt to make much of a historical case for ignoring
legislative history or for support of their judgments about legislative procedure. Indeed,
new textualism is very heavily influenced by public choice theory, a contemporary theory.
See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 12, at 38-42; Bell, supra note 4, at 50-52 n.183;
Schacter, supra note 18, at 637, 641.
112. More specific limitations upon state legislative procedures appear to be a response
to nineteenth-century problems. See BYRON R. ABERNATHY, CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS OF THE LEGISLATURE 46, 67-68 (1959); ERIC FONER, RECoNSTRUcrION:
AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863-1877, at 465-66, 486 (1988); ROBERT LUCE,
[Vol. 781282
2000] LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1283
Admittedly, the role or existence of congressional staff is not
mentioned in the Constitution."3 The same, however, can be said for
political parties" 4  and standing congressional committees-
institutions which play a vital and legitimate role in American
government."5 With that in mind, the absence of a reference to staff
hardly shows an original intent that there be no legislative staff or
that their roles be limited in the way that the new textualists suggest.
Legislative records are mentioned only in passing in the
Constitution's text, and the Constitution merely requires that
Congress keep a journal and periodically publish a statement of
accounts."6 Little evidence suggests that the Framers envisioned the
judiciary assuming a substantial role in monitoring the production
and maintenance of legislative records."7 Nor does an original intent
LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE 11 (1922); ROSCOE POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF
AMERICAN LAW 54 (1950); William D. Popkin, The Collaborative Model of Statutory
Interpretation, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 543, 553-59 (1988). The state constitutions adopted in
the years surrounding the framing of the United States Constitution specified little in the
way of legislative procedure. See DE. CONST. (1792); DE. CONST. (1776); GA. CONST.
(1779); GA. CONST. (1777); MD. CONST. (1776); MASS. CONST. (1780); N.H. CONST.
(1784); N.H. CONST. (1776); NJ. CONST. (1776); N.Y. CONST. (1777); N.C. CONST. (1776);
S.C. CONST. (1790); S.C. CONST. (1778); S.C. CONST. (1776); VA. CONST. (1776). The
constitutions are reprinted in volumes one through six of SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS (William F. Swindler ed. 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1978,
1979).
113. Members and committees did not have staff until the mid-1800s. 1 FINAL
REPORT OF THE JOINT COMM. ON THE ORGANIZATION OF CONGRESS, H.R. REP. No.
103-413, at 59 (1993) (Sup. Docs. No. YI.118:1031413); JOINT COMM. ON THE
ORGANIZATION OF CONGRESS, 103D CONG., BACKGROUND MATERIALS:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION PROVIDED TO MEMBERS OF THE JOINT COMM. ON THE
ORGANIZATION OF CONGRESS 1379-80 (Comm. Print 1993) [hereinafter BACKGROUND
MATERIALS].
114. The Framers may well have disapproved of political parties; James Madison
expressed disapproval of factions in the Federalist Papers. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10
(James Madison); George Washington, Farewell Address (Sept. 17, 1796), in 35 THE
WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON FROM THE ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPT SOURCES:
1745-1799, at 225,226-28 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1940).
115. See RALPH VOLNEY HARLOW, THE HISTORY OF LEGISLATIVE METHODS IN
THE PERIOD BEFORE 1825, at 22-23,78,116, 126,129,135-36 (1917); STEVEN S. SMITH &
CHRISTOPHER J. DEERING, COMMITTEES IN CONGRESS 25-30 (2d ed. 1990); Thomas F.
Broden, Jr., Congressional Committee Reports: Their Role and History, 33 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 209,217-29 (1958).
116. See U.S. CONST art. I, § 5, cl. 3 (Journal Clause); id. art. I, § 7, el. 2 (regarding
contents of legislative journal); id. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (Statement of Accounts Clause).
117. The courts have not asserted any such role. See United States v. Richardson, 418
U.S. 166, 178 n.11 (1974) (holding that the public lacked standing to assert a violation of
the Statement of Accounts Clause of the Constitution); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 667-
73 (1892) (explaining that matters concerning what is included in the legislative journal are
left to the discretion of Congress); Gregg v. Barrett, 771 F.2d 539, 549 (D.C. Cir. 1985)
(involving the accuracy of the Congressional Record); Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190,
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argument aid new textualists with regard to their view of lobbyists;
the Framers did not give the courts power to control or limit
lobbying.'18 It seems unlikely that the Framers meant either to
foreclose future Congresses from considering additional necessary
congressional procedures and practices or to empower the courts to
review those decisions.
Perhaps the new textualists' concern about statutory vagueness
can lay claim to stronger historical support. Some evidence suggests
that post-Revolutionary Americans regarded specificity as a virtue.n 9
Moreover, courts currently hold that the Due Process Clauses of the
Constitution preclude the enforcement of excessively vague
statutes. 120 Yet even these arguments have limited value. Neither the
Federalist Papers nor the debates at the Constitutional Convention
and the state ratifying conventions suggest that the Constitution was
214 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (refusing "to provide a second opinion" on the optimal procedure for
legislative action).
118. The First Amendment provides that the right to petition the government shall not
be abridged, see U.S CONST. amend. I, and some have argued that this provision accords
constitutional protection to lobbying. See, e.g., HOPE EASTMAN, LOBBYING: A
CONSTITUTIONALLY-PROTECTED RIGHT 1, 3-4, 23 (1977). Modem lobbying, however,
bears little resemblance to traditional petitioning and arguably does not fall within the
meaning of the First Amendment. See Gregory A. Mark, The Vestigial Constitution: The
History and Significance of the Right to Petition, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 2153, 2160-61
(1989).
119. See EDWARD DUMBAULD, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE LAW 152 (1978);
Philip A. Hamburger, The Constitution's Accommodation of Social Change, 88 MICH. L.
REV. 239, 303 (1989) ("A variety of traditions encouraged Americans to seek clarity in
language. Seventeenth- and Eighteenth-century political disputes about the effect of
statutes and charters, religious quarrels over the meaning of the Bible, and the inclinations
and habits of lawyers had all for centuries inculcated an appreciation of linguistic
precision."); id. at 305 (discussing Madison's desire for precision); see also LAWRENCE M.
FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 91 (2d ed. 1985) (ascribing the valuing of
clarity to colonists' religious beliefs); Gordon S. Wood, Comment, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION, supra note 44, at 49, 50 (noting that Thomas Jefferson believed that
statutes should be written so that the judge becomes "'a mere machine'" (quoting Letter
from Thomas Jefferson to Edmund Pendleton (Aug. 26, 1776), in 1 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 503, 505 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950))).
In fact, the Privy Council, which reviewed all colonial laws, sometimes invalidated
laws on ground that they were excessively vague. See ELMER BEECHER RUSSELL, THE
REVIEW OF AMERICAN COLONIAL LEGISLATION BY THE KING IN COUNCIL 142-43
(1915) (noting colonial legislation that was invalidated by the Board of Trade for being
vague or loosely worded); Stefan A. Riesenfeld, Law-Making and Legislative Precedent in
American Legal History, 33 MINN. L. REv. 103, 137 (1949) (same). On the other hand,
Professors Atiyah and Summers assert that there is a tradition in the United States of
drafting statutes in relatively broad language to establish broad general principles. See
P.S. ATIYAH & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM AND SUBSTANCE IN ANGLO-AMERICAN
LAW 323 (1987). They rely, in part, on the vagueness of the Constitution. See id.
120. See, e.g., Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 509 (1948); Lanzetta v. New Jersey,
306 U.S. 451,453 (1939).
1284 [Vol. 78
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
intended to prohibit vague statutes.' In fact, little suggests that the
Framers believed that legislation would necessarily be precise.'2
Moreover, the belief that excessively vague statutes offend the
Constitution arose long after the founding period." 3 In short,
substantial questions remain as to whether original intent justifies
judicial review of Congress's precision in drafting statutes.
Though the Framers did not intend to resolve the specific
concerns new textualists raise about the legislative process, the
Framers might have held a firm conviction that legislative history
should have no significance. Such an argument is perhaps the best
originalist argument that textualists can advance. In 1769, British
courts adopted a rule barring consideration of legislative history in
interpreting statutes;24 American courts adhered to that rule into the
mid-1800s.1 5 Nevertheless, the existence of such a judicial rule does
not conclusively establish the Framers' intent to preclude later
generations from revisiting the issue of the role of legislative history
in statutory interpretation. During the formative years of our nation,
legal understanding remained heavily influenced by the common law,
and even judicial constructions of statutes were often heavily laden
121. In England, statutes were not invalidated because of vagueness, and there is no
record of the application of the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine in the colonial period. See,
e.g., Note, Void for Vagueness: An Escape from Statutory Interpretation, 23 IND. Li. 272,
274-75 (1948). The significance of these points is somewhat questionable, however,
because English and colonial courts did not engage in "constitutional" review of statutes.
122. The first Congresses enacted statutes giving the executive branch broad discretion
under relatively imprecise standards. See, e.g., Act of June 4, 1794, ch. 41, 1 Stat. 372
(giving the President the authority to lay embargoes when the "the public safety shall so
require"); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 681-90 (1892) (discussing statutes that give the
President broad discretion under relatively imprecise standards in the area of trade and
commerce). But see THEODORE J. LowI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: IDEOLOGY,
POLICY, AND THE CRISIS OF PUBLiC AIJTHoRrrY 128-43 (1969) (noting the clear
standards of discretion that apply to modem governmental agencies).
123. Some trace the origins of the doctrine to 1830s state court decisions and date its
recognition by the federal courts in the late 1880s. See Joseph E. Bauerschmidt, Note,
"Mother of Mercy-Is This the End of Rico?"-Justice Scalia Invites Constitutional Void-
for-Vagueness Challenge to RICO "Pattern," 65 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1106, 1113 n.51
(1990); Note, supra note 121, at 275, 278. The first state case employing vagueness to
invalidate a statute was Drake v. Drake, 15 N.C. (4 Dev.) 110, 115, 116 (1833). The first
explicit statement of the doctrine in federal court was in Chicago & Northwest Railway Co.
v. Dey, 35 F. 866, 876 (C.C.S.D. Iowa 1888). Two earlier cases also mention vagueness in
an analysis of a statute. See United States v. Sharp, 27 F. Cas. 1041, 1043 (C.C.D. Pa.
1815) (No. 16,264); In re The Enterprise, 8 F. Cas. 732,734 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1810) (No. 4499).
The Supreme Court first invalidated a statute as a violation of the Due Process Clause on
vagueness grounds in 1914 in International Harvester Co. of America v. Kentucky, 234 U.S.
216,222-24 (1914).
124. See Millar v. Taylor, 98 Eng. Rep. 201,217 (K.B. 1769).
125. See Note, supra note 36, at 1008-09.
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with common-law notions. 126 Consequently, judges enjoyed great
discretion when interpreting statutes. Given the discomfort with the
type of judicial decisionmaking that was commonplace during the
framing of the Constitution,127 as well as the change in the roles of
courts and legislatures-reflecting the transition from a common-law
to a largely statutory legal system-the Framers may have embraced
126. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 398-400 (Alexander Hamilton) (Max Beloff ed.,
1987) (arguing that the courts were well suited to interpret statutes because of their role as
a check on the legislature's power); William S. Blatt, The History of Statutory
Interpretation: A Study in Form and Substance, 6 CARDOZO L. REv. 799, 803 (1985)
(noting the prevalence of equity considerations in statutory interpretation); Carlos E.
Gonzalez, Reinterpreting Statutory Interpretation, 74 N.C. L. REv. 585, 682-88 (1996)
(tracing the evolution of the American attitude toward the judiciary from the Revolution
to the framing of the Constitution); John Choon Yoo, Note, Marshall's Plan: The Early
Supreme Court and Statutory Interpretation, 101 YALE L.J. 1607, 1611-12 (1992)
(discussing Hamilton's view that the courts could employ statutory interpretation as a
means to protect the people from unfair congressional action); Note, supra note 36, at
1008-09 n.26 (noting the understanding among early English jurists that statutory
interpretation was not limited to the expressed language of a statute). See generally Hans
W. Baade, The Cass Omissus: A Pre-History of Statutory Analogy, 20 SYRACUSE J.
INT'L L. & COM. 45, 65-91 (1994) (discussing the development of statutory interpretation
in Great Britain prior to the American Revolution); Robert J. Martineau, Craft and
Technique, Not Canons and Grand Theories: A Neo-Realist View of Statutory
Construction, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 6-9 (1993) (discussing nonliteral approaches to
interpreting statutes from the sixteenth through the nineteenth centuries, including
approaches focusing on the equity of the statute, the purpose of the statute, and the intent
of the legislature); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98
HARV. L. REV. 885, 894-99 (1985) (noting that the rules of statutory construction in
existence at the time of the establishment of the Constitution permitted looking beyond
the text for "reasonable evidence" of its meaning, though this ordinarily meant attempting
to read the acts of Parliament against the background of the common law), reprinted in
INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL INTENT 53, 58-60
(Jack N. Rakove ed., 1990); Yoo, supra, at 1615-29 (noting that the Marshall Court
resolved the differences between two divergent approaches to statutory interpretation
prevalent in American legal thought-one focusing on judicial discretion and the other
directing courts to consider legislative intent).
127. See Badaracco v. Commissioner, 464 U.S. 386, 397-98 (1984) ("Courts are not
authorized to rewrite a statute because they might deem its effects susceptible of
improvement." (citation omitted)); Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 193-95
(1978) ("Our individual appraisal of the wisdom or unwisdom of a particular course
consciously selected by the Congress is to be put aside in the process of interpreting a
statute."); United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 542 (1943) ("Sound rules of
statutory interpretation exist to discover and not to direct the Congressional will.");
United States v. Hong-Liang Lin, 962 F.2d 251, 257 (2d Cir. 1992) (stating that "[t]he
government is asking us to improve upon Congress's work" by giving a statute a broad
reading and that to do so would be inappropriate); Gonzalez, supra note 126, at 688--89
(describing the "honest agent" approach to statutory interpretation, in which the court has
no authority to depart from the legislative will in interpreting a statute, and arguing that
the "honest agent" approach is inconsistent with the role of the courts implicit in the
popular sovereignty and separation-of-powers models ratified in the Federal
Constitution).
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the use of legislative history to provide the context previously
provided by the common law." Given the profound change in our
legal system, 9 transposing the Framers' view of the role of legislative
history to today poses great peril. In any event, there is little
evidence that the Framers sought to preclude future generations from
relying on legislative history,13 and nothing in the Constitution's text
clearly resolves these issues.
2. Original Intent and Legislative Prerogatives
Even the existence of clear original intent on the issues new
textualists raise would not justify a refusal to defer to congressional
judgments. As the courts have recognized, respect for legislative
autonomy requires courts to refrain from interfering in legislative
processes even when there is a clear constitutional mandate
governing that legislative process. 3' Justice Scalia has recognized this
principle as well. For example, the Origination Clause, which
requires that tax bills originate in the House of Representatives,
provides a clear constitutional mandate, yet in urging the rejection of
an Origination Clause challenge in Munoz-Flores, Justice Scalia
accorded Congress great deference by invoking the enrolled bill
rule.32 More generally, Justice Scalia has forcefully argued that some
constitutional violations have no judicial remedy. In Webster v.
Doe, for example, he explained that the text of the Constitution
itself commits some questions to the political branches of
128. See Blatt, supra note 126, at 808-09.
129. See Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383, 383-88
(1908) (analyzing early legislative interpretive methods employed by courts during the
shift from common law to a statutory-based legal system in the United States); Roscoe
Pound, Spurious Interpretation, 7 COLUM. L. REV. 379, 381-86 (1907) [hereinafter Pound,
Spurious Interpretation] (contrasting the type of interpretation necessary in "formative
periods" of a legal system because of the "feebleness of legislation" with the type of
interpretation appropriate during "periods of legislation," when legislation becomes
"stronger and more frequent"); Scalia, supra note 44, at 13 ("We live in an age of
legislation, and most new law is statutory law.").
130. See Blatt, supra note 126, at 813. To some extent Americans reacted against
equity jurisprudence without fully rejecting it and sought a more literal approach to
interpretation. See Gonzalez, supra note 126, at 682-84; Wood, supra note 119, at 49, 50-
51. But this reaction arose out of a desire to curb judicial power vis-a-vis the legislature,
rather than the types of concerns new textualists emphasize (or, for that matter, any other
legislative dysfunction). Ironically, textualism results in the very same increase in judicial
authority (by removing one basis of determining intent) feared by the early American
figures who advocated literalism. See Bell, supra note 4, at 60-62.
131. See supra notes 74,77-78 and accompanying text.
132. See United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 408-09 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
133. 486 U.S. 592 (1988).
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government, and, thus, constitutional violations involving some issues
may remain unredressable because of the respect due coordinate
branches."M For instance, Justice Scalia noted that judges cannot
address the constitutional claim that "an election has been stolen"'135
because the Constitution commits the review of election results to
Congress. 36 Justice Scalia went further, arguing that respect for the
coordinate branches sometimes requires courts to disregard
constitutional claims even when the issue is not explicitly committed
to another branch. 37
Thus, a historical argument cannot compel courts to act-that is,
a court should not decide controversies unsuited to judicial resolution
merely because an originalist constitutional claim exists. Of course, in
Webster and Munoz-Flores, Justice Scalia addressed only direct
constitutional challenges, and the new textualists express disapproval
of congressional practices in the course of interpreting statutes rather
than by entertaining direct constitutional challenges. Perhaps courts
may appropriately exhibit disapproval of congressional practices in
the course of interpreting statutes. After all, unlike constitutional
rulings, statutory rulings constitute, at worst, a "suspensive veto" that
Congress can override by reenacting the statute in clearer terms.
Moreover, the judiciary has a legitimate interest in interpretive
methodology. 139 I will address such arguments later,'14 but they do
134. See id. at 606 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
135. Id at 612 (Scalia, J., dissenting); accord Morgan v. United States, 801 F.2d 445,
447 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (holding that the Elections Clause of the Constitution precluded
judicial review of the House of Representatives' determination that a Representative had
not been lawfully elected). See generally Neil K. Komesar, Taking Institutions Seriously:
Introduction to a Strategy for Constitutional Analysis, 51 U. CH. L. REV. 366, 406-08
(1984) (observing that "[a]lthough the Constitution is concerned with the policing of
governmental processes, it does not make the judiciary the sole or even the dominant
institution to carry out this function," and noting that some structural decisions are beyond
the control of any future decisionmaker while others are explicitly assigned to one or both
of the political branches of government).
136. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5 ("Each House shall be the Judge of the elections,
returns and qualifications of its own members .. ").
137. See Webster, 486 U.S. at 612-13 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia suggests that
the standing doctrine is useful in part because it allows courts to protect individuals and
minorities while excluding the judiciary from the role of prescribing how the other two
branches of government should function to serve the interests of the majority. See
Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of
Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 881, 892, 894-97 (1983).
138. See infra notes 191-92, 217-18. Congress could even overturn interpretive canons
by contrary legislation, although it is unclear how new textualists would react. See infra
note 192.
139. See supra note 21.
140. See infra notes 191-220 and accompanying text.
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not rest on the claim that the clarity of the Framers' intent justifies
the new textualists' aggressive attempt to reform the legislative
process.
3. Textualism and Contemporary Political Theory
Finally, new textualists do not purport to base their approach
solely on the intent of the Constitution's Framers. New textualists
assert that a legislative process in which only statutory text has
significance comports more closely with the ideals of democracy.
Thus, Justice Scalia has argued that disregarding legislative history
furthers the democratic process, asserting that the Court has "an
obligation to conduct [its] exegesis [of statutes] in a way which fosters
the democratic process.""'4  Similarly, in attacking the practice of
using legislative history, Justice Kennedy has argued that the
examination of legislative history is inappropriate because
"rummag[ing] through" legislative history does not further
"democratic exegesis."'4 Yet, this conception of the threat to
democracy posed by legislative history is primarily a contemporary
concern.
New textualists' skepticism about group choice-their doubt
about the coherence of rationales for legislative action-derives from
modern public choice theory. 43 Public choice theory argues that
group choice is not rational.'" In particular, public choice theorists
argue legislative choices are the fortuitous result of the order in which
legislative proposals are voted on or merely the result of
manipulation by agenda setters. If public choice theorists are correct,
they provide good reason to be skeptical about the use of legislative
141. United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 346 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment); see also Eskridge, supra note 2, at 677 (describing Justice
Scalia's argument); Scalia, supra note 44, at 18-23 (arguing that reliance on legislative
intent is "nothing but an invitation to judicial lawmaking"); Stock, supra note 109, at 167
(noting Justice Scalia's argument).
142. Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 473 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in the judgment); accord United States v. University Hosp., 729 F.2d 144, 161-
63 (2d Cir. 1984) (Winter, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority would "facilitate the
democratic legislative process" if it construed congressional statutes literally because
doing so would encourage legislatures to "address and resolve the highly delicate issues
which may lurk in seemingly unobjectionable legislative proposals").
143. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. Cm. L. REv. 533,
547-48 (1983) (grounding the argument that legislatures cannot have any "intent" on
public choice theory); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court 1983 Term-Foreword.
The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARv. L. REv. 4, 14-18 (1984) (using public
choice theory to criticize reliance on the legislative history of most statutes) [hereinafter
Easterbrook, The Court and the Economic System].
144. See, e.g., FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 12, at 38.
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history. Accordingly, several of those who attack the use of
legislative history challenge its use based on public choice theory's
lessons about group choice. 45 Whether public choice theory is an
ultimately sound political theory, it surely lacks the imprimatur of the
Framers'intent.
In fact, new textualists' concerns about minority dominance of
legislatures stand in striking contrast to the Framers' concerns.'46
While the Framers focused on preventing legislative majorities from
oppressing minorities, new textualists focus on preventing legislative
committees, legislative minorities, and interest groups from
enshrining policies in legislative history that the majority of legislators
might not support. The fears of new textualists reflect both public
choice theory and concerns about the atomization and specialization
within Congress resulting from the position of committees in the
legislative process 47
In short, originalism does not help new textualists. The intent of
the Framers regarding legislative history cannot be readily discerned
or easily transposed to the contemporary American legal system.
Moreover, the existence of Framers' intent alone would not justify
judicial interference in internal legislative processes.
B. Process Theory
A second school of constitutional theorists has suggested that in
a democracy the judiciary should ensure merely that the political
system works properly and should assume a more limited role in
reviewing the political branches' substantive decisions.148 John Hart
145. See id. at 38-42; Bell, supra note 4, at 37-43; Shepsle, supra note 36, at 244.
146. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
147. See Brudney, supra note 12, at 53-55. For a discussion of committee autonomy in
relation to the House and Senate, see WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL
PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY PROCESS 103-06, 121-22 (4th ed. 1996), SMITH &
DEERING, supra note 115, at 169-71, and ARTHUR MAAS, CONGRESS AND THE COMMON
GOOD 32-35,43-44 (1983).
Traditionally courts placed great weight on committee intent for a given statute. See,
e.g., Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 186 (1969). In contrast, Justice Scalia has asserted that
the meaning of terms in statutes "ought to be determined ... on the basis of which
meaning" most likely comports with the understanding of "the whole Congress which
voted on the words of the statute." Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528
(1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). Others have suggested that courts
primarily should be interested in the views of typical majority members or in legislators
who provide the swing votes rather than the views of committee members. See, e.g., Frank
H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARv. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 59, 63 (1988); see also Costello, supra note 12, at 61-62 (discussing Judge
Easterbrook's view).
148. See ARTHUR, supra note 67, at 48-49; Jed Rubenfeld, Reading the Constitution as
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Ely, a leading process theorist, argues that courts should invalidate
statutes only if they distort the political process or result from typical
pathologies of the democratic process. 14 9 Admittedly, Ely's concern-
majority dominance of minorities-is the converse of the new
textualists' fear, which is that legislative minorities frustrate
legislative majorities by using legislative history. 5 ° Daniel Farber and
Phillip Frickey likewise advocate process review rather than
substantive review because "[r]ather than scrutinizing the results of
the legislative process for signs of taint, it may be better for the courts
to police the process itself."''
Spoken, 104 YALE L.J. 1119,1132 (1995).
149. See ELY, supra note 67, at 102-03. See generally United States v. Carolene Prods.
Co., 304 U.S. 144,152-53 n.4 (1938) (suggesting heightened scrutiny of laws that "restrict[]
those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of
undesirable legislation" or laws that reflect prejudice against "discrete and insular
minorities" and thus seriously "curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily
to be relied upon to protect minorities"). Like Ely, a second major process theorist, Jesse
H. Choper, published a book in 1980. See JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE
NATIONAL POLrrICALPRO ESS (1980). Ely's and Choper's books have been subjected to
extensive commentary and symposia discussion. See, e.g., Symposium on Democracy and
Distrust: Ten Years Later, 77 VA. L. REV. 631 (1991); Symposium, Judicial Review Versus
Democracy, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1981).
Ely presents his theory of constitutional adjudication as an alternative to the
constitutional approach of original intent theorists. See ELY, supra note 67, at 11-41.
Indeed, many consider process theory and original intent theory as distinct, and somewhat
conflicting, approaches to constitutional interpretation. See ARTHUR, supra note 67, at ix,
43; Rubenfeld, supra note 148, at 1132. In theory, original intent jurists could comfortably
argue that a court should act more assertively in crafting its interpretive methodology to
ensure that the political process operates properly than in crafting interpretive
methodology to further substantive ends. That is, originalists can believe that courts, in
interpreting statutes, should play a greater role in furthering democratic processes than in
pursuing substantive outcomes.
150. Ely's argument for aggressive judicial review rests on his concern that minorities
must be protected from majorities. Indeed, Ely been criticized for ignoring the potential
minority dominance of a majority that results from the probability that small groups will
make more of an effort than large, diffuse groups to influence legislators. See Komesar,
supra note 135, at 412-13 n.141, 414-25. New textualists question Congress's procedural
choices largely out of fear that minorities will dominate the majority. They assume that
majorities cannot and do not protect themselves in structuring congressional procedures.
151. FARBER & FRiICKEY, supra note 12, at 73; see also id. at 119 & n.6 ("We agree
with Hans Linde that the courts seem more capable of constructing 'a blueprint for the
due process of deliberative, democratically accountable government' than of assessing, in
all but exceptional cases, whether legislation properly promotes public values." (quoting
Linde, supra note 65, at 253)); Burt Neuborne, Judicial Review and Separation of Powers
in France and the United States, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 363,365 (1982) ("Process-based judicial
review seems a good deal less ambitious than its substantive counterpart. It seeks merely
to ensure that value choices arguably in conflict with those of the Founders be made by an
appropriate government body pursuant to appropriate rules." (citation omitted)); Susan
Rose-Ackerman, Progressive Law and Economics-And the New Administrative Law, 98
YALE L.J. 341, 354 (1988) (proposing that courts "reinforce democratic representation by
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Citizens, acting through their elected representatives, do not lose
their interest in deciding issues merely because those issues can be
characterized as procedural. Therefore, process theorists offer three
justifications for the judiciary's assumption of a more active role in
reviewing procedural, rather than substantive, decisions. First, the
judiciary possesses greater expertise in addressing procedural issues
than substantive issues. 52  Second, procedural issues are more
amenable to resolution by "neutral principles"15 3 and thus do not
require courts to make value judgments that elected officials should
make.154 The third process theory justification does not assume
heightened judicial competence, but diminished legislative
competence. Process theorists argue that legislative resolution of
procedural issues warrants distrust because elected officials have
incentives to determine these issues in a manner that is neither
deliberate nor unbiased.'55
Some justifications of process theory are problematic in general.
Others have force in some circumstances, but not when used to justify
heightened judicial scrutiny of legislatures' internal processes.
Concerns about protecting legislatures' institutional autonomy may
counsel added caution in pursuing a process theory approach.
Although courts reputedly possess special competence to judge
adding greater realism to judicial interpretation of statutes and review of the legislative
process").
152. See ELY, supra note 67, at 21, 102.
153. Id. at 54-55. There is a tradition of seeking to discover neutral principles on which
to ground constitutional law. See generally Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some
First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 35 (1971) ("The Supreme Court's
constitutional role appears to be justified only if the Court applies principles that are
neutrally derived, defined, and applied."); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of
Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 15 (1959) (arguing that courts have the power
and the duty to analyze cases on "grounds of adequate neutrality and generality").
154. Some process scholars rely on another, purely temporal argument: the judiciary
should assume a greater role in addressing procedural issues because specification of the
process precedes resolution of substantive issues. See Neuborne, supra note 151, at 366-.
67; Frederick Schauer, Judicial Review of the Devices of Democracy, 94 CoLUM. L. REV.
1326, 1343 (1994). In other words, procedures must be established before substantive
issues can be resolved. For example, before the U.S. Government could begin to address
substantive issues, a Federal Constitution had to be drafted and ratified-the
establishment of procedural requirements for legislation had to precede the adoption of
statutes. Similarly, the first order of business in the House of Representatives in each
Congress is to enact its standing rules for that Congress, see CHARLES W. JOHNSON, III,
How OUR LAWS ARE MADE 2 (rev. ed. 1998), and the first order of business in legislative
debate is to debate and vote upon the special rule proposed by the House Rules
Committee, see OLESZEK, supra note 147, at 165; BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX
LAWMAKING: NEW LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES IN THE U.S. CONGRESS 26 (1997).
155. See ARTHUR, supra note 67, at 49-52; ELY, supra note 67, at 101-04; Schauer,
supra note 154, at 1336-37 & n.3.
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procedural issues,"6 the procedural issues that fall within that
expertise relate to adjudicative proceedings. Significantly, process
theorists have not shown that judges have acquired any special
competence with regard to issues of legislative procedure. 157  Nor
have process theorists made such a showing with respect to the
various nonlegislative matters that fall within the jurisdiction of one
156. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 248 (1993) (White, J., concurring in the
judgment) ("One might think that if any class of concepts would fall within the definitional
abilities of the Judiciary, it would be the class having to do with procedural justice."); Hi-
Craft Clothing v. NLRB, 660 F.2d 910, 914-16 (3d Cir. 1981) (comparing judicial and
agency competence); ELY, supra note 67, at 21, 87-88, 102 (critiquing the assumption that
the courts have unique expertise regarding questions of how the political system allocates
"voice and power"); Komesar, supra note 135, at 379 (positing that given the selection and
training of judges, they are better at resolving procedural issues, or at least they feel most
comfortable dealing with such issues); Jonathan R. Macey, Judicial Preferences, Public
Choice, and the Rules of Procedure, 23 J. LEG. STUD. 627, 643 (1994) (noting that judges
generally "have significant expertise in existing procedural norms"). See generally 5
KENNETH CuLp DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 29.14, at 393 (2d ed. 1984)
(emphasizing judicial competence regarding issues of procedural fairness); Ronald M.
Levin, Identifying Questions of Law in Administrative Law, 74 GEo. L.J. 1, 59-62 (1985)
(observing that some writers' belief that the courts should exercise independent judgment
when reviewing agency procedural decisions is consistent with "the widely repeated but
controversial claim that judges are the 'experts' on procedural fairness").
157. See Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1182 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Bork, J.,
concurring); ALEXANDER BICKEL, REFORM AND CONTINUITY 2 (1971); Davidson, supra
note 48, at 94; Katzmann, supra note 53, at 177; Katzmann, supra note 48, at 11, 15, 19.
See generally Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976) (stressing that political
branches are accorded deference in determining what process is due); 1 KENNETH CuLP
DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 2.5, at 61-62 (3d
ed. 1994) (arguing that courts are not as competent as legislatures and agencies in
performing cost-benefit analysis such as the three-part test in Mathews v. Eldridge); Jerry
L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in
Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28,
47-49 (1976) (same); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Due Process Counterrevolution of the
1990s?, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 1973, 1998 (1996) (asserting that legislatures and agencies are
better suited than courts to the task of selecting decisiomaking procedures that guarantee
that claimants for government benefits receive due process); Richard A. Posner,
Democracy and Distrust Revisited, 77 VA. L. REV. 641, 649-50 (1991) (arguing that
process theorists' assertion that lawyers and judges are better equipped to deal with
questions of process than with questions of substance is true only with respect to trial and
hearing procedures, not with respect to the design of political institutions); Todd D.
Rakoff, Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc. and the New Law of Regulatory Due Process,
1987 Sup. CT. REv. 157, 197 (questioning whether the courts are any more competent to
make judgments regarding procedural issues than to make judgments on substantive issues
when procedural issues arise in the administrative rather than the judicial context).
Indeed, perhaps the courts possess special competence with respect to the adjudicatory
process and similarly functioning processes, rather than the legislative process. See
generally ELY, supra note 67, at 102 (arguing that judges are not the only decisionmakers
who can claim some expertise about "how the political process allocates voice and
power"); Komesar, supra note 135, at 406-08 (noting that a legislature can also address
questions of its procedure).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
or both Houses of Congress, such as the consideration of nominations
to government positions and agency oversight." 8  The courts
themselves often acknowledge their limitations in resolving such
procedural quandaries.59
The resolution of procedural issues, like the resolution of
substantive issues, involves choices among contested values. No
"neutral principles" enable courts to avoid reconciling contested
values in the course of resolving procedural issues.16° Issues such as
the composition of election districts, the method of electing members
of multimember bodies, the requirement of holding a run-off if a
candidate prevails by only a plurality, the requirements for
registration of voters and candidates, and the power of various
institutions in the legislature involve reconciliation of competing
values that cannot be accomplished by resorting to any value-neutral
formulas. Issues regarding the drawing of district lines may involve
questions of whether racial minorities will fare better if they
constitute a majority or near-majority in a few districts or a significant
minority in a number of districts.16' Whether elections are at-large or
158. There is little reason to believe that process theorists could support such a claim.
159. See supra notes 72, 74, 85-86 and accompanying text (discussing the judiciary's
reluctance to involve itself in legislative procedure).
160. See Neuborne, supra note 151, at 366; Daniel R. Ortiz, Pursuing a Perfect Politics:
The Allure and Failure of Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 721 (1991); Schauer, supra note
154, at 1327 & n.2.; see also The Electoral College and Direct Election: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 42, 57
(1977) (Sup. Docs. No. Y4.J8912El29ISupp) (testimony of Judith A. Best) ("No electoral
system is neutral. Every electoral system, as a practical matter, favors certain groups and
interests and discriminates against others."). Even a devotee of Ely's approach concedes
that process theory can only identify the areas in which the courts should make decisions;
it does not tell us what those decisions should be. See Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling
Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 747, 782-88 (1991) (stating that Ely
tries to prove too much when he uses political process theory to purport to find the results
that the court should come to rather than the areas in which the court has authority to
decide).
161. See, e.g., Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 153-55 (1993) ("[T]he creation of
majority-minority districts does not invariably maximize or minimize minority voting
strength."); KErH J. BYBEE, MISTAKEN IDENTITY: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
POLrIcs OF MINORITY REPRESENTATION 52-54 (1998) (discussing some of the
arguments for and against the creation of majority-minority electoral districts); LANI
GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS IN
REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY 36-37 (1994) (discussing the advancement of minority
interests by majority-minority electoral districts); ABIGAIL M. THERNSTROM, WHOSE
VOTES COUNT? AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS 234, 243-44
(1987) (arguing that the creation of majority-minority districts has reduced the influence
of racial minorities); MELISSA S. WILLIAMS, VOICE, TRUST, AND MEMORY 70-75, 110-15
(1998) (same). More generally, Justice Frankfurter described legislative apportionment as
"the product of legislative give-and-take and of compromise among policies that often
conflict." Baker v. Can-, 369 U.S. 186,349 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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by single member districts requires a reconciliation of the importance
of the representation of geographically concentrated minorities and
the importance of having representatives who can consider the
interests of the whole community or who can represent
geographically dispersed minorities.162 Legislative procedures involve
trade-offs between efficiency and promoting deliberation and
equality among legislators. 63 Whether courts should have a role in
resolving these questions surely does not turn on the existence of any
"neutral principle" that can eliminate the need to choose between
competing values. Neutral principles cannot guide decisions with
regard to legislative procedure, any more than neutral principles can
guide substantive decisions.
Process theorists' third justification for aggressive review,
diminished legislative competence, provides some support for new
textualist arguments. Process theorists' assessment that legislative
consideration of some political issues probably will reflect some bias
is sound.1 4 For example, Ely fears that those holding power will rig
162. See City of Port Arthur v. United States, 459 U.S. 159, 167-68 (1982) (upholding a
lower court decision that a particular majority-vote system was designed with
discriminatory animus); Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 616 (1982) ("At-large voting
schemes and multimember districts tend to minimize the voting strength of minority
groups by permitting the political majority to elect all representatives of the district.");
Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 157-60 (1971) (stating that both multimember and
single member schemes are problematic).
163. The size of the House and the difficulty in managing it require compromising
individual legislators' abilities to amend statutes and participate in debate. See, e.g.,
Joseph Cooper, Congress in Organizational Perspective, in CONGRESS RECONSIDERED
140, 140-59 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 1977); Nelson W. Polsby,
The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives, 62 AM. POL. SI. REV. 144,
164-65 (1968) (noting that traditionally, political scientists have seen congressional
procedural changes as compelled by institutional needs); Charles Stewart, Responsiveness
in the Upper Chamber: The Constitution and the Institutional Development of the Senate,
in THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT 63, 63-96 (Peter F.
Nardulli ed., 1992) (discussing the resiliency and responsiveness of the Senate in the
political process). But see Sarah A. Binder, The Partisan Basis of Procedural Choice:
Allocating Parliamentary Rights in the House, 1789-1990, 90 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 8 passim
(1996) (concluding that changes in the rules of the United States House of
Representatives suggest that partisanship lay behind the decisions). Many congressional
procedures necessary to help manage the House accord some individual members
extraordinary power, thereby undermining the ideal of equality among legislators. See
Bell, supra note 4, at 49-50 & n.144; Larry Evans et al., Congressional Procedure and
Statutory Interpretation, 45 ADMIN. L. REV. 239,247-53 (1993).
164. Such a consideration, for instance, has led most countries to place control over
monetary policies in institutions insulated from elected officials. In particular, monetary
policies are decided by central banks, such as the Federal Reserve Board in the United
States or the Bundesbank in the Federal Republic of Germany, whose directors are
insulated from the government of the day. See, e.g., PAUL KRUGMAN, PEDDLING
PROSPERITY: ECONOMIC SENSE AND NONSENSE IN THE AGE OF DIMINISHED
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procedures in their favor in order to retain power-that is, they wil
seek to close the "channels of political change."'6 s His concern is not
without justification. The history of congressional reform measures
shows that those enjoying extraordinary power likely will prevent
procedural reforms that would make the institution more amenable
to changes in leadership. In particular, the fate of efforts to change
congressional rules and practices regarding seniority, committee
power, and jurisdiction, and the Speaker's prerogatives illustrate this
phenomenon.166 The same phenomenon arises with issues involving
the electoral system-such as reform of campaign finance rules and
control of franking privileges. 67
Some new textualist concerns involve aspects of the legislative
process that may well entrench those who already enjoy
extraordinary, undemocratic power. For instance, committee and
subcommittee chairs probably have much greater influence over
committee reports than other legislators, and committee staff likely
entrench a bias toward the majority party viewpoint to the extent that
majority party committee members control inordinate numbers of
committee staff members. Accordingly, sound process-based
arguments could justify judicial assumption of a more aggressive role
on at least some of the issues new textualists press.
New textualists' arguments, however, raise distinctive
institutional autonomy concerns because, unlike traditional process
theorists, new textualists focus on legislatures' internal processes. For
EXPECrATIONS 118-21 (1994) (discussing the power of the Federal Reserve Board and its
independence from the political branches of government); Richard W. Stevenson,
Divorcing Central Banks and Politics: Independence Helps in Inflation Fight, N.Y. TIMES,
May 7, 1997, at D6 (contending that the separation of federal reserve policy from politics
is beneficial to the American economy).
Interestingly, in the context of congressional decisions regarding disputed
congressional elections, Justice Scalia has rejected the argument that the likelihood of
biased legislative decisionmaking justifies judicial intervention. See Morgan v. United
States, 801 F.2d 445,447 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
165. ELY, supra note 67, at 105-34.
166. See LEROY N. RIESELBACH, CONGRESSIONAL REFORM: THE CHANGING
MODERN CONGRESS 77-79 (1994).
167. See Paul S. Hernson et al., Interest Groups at the Dawn of a New Millennium, in
THE INTEREST GROUP CONNECrION: ELECITONEERING, LOBBYING, AND
POLICYMAKING IN WASHINGTON 327, 332-34 (Paul S. Hernson et al. eds., 1998); see also
Bradley A. Smith, Faulty Assumptions and Undemocratic Consequences of Campaign
Finance Reform, 105 YALE LJ. 1049, 1074 n.156 (1996) ("Incumbents will always have
powerful personal incentives to set spending caps at a level that disadvantages their
challengers."); W. Duane Benton, Note, Congressional Perquisites and Fair Elections: The
Case of the Franking Privilege, 83 YALE LJ. 1055, 1060-62, 1077-79 (1974) (suggesting
that the franking privilege aids incumbents).
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example, much of Ely's discussion of the role of heightened judicial
review of procedure does not relate to internal legislative
procedures.1ss Rather, Ely calls for heightened judicial scrutiny on
two bases. The first is designed to ensure that the structure of
government remains uncompromised,169 but its focus is on protecting
the integrity of the electoral processes. For instance, Ely concentrates
on the freedom of expression 7 ° and the rights to vote and seek
elective office.17 1 Ely's second basis for heightened judicial scrutiny
involves substantive review of statutes that disadvantage minorities. 172
Ely argues that such a principle addresses a pathology of
democracy-majoritarian institutions' tendency to reflect the
prejudices of popular majorities and neglect the interests of groups
with whom popular majorities cannot empathize. 73 Thus, Ely argues
for heightened scrutiny of legislative classifications based on
alienage, 74 poverty,'75 and race,'76 as well as heightened scrutiny of
statutes that disadvantage citizens of other states. 77
168. See ELY, supra note 67, at 105-34. However, Ely seems willing to allow courts to
interfere with legislatures' autonomy over legislative operations. For instance, while he
ultimately rejects the judicial imposition of a requirement that legislatures articulate the
purposes of their statutes, he does so because such an articulation requirement probably
would not improve the legislative process. See id. at 128. Nevertheless, Ely does not
suggest that imposing such a requirement would infringe improperly upon legislative
prerogatives. On the other hand, even with respect to requiring legislatures to articulate
purposes, Ely's concern is not with the allocation of power between legislators, but with
the assurance that legislative actions are "visible" in order to facilitate accountability to
the electorate. See id. at 125-31.
169. See id. at 103 (arguing that this is "critical to the functioning of an open and
effective democratic process").
170. See id. at 105-16.
171. See id. at 116-25.
172. See id. at 152-54. See generally id at 135-70 (presenting an argument that
heightened judicial scrutiny is needed to ensure that some minorities are treated fairly in
the political process).
173. See id. at 151,153.
174. See id. at 161-62.
175. See id at 162. Ely notes that such heightened scrutiny of explicit wealth
classifications is not likely to provide much help to the poor because their problems
generally do not arise from explicit statutory classifications. See id.
176. See id- at 150-53.
177. See id. at 83-84, 90-91. This second prong of Ely's theory has been the one most
subject to attack. The first prong has been somewhat less controversial and is considered
quite limited in its implications. See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Substance of Process, 42 OHIo
ST. L.J. 131, 133 (1981) (ignoring the first prong of Ely's argument and focusing on the
second prong); Klarman, supra note 160, at 748 (asserting that "the access, but not the
prejudice, prong of political process theory has emerged relatively unscathed from the
barbs of Ely's critics"); Ortiz, supra note 160, at 729 (arguing that Ely's theory that judicial
review is necessary to core formal or process imperfections that choke off the channels of
change justifies "only a small part of the area of judicial review that process theory
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The new textualist challenge to the use of legislative history
invades the legislature's institutional autonomy. The questions that
new textualists raise regarding the use of staff, the reliability of
congressional documents, and the influence of lobbyists in the
legislative process all involve the internal operation of the legislature
to a much greater extent than do issues of free speech, voting rights,
and the right to run for office. 78 Courts have recognized a distinction
between enforcement of rules or constitutional provisions that relate
to the rights of nonlegislators and those that relate solely to the power
of legislators,179 and the judiciary has been much more willing to
traditionally defends"); see also ARTHUR, supra note 67, at 62-74, 140-41 (critiquing Ely's
process theory).
178. To the extent that the new textualists base their challenge on views about the
appropriate precision of statutes, their challenge is not an exclusively institutional concern
and is one that Ely addresses. Although Ely addresses this challenge in the context of
ensuring that the electoral process is meaningful, he argues that voting is meaningful only
if elected representatives make significant governmental decisions. See ELY, supra note
67, at 131-34. Votes can be diluted as much by altering legislative responsibilities as by
changing voting procedures. Cf. Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 502 U.S. 491, 521-25
& n.27 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that a county commission that delegated its
powers to appointed officials after the election of an African-American to the commission
violated the Voting Rights Act by diluting the votes of African-Americans); Hardy v.
Wallace, 603 F. Supp. 174, 178-79 (N.D. Ala. 1985) (holding that a statute that transferred
authority to appoint the county racing commission from the delegation representing the
county in the state legislature to the governor was subject to review); County Council of
Sumter County v. United States, 555 F. Supp. 694, 696-98 (D.D.C. 1983) (asserting that
the elimination of certain elected county supervisory positions in conjunction with an at-
large voting system for a county council was subject to review); GUINIER, supra note 161,
at 179-80 (criticizing the Supreme Court's holding in Presley, in which the Court upheld
white incumbent commissioners' decision to reduce the power of county commissioners
after the election of the first African-American county commissioner since
Reconstruction).
179. See United States v. Smith, 286 U.S. 6, 33 (1932) (stating that whenever a Senate
committee's interpretation of Senate rules "affects persons other than members of the
Senate, the question presented is of necessity a judicial one"); Exxon Corp. v. FTC, 589
F.2d 582, 590 (D.C. Cir. 1978) ("Although the courts will intervene to protect
constitutional rights from infringement by Congress, ... where constitutional rights are
not violated, there is no warrant for the judiciary to interfere with the internal procedures
of Congress."); Skaggs v. Carle, 898 F. Supp. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1995) (noting that the D.C.
Circuit has long refused to intrude on the internal affairs of Congress at the behest of
lawmakers complaining of their colleagues' unconstitutional conduct); Castello, supra note
71, at 522 ("Under doctrines of abstention and jurisdiction, courts usually decline to
enforce legislatures' internal rules. Nevertheless, in cases where private parties' rights are
at issue, courts have made it clear that legislatures' rules are legally binding."); Miller,
supra note 71, at 1347 (observing that legislative rules are rarely justiciable because they
typically are challenged to vindicate legislators' interests rather than the interests of
citizens); id. at 1374 ("The 'political' political question doctrine recognizes the political
nature of legislative rules of procedure, but it also recognizes the necessity of limiting the
legislature's ability to affect through the use of procedural rules the rights and liabilities of
non-legislators."). See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 166, 167, 170
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protect the rights of nonlegislators than to protect the rights of
legislators.
Christoffel v. United States'80 and Exxon v. FTC8' highlight this
distinction. In Christoffel, the Court reviewed a perjury conviction
appealed by a defendant who claimed that he could not have
committed perjury because he had provided false testimony to a
congressional committee that lacked a quorum at the time he testified
and thus was not "a competent tribunal. '182  In holding that the
defendant could raise the absence of a quorum as a defense, the
Court disregarded the congressional rule that the presence of a
quorum at the beginning of a committee session conclusively
establishes the presence of a quorum for the entire session. The
Court explained that "[i]n a criminal case affecting the rights of one
not a member [of Congress], the occasion of trial is an appropriate
one" to contest the lack of a quorum."l A challenge to the conclusive
presumption by a member of Congress or a member of the public
who disapproved of the practice but was not a criminal defendant
would probably have failed.1m The Court's lack of deference in
Christoffel contrasts starkly with the deference accorded Congress in
the challenges to legislative procedure cited earlier.
By contrast, in Exxon a congressional committee sought
confidential information, including trade secrets, that the Federal
Trade Commission had previously received from Exxon pursuant to
subpoena. Expressing concern about potential committee disclosure
of its confidential information, Exxon sought a court order requiring
the committee: (1) to give citizens ten days notice before it
subpoenaed their files from the FTC; and (2) to establish safeguards
to prevent public disclosure of Exxon's confidential information. In
denying relief to Exxon," the D.C. Circuit cited Christoffel and Yellin
v. United States 86 and explained that the judiciary will intervene to
(1803) ("The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals, not to
inquire how [public officials perform discretionary duties].").
180. 338 U.S. 84 (1949).
181. 589 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
182. Christoffel, 338 U.S. at 85.
183. Id. at 88 (emphasis added).
184. Similarly, in Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109 (1963), the Supreme Court
reversed a defendant's conviction for contempt of Congress. See id. at 124. The Court
held that the committee seeking the defendant's testimony had violated his right to testify
in private, which was guaranteed by the committee's rules. See id. at 123. In doing so, the
Court rejected the interpretation of the committee rule offered by the committee itself, as
the dissent pointedly noted. See id. at 143 (White, J., dissenting).
185. See Exxon, 589 F.2d at 590.
186. See id.
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protect a citizen's constitutional rights from infringement by
congressional committees. 1' 7 By acting in the absence of such a threat
to an individual's constitutional rights, the court would be intruding
upon the internal operations of Congress, which it was loath to do.'M
In short, "requir[ing] guarantees of specific congressional procedures
in advance of any concrete threat to [Exxon's] vital interest" would
"exceed [the court's] jurisdiction.' '189
These cases show that, in essence, when an injured private party
claims that Congress failed to provide a privilege or right granted by a
legislative procedural rule, "[t]he political nature of the rule gives way
to [the rule's] function as a nonpolitical guarantee of individual
protections.' 190 Even if the process theory advocated by Professor
Ely is justified to protect the interests of individual citizens, reliance
on process theory to interfere with legislative autonomy regarding the
relative powers of legislators or regarding internal legislative
187. 374 U.S. 109 (1963).
18& See Exxon, 589 F.2d at 590. Had Exxon claimed imminent disclosure of its trade
secrets, the court might have entertained the action. See id. at 587.
189. Id. at 590. Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975), calls
into question the distinction suggested above. In Eastland, the First Amendment freedom
of association rights of members of an unpopular political group were threatened by a
congressional subpoena. See id, at 493. The committee subpoena ordered a bank to
provide information that would have identified members of the group. While the Court
had recognized such claims in the context of challenges to judicial subpoenas in NAACP v.
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), it held in Eastland that the Speech and Debate Clause
precluded it from quashing a congressional committee subpoena based on such First
Amendment claims. See Eastland, 421 U.S. at 510. The varying results in Christoffel,
Yellin, Eastland, and Exxon potentially can be explained by the types of liability at stake.
Those faced with criminal liability can challenge legislative procedures; those who face
civil liability cannot. Alternatively, the varying results could be explained by the types of
people complaining about legislative procedures. Holders of information can challenge
legislative procedures, while someone who will be harmed by the use of information held
by another cannot challenge legislative procedures. The cases also could be explained
plausibly by their historical context-perhaps the courts more aggressively policed
committee proceedings in the McCarthy Era and the years immediately preceding and
succeeding that era than at other times.
190. Miller, supra note 71, at 1370; see also United States v. Smith, 286 U.S. 6,33 (1932)
("[When] the construction to be given to the rules affects persons other than members of
the Senate, the question presented is of necessity a judicial one."); Gregg v. Barrett, 771
F.2d 539, 542 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (stating that the court does not "reviewo congressional
practices and procedures when they primarily and directly affect the way Congress does its
legislative business" (emphasis added)); Skaggs v. Carle, 898 F. Supp. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1995)
(reiterating that the separation-of-powers principle prevents courts from reviewing
internal congressional rules at the behest of legislators); Gregory Frederick Van
Tatenhove, Note, A Question of Power: Judicial Review of Congressional Rules of
Procedure, 76 KY. LJ. 597, 615 (1988) ("Yellin illustrates once again the Court's
willingness to review congressional rules for compliance when a private party is involved."
(citation omitted)).
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institutions is difficult to justify. In sum, process theory does not
justify the new textualists' heightened scrutiny of Congress's decisions
regarding the reliability of legislative history and the role of staff or
interest groups in the legislative process.
C. Underenforced Constitutional Nonns
Aggressive review of legislative practices in the course of
interpreting statutes might be appropriate because statutory
decisions, unlike constitutional decisions, may be reversed by
legislators. If a congressional majority disagrees with a court decision
grounded in the Constitution, it may reverse that decision only by
initiating the arduous process of amending the Constitution, but if
that majority disagrees with a court's construction of a statute, it can
revise the statute by ordinary legislative processes.19' Thus, the
judiciary can aggressively pursue constitutional values in the course of
interpreting statutes because such decisions can be "overturned" by
Congress.72 The courts may opt for such an approach because they
cannot fashion a judicially administrable yet robust standard to use in
deciding the constitutionality of statutes threatening a particular
constitutional value. Such a statutory interpretation approach would
serve merely to encourage the legislature to consider fully the
191. This constitutional-statutory dichotomy has been used as a basis for advocating an
absolute rule of stare decisis with regard to statutory rulings. See, e.g., Neal v. United
States, 516 U.S. 284,295-96 (1996) ("One reason that we give great weight to stare decisis
in the area of statutory construction is that 'Congress is free to change this Court's
interpretation of its legislation.' " (quoting Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 736
(1977))); Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 641 (1983) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("For when the Court unequivocally rejects one reading of a statute, its action
should be respected in future litigation."); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory
Precedents, 76 GEo L.J. 1361, 1364-69 (1988) (claiming that a "super-strong presumption"
of stare decisis exists in the Supreme Court); Frank E. Horack, Jr., Congressional Silence:
A Tool of Judicial Supremacy, 25 ThX. L. REV. 247, 251-52 (1946) (arguing that judicial
reversal of a prior judicial construction of a statute usurps Congress's legislative power);
Lawrence C. Marshall, "Let Congress Do It". The Case for an Absolute Rule of Statutory
Stare Decisis, 88 MICH. L. REv. 177, 183 (1989) (arguing that the Supreme Court should
"adopt an absolute rule of stare decisis for all of its statutory and federal common law
decisions").
192. Although Congress could overturn the Court's substantive interpretation of a
statute, it is not clear that the new textualists would allow Congress to overturn their
judgments about the deficiencies of the legislative process and the deleterious effects of
legislative history. It is also not clear that new textualists would uphold a statute
purporting to require the courts to use legislative history when interpreting ambiguous
language. See Statutory Interpretation and the Uses of Legislative History, supra note 12, at
92-93, 144 (statement of William N. Eskridge, Jr.) (suggesting that a statute providing that
the federal courts should consider legislative history would be considered unconstitutional
by Justice Scalia).
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constitutional value, without risking excessive intrusion into
legislative prerogatives.
Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong"93 provides a classic example of the
underenforced constitutional norms approach-although not in the
context of statutory interpretation. 194  In Hampton, a group of
resident aliens contended that a regulation 195 barring noncitizens from
federal government employment violated the Equal Protection and
Due Process Clauses. The Court acknowledged that the federal
government's power over aliens is "subject only to narrow judicial
review,"'96 because of "the political character of the power overimmigration and naturalization."'" The Court also acknowledged
that the Civil Service Commission "ha[s] identified several interests
which the Congress or the President might deem sufficient to justify
the exclusion of noncitizens from the federal service. '198  These
interests included the President's use of employment as a bargaining
tool in negotiating treaties and encouraging aliens to seek
citizenship. 9 9 The Court nevertheless invalidated the provision,
reasoning that only Congress or the President could invoke the
interests justifying such an exclusion from employment-and that the
Civil Service Commission could point to no congressional or
presidential consideration of the issue.20 Moreover, the Civil Service
Commission's responsibilities did not include the type of foreign
affairs and naturalization concerns that could justify such a limitation
on employment.2 1 The Court concluded that:
Since these residents were admitted as a result of decisions
made by the Congress and the President, implemented by
the Immigration and Naturalization Service acting under the
Attorney General of the United States, due process requires
that the decision to impose th[e] deprivation of an important
liberty interest [in potential federal employment] be made at
a comparable level of government or, if it is to be permitted
to be made by the Civil Service Commission, that it be
justified by reasons which are properly the concern of the
193. 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
194. See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 12, at 119-21; MARK V. TUSHNET, RED,
WHITE, AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 202-03, 208
(1988); Sager, supra note 65, at 1412-14.
195. See 5 C.F.R. § 338.101 (1976).
196. Hampton, 426 U.S. at 101 n.21.
197. Id. at 101 (citation omitted).
198. Id. at 103-04.
199. See id. at 104.
200. See id. at 104-05,105-14.
201. See id. at 104-05, 114-15.
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agency.2
Thus, in an area in which constitutional principles are
underenforced 2°3 because the issues involve "political questions"
dedicated to other branches of government, the Court encouraged
adherence to those principles by requiring Congress and the
President to consider explicitly whether to contravene those
principles.
Courts have refrained from directly enforcing some principles
because of institutional competence concerns, while nevertheless
furthering them in the process of interpreting statutes.2 5 For
example, courts have fashioned clear statement rules to further
underenforced constitutional norms.2 6 Clear statement rules specify
that courts will interpret statutes to contravene certain principles only
if the legislature clearly indicates its intention to contravene those
principles.2° For instance, the Supreme Court has held that courts
should interpret a statute to abrogate Eleventh Amendment
202. Id. at 116 (citation omitted).
203. The Court already had held, for instance, that a state could not ban noncitizens
from state employment, see Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 646 (1973), or from
admission to the bar, see In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717,729 (1973).
204. A similar approach has been taken with respect to equal protection review of
affirmative action plans. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 549-52 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320 (1978) (Powell, J.,
concurring); Mark S. Kende, Note, Principles of Competence: The Ability of Public
Institutions to Adopt Remedial Affirmative Action Plans, 53 U. Ci. L. REV. 581, 586--92
(1986).
205. See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 12, at 70 n.22. Professors Farber and Frickey
discuss underenforced constitutional norms-constitutionally based norms that "may well
be binding upon legislators, administrators, and judges but because of institutional
differences ha[ve] far more practical relevance outside the judiciary." Id See generally
TUSHNET, supra note 65, at 163-65 (arguing that in the absence of judicial review of the
constitutionality of government actions, courts could restrain governmental actions by
employing an ultra vires doctrine like that used in Great Britain and the Netherlands or by
employing statutory interpretation).
206. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 546 (1992) (Scalia J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking,
45 VAND L. REv. 593, 597 (1992) (claiming that clear statement rules are "a practical way
for the Court to focus legislative attention" on underenforced constitutional values);
Nagle, Waiving Sovereign Immunity, supra note 32, at 805 (suggesting that the Court uses
clear statement rules to "guard values deserving special judicial protection").
207. See Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes, supra note 19, at 457-58; Cass R. Sunstein, Law
and Administration After Chevron, 90 CoLUM. L. REv. 2071, 2109, 2110-11 (1990); see
also Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARV. L. REV.
469, 504 (1996) (describing the concept of "clear statement" rules and observing that they
reroute delegated lawmaking authority back to Congress). See generally TUSHNET, supra
note 65, at 126 (discussing "clear statement" rules as a means of encouraging the political
branches of government to further constitutional norms).
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sovereign immunity from suit only if the statute abrogates that
immunity explicitly."' Thus, a court may not find that a federal
statute imposes monetary liability on a state unless the statute does so
unambiguously. However, when Congress provides statutory text
that satisfies the clear statement rule, expressly making states liable
for damages, the courts will find that states are amenable to such
suits.?9
Federalism norms have traditionally been underenforced. For
most of the last century, the Supreme Court found it difficult to craft
robust constitutional doctrines that constrained national government
encroachments upon state power, but the Court has protected the
states by establishing several clear statement rules.210  The clear
statement rule regarding abrogation of the states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity described above provides one example. A
second example of such a clear statement rule is the requirement that
Congress enact an express provision before the courts wiil interpret
the statute as effectively imposing a condition on federal monetary
grants to the states.2  Of course, over the last few years the Court
vigorously has begun to enforce federalism principles, in a variety of
contexts, by invalidating statutes.212
The Supreme Court also has established a clear statement rule to
208. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234,242 (1985); see also Hoffman
v. Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintenance, 492 U.S. 96, 101 (1989) ("[T]o abrogate the
States' Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court... Congress must make
its intention 'unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.' " (quoting Atascadero, 473
U.S. at 242)). The Court has employed a similar approach with regard to the federal
government's common-law immunity from suit. See Lehman v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156,
160 (1981).
209. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 7-13 (1989), overruled by
Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
210. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 206, at 619-28, 642-43.
211. See Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 190 n. 11 (1982); Pennhurst State Sch.
& Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).
212. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that "states retain
immunity from private suit in their own courts, an immunity beyond the congressional
power to abrogate by Article I legislation"); College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219, 2233 (1999) (holding that the
Trademark Remedy Clarificaton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1122 (1994), does not abrogate states'
sovereign immunity, nor does a state voluntarily waive its immunity by its "activities in
interstate commerce"); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say.
Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199, 2210 (1999) (holding that the Patent and Plant Variety Protection
Remedy Clarification Act, 35 U.S.C. § 271 (1994 & Supp. III 1997), does not abrogate
state soverign immunity); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (holding that
the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1994), current version
at id. (Supp. IV 1998), violates the Commerce Clause).
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address the constitutional concerns raised by retroactive legislation,2 3
making most statutes prospective only, unless Congress clearly
expresses its intent to make a statute retroactive.
Justice Scalia is a proponent of clear statement rules, though
perhaps not solely because they allow the courts to further
constitutional values.214  Thus, this underenforced constitutional
norms approach might form part of the basis for Justice Scalia's more
aggressive review of legislative judgments in the interpretive process.
New textualists could argue that while a court should neither
entertain constitutional challenges to statutes because of staff or
lobbyist involvement,215 nor police the compilation of legislative
documents to ensure their accuracy,216 courts may adopt interpretive
approaches that encourage salutary practices?17  By merely
remanding the decision to a democratic body, such an approach is less
intrusive than traditional judicial review.218
213. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 286 (1994); DANIEL E. TROY,
RETROACrIVE LEGISLATION 27-28,32-33,40-43 (1998); Bernard W. Bell, In Defense of
Retroactive Laws, 78 TEx. L. REv. 235,242 (1999).
214. See Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 286 (Scalia, J., concurring); EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil
Co., 499 U.S. 244,260 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring); Karkkainen, supra note 7, at 450-51.
Justice Scalia's enthusiasm for clear statement rules may stem from his preference for
precision over flexibility and from the focus clear statement rules require of text.
215. See United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166,179 (1980).
216. See Gregg v. Barrett, 771 F.2d 539,549 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
217. I make a similar argument in defending the judiciary's use of legislative history to
interpret statutes. In particular, I have argued that legislative bodies have an obligation to
explain the justification for the statutes they enact, and I believe that this obligation is
implicit in our form of government. I argue, however, such an obligation should not be
enforced by exercising the power of judicial review of the validity of statutes, rather courts
should interpret statutes as if the justifications set forth in legislative history were
important. See Bell, supra note 4, at 26-33. This underenforced norms approach is
popular. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Constitutional Flares: On Judges, Legislatures,
and Dialogue, 83 MINN. L. REv. 1, 61 (1998); Schacter, supra note 18, at 595, 606-11
(1995); Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes, supra note 19, at 468; Mark G. Yudof, When
Governments Speak: Toward a Theory of Government Expression and the First
Amendment, 57 TEX. L. REv. 863, 912-17 (1979). Indeed, Professor Tushnet recently has
argued that reliance on underenforced norms techniques should replace judicial review of
the constitutionality of statutes. See TUSHNET, supra note 65, at 95-176.
218. See Neuborne, supra note 151, at 366. Professor Neuborne states that,
"[a]dditionally, in many-perhaps most-settings, the impact of process-based review will
be merely to remand an issue to one or another democratic forum for reconsideration in a
procedurally correct manner. As such, it casts a suspensive veto that slows, but does not
derail, majority will." Id.; see FARBER & FRIcKEY, supra note 12, at 122 n.28 (arguing
that Justice Stevens, in his affirmative action jurisprudence, has embraced the concept that
courts should exercise a "'suspensive veto' " over constitutionally questionable
legislation); TUSHNET, supra note 194, at 210 (arguing that structural review, involving
courts merely requiring government to take a "second look" at actions disadvantaging
certain suspect or quasi-suspect groups, is salutary because it is merely "suspensory").
Although Professor Neuborne discusses this as "process-based review," see Neuborne,
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Justifying the new textualist approach on this ground is
promising but ultimately problematic because even an underenforced
norms approach usurps majoritarian judgments with judicially
imposed policies.2 9 Generally accepted or textually based principles,
such as state sovereignty, nondelegation, and avoidance of
retroactivity pose fewer problems than do more controversial
principles.' As we shall see below, new textualist ideals of legislative
procedure are sufficiently controversial to call into question any new
textualist reliance on underenforced constitutional norms theory.
Moreover, new textualists have a particular problem in seeking to
rely on underenforced norms theory to the extent that they profess a
heightened sensitivity to the countermajoritarian difficulty atypical of
most theorists. In short, underenforced norms theory has potential,
although it certainly betrays new textualists' claims of greater fidelity
to the principle of limiting judicial intrusions upon majoritarian
institutions.
IV. REVISITING THE NEW TEXTUALIST CRITIQUE OF THE
LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
In this Part, I discuss the controversial nature of the new
textualists' claims. I do not seek to prove the new textualists wrong,
but rather merely seek to show that the principles they espouse arejust as controversial as the principles they vigorously attack other
theorists for seeking to further by means of judicial review. That is,
the new textualist principles are subject to the same challenge that
new textualists so often assert against others-that decisions
regarding recognition of theorists' principles and balancing those
principles against other interests should be left to the political
supra note 151, at 366, it is also a form of underenforced norms. That is, courts will not
directly decide whether the constitutional norm was violated because of institutional
competence issues, but will instead ensure legislative adherence to certain procedures that
encourage democratic bodies to protect the norm.
219. Professor Mashaw has criticized this approach. See Jerry Mashaw, As If
Republican Interpretation, 97 YALE LJ. 1685, 1690-94 (1988). He argues that pursuing
underenforced norms through statutory interpretation rather than constitutional
adjudication substitutes judicial policy for legislative policy. The legislative process makes
it difficult for simple majorities to draft precise statutory language. By refusing to
interpret statutes to harm certain interests, the courts give the advocates of those interests
an advantage in the legislative process. The result is that advocates of a judicially
protected interest need not ensure that a statute explicitly adopts their position; rather
they need only preclude opponents from having the statutes explicitly adopt the opposite
position. In this way, clear statement rules shift power away from the legislative process
and to the judiciary. See, e.g., Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 206, at 636-40.
220. See Nagie, Waiving Sovereign Immunity, supra note 32, at 808-13.
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branches of government.
A. Rules vs. Standards
The new textualists' claim that contemporary statutes suffer from
excessive vagueness and thereby grant excessive power to
administrative agencies is highly contestable. 2 In several contexts,
courts have demonstrated an inability to review the political
branches' determinations regarding the appropriate specificity of law,
and consequently, courts have left those decisions largely
unreviewed. 2 In three areas in particular, the judiciary has failed to
supervise legislative or executive determinations regarding specificity.
Those are: (1) the constitutionality of Congress's delegation of
legislative power; (2) the discretion of administrative agencies to
proceed by adjudication or rulemaking; and (3) the constitutionality
of claims that statutes are excessively vague in violation of the Due
Process Clause.2
The nondelegation doctrine limits congressional delegation of
legislative authority. The Constitution assigns to Congress "all
legislative [p]owers" granted the federal government.P4 Thus,
arguably, it implicitly limits Congress's power to delegate such
legislative power to noncongressional institutions, such as the
President and administrative agencies. 5  The federal courts,
221. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 57 (1990) ("[It is
not obvious that the combination that predominates in federal income taxation-
extremely detailed statutory specifications with frequent amendments and executive rule
making-is always to be preferred to judicial administration of flexible standards.");
Sidney A. Shapiro & Robert L. Glicksman, Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Quiet
Revolution in Administrative Law, 1988 DUKE LJ. 819, 843 (discussing the benefits of
statutes that give agencies discretion in promulgating regulations); Stock, supra note 109,
at 173 & n.59 (arguing that new textualism has led Congress to draft in too much detail).
222. See Bernard W. Bell, Dead Again: The Nondelegation Doctrine, the
Rules/Standards Dilemma, and the Line Item Veto, 44 VILLANOVA L. REv. 189, 193-95
(1999).
223. Critical legal theorists see the tension between rules and standards as
irreconcilable, and argue that the tension pervades many areas of the law. See, e.g., MARK
KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 15, 17, 40-54 (1987). Professor
Kelman describes this tension in the law of contracts, criminal law, welfare rights,
occupational safety, environmental protection, taxation, torts, and property. See id at 17-
40.
224. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States which shall consist of a Senate and House of
Representatives.").
225. See J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. U.S., 276 U.S. 394 (1928) (holding that a
delegation is proper only if Congress sets forth intelligible principles by which it can be
implemented); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892) (upholding delegation of
authority); TRIBE, supra note 64, § 5-17, at 363 (discussing the limitations of delegation);
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however, have been unable to fashion any standard for determining
the appropriate extent of congressional delegation and accordingly do
not seriously enforce the nondelegation doctrine. 6 The Supreme
Court has not held that a statute unconstitutionally delegates
legislative power since 1935,217 and new textualist Justice Scalia has
expressed agreement with this approach. In Mistretta v. United
States,.' Justice Scalia, invoking the words of Chief Justice Taft,
observed that the "limits of delegation 'must be fixed according to
common sense and the inherent necessities'" of government
cooperation. 229 He continued:
Since Congress is no less endowed with common sense than
we are, and better equipped to inform itself of the
"necessities" of government; and since the factors bearing
upon those necessities are both multifarious and (in the
nonpartisan sense) highly political.., it is small wonder that
we have almost never felt qualified to second-guess
Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy
judgment that can be left to those executing or applying the
law.230
The courts face the same problem, in a slightly different form,
when asked to review agency decisions regarding whether to proceed
by using standards or rules.231 While standards set forth factors for
decisions made on a case-by-case basis, rules provide precise
prescriptions that do not vary greatly according to the situation.
Sometimes private parties seek judicial orders to force agencies to
see also JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 141 (Peter Laslett ed., 2d
ed. 1967) (1690) (arguing that legislative bodies lack the authority to delegate the
legislative power entrusted to them).
226. See Federal Power Comm'n v. New Eng. Power Co., 415 U.S. 345, 352-53 (1974)
(Marshall, J., concurring); ELY, supra note 67, at 132-33; see also FARBER & FRICKEY,
supra note 12, at 78-79 (noting that since 1935 the federal courts have rejected every
challenge "no matter how sweeping the congressional grant of power"). See generally
JERRY L. MASHAW ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: THE AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW
SYSTEM 75-79 (3d ed. 1992) (describing the debate regarding the nondelegation doctrine).
227. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 373 (1989); Byrd v. Raines, 956 F.
Supp. 25,36 (D.D.C. 1997).
228. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
229. L at 416 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
230. Id (Scalia, J., dissenting). Indeed, given the inability of courts to enforce directly
the nondelegation doctrine, Justice Scalia believes that "structural restrictions that deter
excessive delegation" should be enforced in a "particularly rigorous" manner. Id. at 416-
17 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The "major" structural restriction, in Scalia's view, is that "the
power to make law cannot be exercised by anyone other than Congress, except in
conjunction with the lawful exercise of executive ors judicial power." Id. at 417 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
231. See 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 157, § 6.8, at 266-78.
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proceed by rules, rather than by standards and adjudication;2 2 at
other times, the converse is trueY 3  The Court, while at times
proclaiming the value of standardsm and at other times praising the
advantage of rules, 5 has left the choice to proceed by rules or
standards to administrative agencies and generally dismisses such
claims. 36 The Court adopted such a deferential approach because of
the difficulty of articulating judicial standards for determining when
an agency should adopt standards or rules. 7
Courts have had difficulty with the same issue-the appropriate
specificity of law-when attempting to determine whether statutes
are so vague as to offend the Due Process Clause.238 Outside of the
criminal and First Amendment contexts, courts virtually never find a
232. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194,199-200 (1947).
233. See Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l v. Quesada, 276 F.2d 892, 894-95 (2d Cir. 1960).
234. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974) (suggesting that
adjudication can provide an effective means of establishing standards that are most
appropriate in a given situation); Chenery, 332 U.S. at 201-04 (explaining the necessity of
adjudication and the need for flexibility in rules); see also 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note
157, § 6.8, at 267-68 (discussing case law regarding agency obligations to proceed by
rulemaking).
235. See Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231-32 (1974); National Petroleum Refiners
Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 681-83, 686-91 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Quesada, 276 F.2d at 896.
See generally 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 157, § 6.7, at 260-66 (discussing various
benefits of rules and rulemaking).
236. See 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 157, § 6.8, at 272-73 ("The Court has not even
suggested that a court can constrain an agency's choice between rulemaking and
adjudication in any opinion since Bell Aerospace."); MASHAW ET AL., supra note 226, at
553-59, 566 (noting that "[j]udicial consideration of 'appropriate specificity' has made
little doctrinal headway" either with respect to legislation or administrative action).
237. This same problem afflicted the Court's short-lived irrebuttable presumption
doctrine, a due process doctrine limiting the government's power to establish rules that
obviate the need for individualized consideration (which, in effect, required the use of
flexible standards combined with individualized adjudication). See, e.g., Vlandis v. Kline,
412 U.S. 441, 452-54 (1973). The Court quickly abandoned the doctrine as unworkable.
See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 64, § 13.6, at 545-47; TRIBE, supra note 64, § 16-32,
at 1609; id. § 16-34, at 1618-25. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING
AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 133-34, 141-43 (1996) (discussing the view that due process
includes giving people an opportunity "to urge that their case is different from those that
have gone before, and that someone in a position of authority ought to pay heed to the
particulars of their situation"); Bell, supra note 222, at 199-208 (discussing the courts'
inability to specify the appropriate level of precision in statutes or judicial doctrines).
238. See Rex A. Collings, Jr., Unconstitutional Uncertainty-An Appraisal, 40
CORNELL L.Q. 195, 195 (1955); Anthony Amsterdam, Note, The Void-for-Vagueness
Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67, 70-71 (1960); Jeffrey Merle Evans,
Recent Development, Void-for-Vagueness-Judicial Response to Allegedly Vague
Statutes-State v. Zuanich, 56 WASH. L. REV. 131, 140 (1980); Leon S. Hirsch, Comment,
Reconciliation of Conflicting Void-for-Vagueness Theories Applied by the Supreme Court,
9 Hous. L. REv. 82,85 (1971).
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statute to be unconstitutionally vague.239 Here again, in essence, the
judiciary leaves the decision regarding the appropriate specificity of
statutes to the legislature.240  Admittedly, Justice Scalia and others
seek to invoke the doctrine more frequently and also would declare
unconstitutional some statutes that have been found sufficiently
definite. 4' It is not clear, however, that Justice Scalia or other new
textualists would demand substantially more precision in statutory
drafting than the Supreme Court currently requires.
New textualists assume that the general vagueness of
contemporary statutes is unjustifiable. The vagueness of
contemporary statutes, they claim, results from one of two political
pathologies: (1) elected representatives' desire to avoid
accountability; 242  or (2) legislators passing statutes despite
fundamental disagreements that should prevent them from acting
until a more substantial consensus is reached.24 3
New textualists are correct in their belief that vague statutes can
239. See Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572-73 & n.10 (1974); see also Bauerschmidt,
supra note 123, at 1118-20 (asserting that with one exception "no civil statute ... has been
found unconstitutionally void-for-vagueness"); Jeffrey I. Tilden, Note, Big Mama Rag: An
Inquiry Into Vagueness, 67 VA. L. REV. 1543, 1553-59 (1981) (observing that while the
vagueness doctrine nominally applies to civil statutes as well as criminal statutes, the
threat of criminal punishment traditionally has been the fact that has triggered a
vagueness analysis). In his leading constitutional law treatise, Laurence Tribe does not
even discuss the doctrine outside the context of the criminal law and First Amendment
contexts. See TRIBE, supra note 65, § 12-31, at 1033-35.
240. See Bauerschmidt, supra note 123, at 1118-20.
241. See HJ., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229,254-56 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (suggesting that a portion of the Racketeer Influenced &
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1967-1968 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998), may
be unconstitutionally vague); Georgia Ass'n of Retarded Citizens v. McDaniel, 716 F.2d
1565, 1581-82 (11th Cir. 1983) (Hill, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1491 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998), should be
declared unconstitutional).
242. See American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 543-48 (1981)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S.
607, 685, 687-88 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment); ELY, supra note 67, at
131-34; FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 12, at 80; LoWi, supra note 122, at 126, 148-49,
155; DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: How CONGRESS
ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION 84-94 (1993); Marci A. Hamilton,
Discussion and Decisions: A Proposal to Replace the Myth of Self-Rule with an
Attorneyship Model of Representation, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 477, 537-40 (1994). See
generally RIESELBACH, supra note 166, at 196 (arguing that Congress plays a subordinate
role to the executive branch in formulating policy in part because members of Congress
lack the courage to take the political risk of asserting their policy preferences and
accepting the consequences if those policies turn out badly).
243. See Statutory Interpretation and the Uses of Legislative History, supra note 12, at 68
(statement of Judge Buckley of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals) (commenting that
difficult issues are often resolved by legislative decisions to "let the courts decide").
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help legislators who wish to avoid responsibility for making difficult
choices between competing aims. By enacting vague statutes,
legislators can claim to have addressed a problem while delegating
the hard choices to administrative agencies or courts. However,
statutory vagueness-and the attendant discretion conferred upon
administrative officials and judges-does not stem merely from a
congressional desire to avoid responsibility.24 Vagueness also stems
from the tendency of rules to be both underinclusive and
overinclusive.2 45 Rules are underinclusive because they often do not
cover situations or people that the rule is intended to address. They
are also overinclusive because they cover situations or people that do
not pose the harm that the rule is intended to ameliorate. While rules
make law determinate, they may do so by treating dissimilar people
similarly.2 46  Moreover, precise rules allow, and even encourage,
evasion 247 and may be rendered ineffectual, or even harmful, by
rapidly changing circumstances.24 Not surprisingly, then, scholars
vigorously debate the relative merits of vague and specific rules.2 49
244. Statutes have become less precise, but commentators have suggested a number of
possible reasons for this phenomenon that have little to do with the judicial recognition of
legislative history. See Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of
Power in the Administrative State, 89 CoLUM. L. REV. 452, 497-98 (1989); Hatch, supra
note 56, at 43; Michael Herz, Deference Running Riot: Separating Interpretation and
Lawmaking Under Chevron, 6 ADMIN. LJ. 187, 196 (1992); Miriam R. Jorgensen &
Kenneth A. Shepsle, A Comment on the Positive Canons Project, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Winter & Spring 1994, at 43, 44-46; Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the
Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 369, 383-84, 394, 395-96 (1989). These reasons
for imprecise drafting will continue to exist even if the courts refuse to recognize
legislative history.
245. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL
EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 31-34, 100-02
(1991); SUNSTEIN, supra note 237, at 130-33.
246. See SCHAUER, supra note 245, at 42-43, 47-49; SUNSTEIN, supra note 237, at 132.
247. See TOM DIAz, MAKING A KILLING: THE BUSINESS OF GUNS IN AMERICA 132
(1999); SUNSTEIN, supra note 237, at 133.
248. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 237, at 131-32.
249. See, e.g., REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF
STATUTES 49-50 (1975); Brudney, supra note 12, at 10, 28-29, 30, 39, 39-40, 57; Farber &
Frickey, supra note 8, at 458; Hatch, supra note 56, at 43; Spence, supra note 8, at 599; see
also KELMAN, supra note 223, at 15-63 (discussing the contradictory impulses in the legal
system to resolve issues by rules and by standards); SUNSTEIN, supra note 237, at 101-47
(discussing extensively the relative merit of vague and specific legal rules).
An archetypal example of excessive statutory specificity is the Delaney Clause,
which bars cancer-causing substances from foods. See 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1994).
The law not only prohibits foods containing substances that induce cancer in human
beings, but also prohibits all food containing substances that might cause cancer in
laboratory animals. See id. As a result, the statute appears to require the banning of many
beneficial substances, such as saccharine. See Public Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108, 1111,
1122 (D.C. Cir. 1987); MASHAW ET AL., supra note 226, at 122-40.
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The judiciary has not adopted a purely rule-based approach even
with respect to common-lawz ° or constitutional doctrines-areas in
which courts enjoy some quasi-legislative power.2 1 Breach of duty
questions in negligence actions provide a prime example of open-
ended, common-law inquiries. Balancing tests and multi-factor
standards have gained ascendancy in constitutional law.22 Thus, the
courts themselves have failed to fashion judicial rules that avoid
delegation- either to lower courts or juries. Even Justice Scalia, one
of the most ardent judicial advocates of rules,2 3 has acknowledged
the advantages of a discretion-conferring approach as opposed to a
rule-bound approach in crafting judicial doctrine,2 and he has
conceded that determining the appropriateness of rules or standards
in a given situation poses great difficulty 5
Similarly, judicial decisions regarding when to adopt rules and
standards have not been consistent or uncontroversial. For instance,
the Court adopted contradictory positions on the appropriate
specificity of rules governing motorists' conduct at railroad crossings
The problems with specificity are also shown by the line of cases in which the
Court has engaged in irrebuttable presumption analysis. See supra note 237.
250. The classic example of the contest between rules and standards are the two
conflicting United States Supreme Court cases, separated by a mere seven years, involving
the standards of conduct for drivers at rail crossings. Compare Baltimore & Ohio R.R.
Co. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66, 69-70 (1927) (noting that when a driver reaches a railroad
grade crossing, if the "driver cannot be sure otherwise whether a train is dangerously near
he must stop and get out of his vehicle"), with Pokora v. Wabash Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 98,
104-06 (1934) (discussing the reasonableness of a driver's failure to stop and exit his
vehicle to survey the situation when his vision at a railroad crossing is limited). For an
argument that standards are generally replacing rules in contemporary tort law, see James
A. Henderson, Jr., Expanding the Negligence Concept: Retreat from the Rule of Law, 51
IND. LJ. 467,477 (1976).
251. I use the term quasi-legislative power to encompass: (1) the power to promulgate
and change legal standards independently of the provisions of a statute; and (2) the
exercise of lawmaking power explicitly or implicitly delegated by a legislature. The courts'
role in such circumstances can be contrasted with the other areas in which courts make law
by interpreting statutes that set forth legislative policies and acting as agents of
legislatures.
252 See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE
LJ. 943, 943-44, 963-72 (1987).
253. See RICHARD A. BRISBIN, JR., JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA AND THE
CONSERVATIVE REVIVAL 294-95 (1997); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of
Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175, 1177-80, 1185 (1989); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme
Court 1991 Term-Foreword" The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22,
78, 82-84, 87 (1992).
254. Justice Scalia acknowledges that the adaptability standards allow is thought to be
the genius of the common law approach. See Scalia, supra note 253, at 1177-78. Justice
Scalia also acknowledges that law cannot be entirely rule-bound and that discretion-
conferring standards are sometimes necessary. See id. at 1186-87.
255. See icL at 1186-88.
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within a decade. 56  Similarly, the major disagreement between
Justices Cardozo and Andrews in the famous Palsgraf57case turned
on whether proximate cause should be governed by an overarching
legal rule, foreseeability-the Cardozo approach-or a multi-factor
standard-the Andrews approach.5 8  More recently, courts have
disputed whether to adhere to the rule-bound scheme of categorizing
plaintiffs who suffer injuries while on other people's property or to
adopt a more flexible "reasonableness" standard to guide such
negligence inquiries? 9 The controversy over rules and standards is
even more pronounced in contemporary constitutional law, as
Justices regularly disagree among themselves about the appropriate
specificity of constitutional doctrine.260
A second explanation for statutory vagueness is the existence of
fundamental disagreements between legislators during enactment of a
statute. When such disagreements occur, legislators are often
satisfied by enacting a vague, broad statute with interpretive guidance
in the form of legislative history. Judicial reliance on legislative
history encourages this practice. At first glance, new textualists
appear to have identified a clear instance of legislators' failure to
acquit their responsibilities. Upon a second look, the new textualists
complaints are more debatable. The Supreme Court itself long has
recognized that legislatures should be allowed to proceed "one step at
a time" in addressing problems. 26' Such an incremental approach has
256. See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
257. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
258. Compare id- at 100-01 (finding no proximate cause because the defendant could
not reasonably foresee that the plaintiff would be injured and explaining that "the risk to
be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed"), with id at 103-04 (Andrews, J., dissenting)
(arguing that proximate cause is a question of "expediency" with "no fixed rules to
govern" courts' judgments and that the existence of proximate cause may not be solved
"by any one consideration").
259. Compare Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 568 (Cal. 1968) (abandoning
traditional categories in determining landowner liability), with Younce v. Ferguson, 724
P.2d 991, 997 (Wash. 1986) (adhering to traditional categories).
260. See Sullivan, supra note 253, at 83-95, 100-12. Generally, the argument about
specificity is made with respect to specific statutes or subject areas, and the attack of
legislative history is very blunt, basically applying equally to all statutes. Perhaps the
question of the appropriate specificity of legislation cannot really be addressed except on a
subject-by-subject basis, as the Court does with respect to judicial doctrine. This argument
has been made with respect to administrative rules. See Colin Diver, The Optimal
Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65,106-09 (1983).
261. See Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 466-68 (1981); New
Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483,
489 (1955). See generally SUNSTEIN, supra note 237, at 35-38 (arguing that much of
lawmaking is possible only because of "incompletely theorized agreements" in which
people can agree on specific outcomes without agreeing on the abstract theoretical
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two benefits. First, it allows a legislature to avoid becoming mired in
a stalemate because its members cannot agree on all issues. By
sanctioning such an incremental approach, courts ensure that
legislatures retain the power, necessary for practical government, of
forging coalitions behind second-best policies while leaving
unresolvable issues for another day.262 Second, new problems often
can best be addressed incrementally by prescribing rules of increasing
specificity as a governmental entity gains experience 6 3 The Court
has shown an appreciation of this notion; in particular, it has
recognized the risk of establishing a rule too precipitously.264 Thus,
attempting to prevent the use of vague statutory text may both
frustrate Congress's ability to reach necessary compromises and
prevent it from gaining experience before comprehensively legislating
in an area.
The new textualists' critique of contemporary statutes surely is
not so compelling that reasonable people must accept their
assessment of the current quality of laws.25 Nevertheless, courts have
underpinnings of the outcomes); Tim Atkeson, Note, Reforming the One Step at a Time
Justification in Equal Protection Cases, 90 YALE L.J. 1777, 1779-80 (1981) (discussing
equal protection jurisprudence that allows the legislature to address problems
incrementally and arguing that decisions upholding statutes under such justifications
remain in effect for a limited period).
262. See Marshall L. Breger, Introductory Remarks, 1987 DUKE L.J. 362, 365 (noting
that ambiguity is often a planned part of drafting because "[w]hen problems become too
sticky, one solution is to leave matters to the courts-each side creating its legislative
record as ammunition for the interpretive lawsuit it knows will surely come"); Davidson,
supra note 48, at 114-15 (discussing vagueness and its importance in consensus-building);
Mikva, supra note 61, at 636-37 (observing that judges should not be critical of statutory
ambiguity because sometimes a bill can be passed only if legislators use ambiguous
language); Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the
1981 Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REv. 195, 206 (1983) ("Key provisions may
purposely be left vague or unsettled, or debate kept to a minimum, to achieve
consensus.").
263. See Edward 0. Correia, A Legislative Conception of Legislative Supremacy, 42
CASE W. REs. L. REv. 1129, 1174 n.151 (1992) (noting that Congress typically legislates
incrementally).
264. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947) (announcing a standard and
stating that developing the standard through case-by-case adjudication was justified
because "the agency may not have had sufficient experience with a particular problem to
warrant rigidifying its tentative judgment into a hard and fast rule"); Pokora v. Wabash
Ry., 292 U.S. 98, 105-06 (1934) ("[There is] need for caution in framing standards of
behavior that amount to rules of law. The need is the more urgent when there is no
background of experience out of which standards have emerged."); OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 124 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1881) ("A judge who has
long sat a nisiprius ought gradually to acquire a fund of experience which enables him to
represent the common sense of the community in ordinary instances far better than an
average jury.").
265. Moreover, suggest Professors Farber and Frickey, if requirements of specificity
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some justification for taking action with regard to at least one new
textualist concern-the concern that legislative history gives courts
too much discretion. Courts must protect their own institutional
integrity. The judiciary not only has the power to prevent legislative
and executive encroachment upon its legitimate powers, but also has
the right to refuse to perform functions that conflict with its judicial
role.67 For example, the Supreme Court has expressed concern
regarding statutes granting federal courts' power to appoint executive
branch officials and has precluded judges from making appointments
when an "incongruity" exists "between the functions normally
performed by the courts and the performance of their duty to
were enforced, members of Congress might nevertheless avoid responsibility by leaving
the drafting of detailed statutes to agencies or congressional staff, thereafter serving their
constituents by intervening on the constituents' behalf in the process. See FARBER &
FRICKEY, supra note 12, at 80.
In addition, there is some reason to doubt whether new textualism could
successfully induce legislatures to engage in more precise drafting. William Eskridge
provides two bases for such doubt. See Eskridge, supra note 2, at 677-78. First, difficult
interpretive issues result either from deliberate legislative decisions to leave conflicting
decisions to legislatures or courts or from social or legal developments that are not
reasonably foreseeable. See id at 677. Professor Eskridge asserts that adoption of the
new textualist approach will not decrease any statutory imprecision that stems from such a
legislative evasion or lack of omniscience. See id Second, Professor Eskridge doubts
whether the judiciary will consistently apply syntax canons, which are crucial to new
textualist interpretation, and without such consistency, legislative practice will not be
affected. See id at 677-78.
266. See Statutory Interpretation and the Uses of Legislative History, supra note 12, at 68
(statement of Judge Buckley of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals).
267. See Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 352-57, 360-62 (1911) (holding that
Congress had given the Court a nonjudicial role, in violation of Article III, when it
conferred jurisdiction upon the Court in such a manner that the Court's sole function was
issuing a determination regarding the constitutionality of a statute); Haybum's Case, 2
U.S. (2 Dali.) 408, 410 (1792) ("[N]either the legislative nor the executive branches can
constitutionally assign to the Judicial any duties, but such as are properly judicial, and to
be performed in a judicial manner."); CHOPER, supra note 149, at 404-15 (arguing that
courts vigorously should exercise judicial review of a statute when that statute either
augments the judiciary's power beyond Article III's narrow confines or "otherwise
unconstitutionally undermine[s]" the Supreme Court's critical role in American
government). The Justices' refusal to advise President Washington in Hayburn's Case is
the best known example of a refusal to accept an incompatible role. See Correspondence
of the Justices, Letter from Chief Justice John Jay and the Associate Justices to President
George Washington (Aug. 8, 1793), in 3 CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF
JOHN JAY 486,486-89 (New York, Henry Johnson ed., 1891); see also Muskrat, 219 U.S. at
355 ("[W]hile [the Supreme Court] executes firmly all the judicial powers intrusted [sic] to
it, the court will carefully abstain from exercising any power that is not strictly judicial in
its character, and which is not clearly confided to it by the Constitution."). Nevertheless,
both before and after the letter to President Washington, members of the Court provided
legal opinions. See RICHARD H. FALLON ET AL., THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 95-96 (4th ed. 1996); NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 64, §2.12(b), at
54.
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appoint."'2
Thus, courts can appropriately preclude Congress from
burdening judges with grants of excessive discretion in statutory
interpretation.2 69  Arguably, excessively general statutes impose
nonjudicial duties upon courts. In construing such statutes courts
must essentially engage in legislative duties of deciding how to
address broad societal problems.2 70  For instance, in Georgia
Association of Retarded Citzens v. McDaniel,271  Judge Hill
complained that Congress, in legislation, merely declared that
education for handicapped children was a problem, leaving
fundamental questions about addressing that problem to the
268. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 676 (1988) ("Congress' decision to vest the
appointment power in the courts would be improper if there was some 'incongruity'
between the functions normally performed by the courts and the performance of their
duty to appoint." (citation omitted)).
269. New textualists have argued that the use of legislative history has increased the
power of the courts in relation to the political branches of government and has led to
excessive judicial discretion because a court can find support for almost any interpretation
of a statute in legislative history. See Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491
U.S. 440, 473 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment); In re Sinclair, 870 F.2d
1340, 1342-43 (7th Cir. 1989); Interbranch Relations, supra note 36, at 84-85, 94-95
(statement of Judge Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals); Easterbrook, The
Court and the Economic System, supra note 143, at 62-64, 66; Michael Herz, Textualism
and Taboo: Interpretation and Deference for Justice Scalia, 12 CARDOZO L. REv. 1663,
1677 (1991); Scalia, supra note 109, at 863; Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes, supra note 19, at
457; Wald, supra note 262, at 214.
270. See H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229,254-56 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (stating that the RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1994
& Supp. IV 1998) may be unconstitutionally vague); Georgia Ass'n of Retarded Citizens v.
McDaniel, 716 F.2d 1565, 1581-82 (11th Cir. 1983) (Hill, J., dissenting) (arguing that by
intentionally enacting a vague statute, the political branches conferred legislative duties on
the courts); Harry T. Edwards, The Role of a Judge in Modern Society: Some Reflections
on Current Practice in Federal Appellate Adjudication, 32 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 385, 424-27
(1984) ("[The courts] are choking, not on statutes in general, but on ambiguous and
internally inconsistent statutes."); Romero, supra note 21, at 211, 227-28 (discussing the
argument that constitutional principles limit legislative delegation of lawmaking powers to
courts). On the other hand, the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994 & Supp.
IV 1998), is a vague statute that has been very successful in achieving its statutory purpose.
Its prohibitions have been interpreted by the judiciary to permit the courts to determine
which restraints on trade are "reasonable," and it has been viewed as the archetypal grant
of common-law power to the judiciary. See United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp.
362, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1943); ATIYAH & SUMMERS, supra note 119, at 323-24; WILLIAM D.
POPKIN, MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: POLITICAL LANGUAGE AND THE POLITICAL
PROCESS 419-20 (1993). However, there is some question about whether this
interpretation is what members of Congress envisioned. See Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 221 U.S. 1, 83, 89-91,103-06 (1911) (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 340-41 (1897).
271. 716 F.2d 1565 (11th Cir. 1983).
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judiciary.2 2 Making such broad unstructured policy judgments is
arguably incompatible with the courts' judicial role. However, Courts
are perhaps the most appropriate institution to make the judgment of
when statutory vagueness forces courts into essentially legislative
duties that conflict with their judicial ones.
Ultimately, however, this argument for judicial control of
statutory vagueness cannot justify disregarding legislative history
entirely. New textualists would have courts disregard legislative
history even when a statute is relatively precise and when the
legislative history may enhance the court's understanding of the
statute's goalsY Courts could more appropriately protect
themselves, however, by construing vague provisions narrowly or by
declaring them unconstitutional, rather than by ignoring legislative
history altogether.
B. Reliability
The new textualists' thesis about the deceptive nature of
legislative history is difficult to assess. Clearly the potential exists for
the abuse of legislative history by legislative minorities seeking to
establish their policies by subterfuge.274  Few legislators read
272. See id. at 1582 (Hill, J., dissenting).
273. While new textualism seeks to decrease judicial discretion over the long term by
encouraging Congress to draft more precise statutes, it may increase judicial discretion
over the short term. Depriving judges of legislative history may require them to use policy
arguments more frequently to resolve interpretive difficulties. If most judges could
resolve most issues based on text, as Justice Scalia asserts that he can, see Antonin Scalia,
Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DuKE L.J. 511, 521, new
textualism might well reduce judicial discretion even in the short term. Many, however,
view statutory language as less determinate. See, e.g., Karkkainen, supra note 7, at 401,
444-45, 475-76; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court's New Hypertextualism: An
Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 COLtM. L. REv.
749, 752, 778-79 (1995). More importantly, most judges probably view text as largely
indeterminate. See National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Me. Corp., 503 U.S. 407,
418 (1992); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Legal Interpretation and the Power of the
Judiciary, 7 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 87, 98 (1984) (noting that for many reasons statutes
"are bound to speak poorly or not at all to essential questions" and that "[w]ords often do
not have fixed meanings"); Farina, supra note 244, at 460-61 ("One need not ... [believe]
in the indeterminacy of language or ... in the inevitability of statutory vagueness to
appreciate that, if the court's independent role ends whenever ambiguity is discovered or
analogy must be employed, the agency's judgment will virtually always control the
interpretive outcome."). If that is so, new textualism will instead more often require
judges to resolve cases by relying upon their own policy views without any guidance from
Congress, even though such guidance may be available in legislative history. See Bell,
supra note 4, at 61-62.
274. For instance, the use of legislative history may allow a committee chair to make
"law" in the form of report language that conflicts with the desires of a majority of
committee members. The staff that prepares reports, normally committee staff, are
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legislative history, and congressional staff and lobbyists influence
much of its content.275 Nevertheless, the mere potential for abuse or
manipulation of legislative history does not warrant rejection of it
altogether. Courts can easily disregard particular legislative history
that is misleading or the product of manipulation. The new textualist
position-to reject legislative history in favor of statutory text-
should be adopted only if legislative history is in fact routinely
misleading, but new textualists have not established that legislative
history is demonstrably misleading. Admittedly, such a showing
would be difficult to make. Some scholars have concluded that
legislative history is not inherently misleading. 6 At the very least,
assessments of the reliability of various aspects of legislative history
conflict.
Just as importantly, however, the judiciary should be able to rely
on Congress to police the accuracy of its own legislative history.
Members of Congress certainly have some interest in ensuring that
procedures protect majoritarian judgments from subversion by
minority tricks.277 In fact, Congress has made some efforts to increase
the accuracy of legislative history 78 by adopting a series of reforms
with respect to the compilation of the Congressional Record 9 Until
the mid-1970s, Congress imposed no limits on members' ability to
accountable not to the committee, but to the committee chair (and such staffs have
become more like personal staffs). See MICHAEL J. MALBIN, UNELECrED
REPRESENTATIVES: CONGRESSIONAL STAFF AND THE FUTURE OF REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT 21, 55 (1980). This control by the chair has the potential for preventing
some information from getting to all the members of the committee. See id. at 126-27;
Abner J. Mikva, A Reply to Judge Starr's Observations, 1987 DUKE L.J. 380,386.
275. Of course, the same can be said with regard to statutory text.
276. See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 12, at 98, 100; Stock, supra note 109, at 175 &
nn.69-71.
277. See generally Katzmann, supra note 48, at 7, 12 ("[T]he various interests have
some incentive to ensure that the record reflects their preferences."). To the extent that
the general populace is not likely to have much interest in such procedural issues and to
the extent that the power to produce change is skewed in the direction of those most likely
to attempt to doctor legislative history to mislead the courts-senior legislators-perhaps
congressional consideration of procedures will be inadequate.
278. See Brudney, supra note 12, at 59-60 (discussing actual and proposed
congressional actions to control manipulation of legislative history in a manner that
frustrates the will of the majority); Correia, supra note 263, at 1157-59 ("In short,
legislatures have self-regulatory procedures for insuring reliability of extra-textual
explanations of statutory text."); Katzmann, supra note 53, at 174 ("[Majority counsel] has
defended the report-drafting process by citing a number of safety checks."); id. (noting
that minority counsel agreed with majority counsel and outlining a process of "political"
safeguards to ensure the report was representative).
279. A similar occurrence happened with respect to the revision of remarks in
proceedings of the House Committee on Science and Technology. See Davidson, supra
note 48, at 107 & n.37.
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revise their remarks, and nothing in the Congressional Record
indicated whether a particular speech actually had been delivered on
the House or Senate floor. The House and the Senate adopted
reforms that provided for a textual "bullet" in the Congressional
Record indicating statements that had not been made on the floor of
the relevant legislative chamber.28 The "bullet" system, it soon
became evident, was also subject to abuse. Legislators could avoid
having their remarks "bulleted" if they made a brief statement and
subsequently "revised" those remarks to include a lengthy statement
never made on the floor.8' In 1985, the House replaced the "bullet"
system with a system in which legislators, while on the floor, asked for
permission to revise and extend their remarks for the record.
Material inserted under such permission was to be printed in different
typeface from the substantially verbatim presentation of the
representatives' remarks made on the floor of the House.' In 1995,
the Republican majority in the House of Representatives again
changed the rules for compiling the Congressional Record to reduce
further representatives' power to edit their remarks?83
A second example of Congress's effort to address the problem of
misleading legislative history involves the Civil Rights Act of 1991
("the Act").84  The question of whether the Act would apply
retroactively became one of the most contentious issues that arose
during consideration of the legislation? Proponents and opponents
of retroactive application attempted to manipulate the legislative
history to suggest that Congress had resolved the issue, even though
the text of the statute was silent. Congress addressed one aspect of
this problem by specifying, in the Act itself, the legislative history that
could be relied upon and by expressly precluding reliance on other
280. See Correia, supra note 263, at 1153-54 n.85; Costello, supra note 11, at 55; Starr,
supra note 40, at 376-77.
281. See Correia, supra note 263, at 1153-54 n.85; Katzmann, supra note 53, at 175.
282- See H. Res. 230, 99th Cong. (1985) (Sup. Docs. No. Y1.4/7:99-230). The change
was made permanent in 1986. See H. Res. 514,99th Cong. (Sup. Docs. No. Y.4/7:99-514),
reprinted in 132 CONG. REC. 20,981 (1986).
283. See OLESZEK, supra note 147, at 193; David S. Cloud, GOP, to Its Own Great
Delight, Enacts House Rules Changes, CONG. Q. WKLY. REP., Jan. 7,1995, at 13,13-15. A
House Committee report on the Organization of Congress had recommended such a
change a year earlier. See 1 FINAL REPORT OF THE JOINT COMM. ON THE
ORGANIZATION OF CONGRESS, H.R. REP. NO. 103-413, at 17 (1993) (Sup. Docs. No.
Y1.1/8:103/413).
284. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994).
285. Indeed, President Bush vetoed the initial version of the legislation largely because
of its retroactive effects. See Message to the Senate Returning Without Approval the Civil
Rights Act of 1990,1990 PUB. PAPERS 1437,1439 (Oct. 22,1990).
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material in the legislative record.26
Notwithstanding Congress's efforts, the new textualist concerns
about manipulation of legislative history continue to have some merit.
New textualists have not successfully made the case, however, that so
much of legislative history is misleading that courts must disregard it.
C. Congressional Staff
New textualists likewise are concerned with congressional staff
members' involvement in the legislative process. Undoubtedly, such
staff involvement is pervasive.? Staff members routinely participate
in resolving policy differences among members of Congress.m
Committee reports are primarily written by staffers2s9 and often are
not fully reviewed by the whole committee or even a substantial
portion of it.290 Nevertheless, reasonable people have long differed
on the appropriate role of staff, and resolving the issue requires
weighing competing considerations.
Many have decried congressional staff's increasing role in the
legislative process.211 At the most basic level, legislators-not staff
286. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105(b), 105 Stat. 1071, 1075
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994)).
287. HEDRIK SMITH, THE POWER GAME 280-81 (1988). As Hedrik Smith noted:
Nowadays, staffers are a ubiquitous presence, riding elevators and congressional
subways beside senators and House members rushing to a vote; at their elbows,
giving advice; behind them at hearings, whispering questions; prepping their
bosses for press interviews or shoving speeches into their hands; giving them
political and substantive guidance; handling constituents; screening lobbyists;
setting the agenda for committees; briefing members on the budget or haggling
over its provisions; formulating proposals; making decisions; mastering
procedure; managing hearings; cross-examining generals; probing the Central
Intelligence Agency; negotiating with the White House.
Id. at 281.
28& See MALBIN, supra note 274, at 46-47, 63-71, 73-74, 88-93, 247-48; DAVID
WHITEMAN, COMMUNICATION IN CONGRESS: MEMBERS, STAFF, AND THE SEARCH
FOR INFORMATION 37-38 (1995).
289. See KENNETH KOFMEHL, PROFESSIONAL STAFFS OF CONGRESS 121, 125-26 (3d
ed. 1977); MALBIN, supra note 274, at 92; Bradford L. Ferguson et al., Reexamining the
Nature and Role of Tax Legislative History in Light of the Changing Realities of the
Process, 67 TAXES 804, 809, 823 (1989); Mikva, supra note 274, at 385-86.
290. See KOFMEHL, supra note 289, at 121-22, 125-26. There may be some safeguards.
See Katzmann, supra note 53, at 174. Staff members on at least some committees consult
interested members regarding disputed sections of committee reports. See KOFMEHL,
supra note 289, at 121-22.
291. See, e.g., infra notes 292-95 and accompanying text. Congressional staff, however,
is not monolithic. Staff members can be divided into three very distinct categories. The
first is the staffs of individual members of Congress, whom the members control. The
second category consists of the staffs of the various congressional committees, who
traditionally were controlled almost exclusively by committee chairs. See Robert H.
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members-are elected to make laws. To the extent that "law" derives
from staff decisions, it does not deserve the respect due "law" that is
adopted by elected representatives. 2 2 This complaint closely reflects
new textualists' concerns.2 93
Salisbury & Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congressional Staff Turnover and the Ties-That-Bind, 75
AM. POL Sci. REV. 381, 383-84 (1981); Robert H. Salisbury & Kenneth A. Shepsle, U.S.
Congressman as Enterprise, 4 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 559,560-61 (1981) [hereinafter Salisbury &
Shepsle, U.S. Congressman as Enterprise]. As a result, staffers sometimes withheld
information from other committee members. See MALBIN, supra note 274, at 126-27,
130-31. Members of the committee were thus dependent on the committee chair. More
recently, the ranking member of the minority party has been given some control over a
portion of the committee staff, and the House of Representatives has authorized the chairs
of subcommittees to hire limited numbers of staff. See H. Res. 6, § 101(c)(4), 104th Cong.
(Sup. Does. No. Y1.4/7:104-6), reprinted in 141 CONG. REC. 462 (1995); H. Res. 5, 94th
Cong. (Sup. Docs. No. Y1.4/7:94:5), reprinted in 121 CONG. REC. 4 (1975); JOINT COMM.
ON THE ORGANIZATION OF CONGRESS, 103D CONG., BACKGROUND MATERIALS:
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION PROVIDED TO MEMBERS OF THE JOINT COMM. ON THE
ORGANIZATION OF CONGRESS 1381 (Comm. Print 1993). The third category consists of
employees of congressional support agencies, such as the Congressional Research Service
and the Congressional Budget Offices. The staffers who are employed by support
agencies do not seem to have drawn the attention of new textualists.
292. Paul Campos argues that staff involvement may create what he calls a
"pseudotext." Paul F. Campos, The Chaotic Pseudotext, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2178, 2213-14
(1996). Pseudotext are rules promulgated by individuals (such as congressional staff
members) who lack the authority to issue rules. Thus, when staff members create "text"
that courts treat as binding, pseudotext is created. See POPKIN, supra note 270, at 426-27;
Campos, supra, at 2213-14; Davidson, supra note 48, at 101-02; Harold L. Wolman &
Dianne Miller Wolman, The Role of the U.S. Senate Staff in the Opinion Linkage Process:
Population Policy, LEGIS. STUD. Q., Aug. 1977, at 281, 284. The title of Michael Malbin's
book, Unelected Representatives, starkly highlights such a concern. See MALBIN, supra
note 274.
Indeed, a parallel argument is used by courts in refusing to defer to the
construction of statutes presented by agency counsel under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). As the Court explained in Bowen v.
Georgetown University Hospital, 488 U.S. 204 (1988):
We have never applied the principle [of Chevron deference] to agency litigating
positions that are wholly unsupported by regulations, rulings, or administrative
practice. To the contrary, we have declined to give deference to an agency
counsel's interpretation of a statute where the agency itself has articulated no
position on the question, on the ground that "Congress has delegated to the
administrative official and not to appellate counsel the responsibility for
elaborating and enforcing statutory commands."
Id. at 212 (quoting Investment Company Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 628 (1971)).
293. In response to the new textualists, some commentators argue that the role that
staff assumes in the legislative process is no less justified than the role that law clerks play
in the adjudicatory process. See Statutory Interpretation and the Uses of Legislative
History, supra note 12, at 59 (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier); Katzmann, supra note 53,
at 174; see also Stock, supra note 109, at 174 (arguing that the task of drafting written
material commonly is delegated to staff in all three branches of government and
concluding "[w]hat should count is not who operates the word processor, but whether the
proper elected [or appointed] official accepts responsibility for the words, according to
proper procedures"). Just as members of Congress do not write committee reports, judges
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Michael Malbin has identified a more subtle injury produced by
staffers' ubiquitous presence. He argues that deliberation, the
exposure of legislators to their fellow legislators' views, forms a
crucial part of the legislative process.2 4 The ascendancy of legislative
staffs has reduced members' direct contact with one another. Issues
legislators once would have resolved by direct contact are now
resolved in discussions among staff. Malbin argues that hearing
arguments indirectly through staff rather than directly from fellow
legislators reduces the likelihood that a member will seriously
consider those views.295
The increased number of staffers and their greater involvement
in the legislative process produces benefits, however. Given the
relatively small number of legislators and the great demands on their
time, staff surely reduces legislators' dependence on the executive
branch, congressional leadership, committee chairs, and interest
groups, and it also allows them to exercise more independent
judgment.296 Staff may also enable members to consider more issues
in greater depth than they could without staff assistance. In
periodically expanding the size of various legislative staffs since the
1960s, Congress has clearly concluded that the presence of staff
provides a necessary enhancement of Congress's ability to make
independent and informed judgments and that those benefits
outweigh concerns about increasing the role of staff vis-a-vis
often allow their law clerks to draft judicial opinions. Judges, however, ultimately sign, or
at least formally join, opinions. Legislatures do not formally vote on committee reports,
and even the committees that report bills to the full chamber do not sign or formally vote
on the reports.
294. See MALBIN, supra note 274, at 240-42; see also Davidson, supra note 48, at 101-
02 (noting that by allowing negotiations regarding legislation to be conducted by staff
members, "Congress sacrifices the advantages of direct deliberation by its elected
members"); Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, supra note 19, at 1548-51, 1558-64,
1581 (discussing the central role of deliberation in the republican conception of politics
and American constitutionalism and the judiciary's ability to encourage deliberation by
the manner in which it construes statutes).
295. See Interbranch Relations, supra note 36, at 128-29 (statement of former Rep.
John 0. Marsh, Jr.); MALBIN, supra note 274, at 240-48.
296. See RIESELBACH, supra note 166, at 182-83; SMITH, supra note 287, at 282-83;
WHITEMAN, supra note 288, at 186; Salisbury & Shepsle, U.S. Congressman as Enterprise,
supra note 291, at 565. Although new textualists do not necessarily advocate staffing
reductions, arguments have been made that staff reductions will increase the role of
interest groups. See JOINT COMM. ON THE ORGANIZATION OF CONGRESS, 103D CONG.,
BACKGROUND MATERIALS: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION PROVIDED TO MEMBERS
OF THE JOINT COMM. ON THE ORGANIZATION OF CONGRESS 1462 (Comm. Print 1993);
AMERICAN ENTER. INST. & BROOKINGS INST., A SECOND REPORT OF THE RENEWING
CONGRESS PROJECT 69 (1993).
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members of Congress.2 97
The concern about the democratic pedigree of agreements made
between unelected representatives is ameliorated by members'
absolute control over staff.298 Staff have no formal independence and
must be careful not to displease the congressperson for whom they
work, and there may well be informal mores and pressures that
ensure that staff members do not act in ways that are contrary to their
employers' interests. For instance, Malbin concludes that staffers
efforts as policy entrepreneurs generally reflect the legislators'
interests, not those of the staffs.299
Given the members' time constraints, as well as the breadth and
complexity of issues they must address, it may not be possible to
reduce the current level of staff involvement in the legislative
process0 0 Indeed, the Supreme Court long ago reconciled itself to
297. See WHrrEMAN, supra note 288, at 2, 186. Of course, greater staff resources may
also increase members' workloads by increasing the number of tangents that members or
committees can follow. See JOINT COMM. ON THE ORGANIZATION OF CONGRESS, 103D
CONG., BACKGROUND MATERIALS: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION PROVIDED TO
MEMBERS OF THE JOINT COMM. ON THE ORGANIZATION OF CONGRESS 1385 (Comm.
Print 1993).
29& See 2 FINAL REPORT OF THE JOINT COMM. ON THE ORGANIZATION OF
CONGRESS, H.R. REP. NO. 103-413, at 71 (1993) (Sup. Does. No. Y1.1/8:103/413); see also
MALBIN, supra note 274, at 21 (noting that staff is vulnerable because they can be fired at
any moment-they have a feudal relationship with Congress members); id. at 47, 74
(noting that Senators retain control over staff negotiations by the way they set the ground
rules for those negotiations). But see MALBIN, supra note 274, at 4, 118 (noting that
members theoretically have right to hire and fire, but their actual control over staff is
tenuous because of time constraints).
Recently enacted legislation subjecting Congress to federal laws may provide staff
members with more protection. See, e.g., Congressional Accountability Act of 1995, Pub.
L. No. 104-1, 109 Stat. 3 (1995) (codified at scattered sections of 2 U.S.C. (Supp. IV 1998).
Moreover, this absolute control may not ensure either that staff members share the policy
views of their legislators or even that they accurately perceive those legislators' views. See
Wolman & Wolman, supra note 292, at 287-89.
299. See MALBIN, supra note 274, at 32.
300. Given the right of legislators to control their staff members, perhaps such staff
involvement should not even cause concern. See Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606,
616-17 (1972); Interbranch Relations, supra note 36, at 129 (statement of former
Congressman John 0. Marsh, Jr.); Brief for the Senate of the United States at 11, Gravel
v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972) (No. 71-107), reprinted in 74 LANDMARK BRIEFS
AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 387-410 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975); Brudney, supra note 12,
at 33 & n.129, 49-50; Costello, supra note 12, at 67; Spence, supra note 8, 604-08.
Congress itself has focused on this issue. See H.R. REP. NO. 91-1215, at 15 (1970)
(Sup. Docs. No. Y1.118:91-1215) ("The staffs of committees of the House make vast
contributions to the legislative, investigative, and oversight work all committees perform
each Congress. But while the quality of the staffs is high, their numbers are insufficient to
meet the increasing workload of the committees they serve."), reprinted in 1970
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4417, 4431; 2 FINAL REPORT OF THE JOINT COMM. ON THE
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the high level of staff participation in agency decisionmaking. 3 1 The
Court, in a series of decisions from 1936 to 1941, decided that the
degree of staff involvement in administrative decisionmaking does
not provide a basis for challenging those decisions? °  Initially, the
Court declared that the agency official "who decides must hear,"
meaning that the official who decides an issue must personally
consider and appraise the relevant evidence.303 Thus, in the first of
four decisions in Morgan v. United States,304 the Supreme Court held
that the trial court had erred in dismissing a claim that the Secretary
of Agriculture's order setting the maximum livestock prices could not
stand because the Secretary had not personally heard or read any of
the relevant evidence. In the succeeding series of decisions
revisiting the controversy, the Court ultimately found its effort to
police the level of staff involvement in administrative decisionmaking
to be unworkable.3°
The legitimate difference of opinion concerning the costs and
benefits attendant to legislative staffs' current role suggests that the
issue of the level of staff involvement is not an appropriate one for
judicial resolution. Moreover, Congress has not ignored staffing
issues.307  Rather, Congress revisits and acts on the subject
periodically"' and even considered the subject during the recent
comprehensive examination of its organization.0 9 In 1995, the House
ORGANIZATION OF CONGRESS, H.R. REP. No. 103-413, at 72-95, 74-75 (1993) (Sup.
Docs. No. Y1.118:1031413).
301. See United States v. Morgan ("Morgan IV"), 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941); Morgan v.
United States ("Morgan I"), 304 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1938), overruled by 313 U.S. 409 (1941); 1
DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 157, § 8.6, at 395-96.
302. See Morgan IV, 313 U.S. at 422; Morgan 11, 304 U.S. at 17-18.
303. Morgan v. United States ("Morgan I"), 298 U.S. 468, 481-82 (1936), rev'd by 304
U.S. 1 (1938).
304. 298 U.S. 468, 481-82 (1936), rev'd by 304 U.S. 1 (1938).
305. Morgan alleged that the Secretary of Agriculture had relied solely on
consultations with his subordinates in making the challenged decision. See id. at 474-46 &
n.1, 482.
306. See Morgan IV, 313 U.S. at 422; Morgan H, 304 U.S. at 17-18.
307. See Interbranch Relations, supra note 36, at 127 (statement of former
Congressman John 0. Marsh, Jr.) ("There has been considerable discussion about the role
[staff] play in the legislative process .... "); JOINT COMM. ON THE ORGANIZATION OF
CONGRESS, 103D CONG., BACKGROUND MATERIALS: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
PROVIDED TO MEMBERS OF THE JOINT COMM. ON THE ORGANIZATION OF CONGRESS
1385 (Comm. Print 1993) (discussing the controversy regarding congressional staffing
practices).
30& See 2 FINAL REPORT OF THE JOINT COMM. ON THE ORGANIZATION OF
CONGRESS, H.R. REP. NO. 103-413, at 59-61 (1993) (Sup. Docs. No. Y1.1/8:103/413).
309. See id. at 59-79.
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reduced committee staffs by one-third 1 °
Finally, the disregard of legislative history would not cure the
problem of excessive staff involvement in the legislative process, even
if we were to concede the correctness of the new textualists'
perceptions and judgments about the excessive influence of staff. The
ubiquity of staff and the time constraints on legislators mean that staff
are no less involved in drafting and negotiating statutory text than in
drafting and negotiating legislative history1 Members of Congress
have no more time to parse statutory language than they do to
consider the more readable legislative history. Thus, an exclusive
focus on legislative history will almost certainly not change the
congressional dynamic that has led to the omnipresent and central
role of staff. In short, the new textualist argument for disregarding
legislative history because of staff involvement again involves
improper intrusion into congressional judgments about issues on
which reasonable people can disagree.
D. Interest Groups and Lobbyists
The new textualists' last major instrumentalist argument involves
310. H. RES. 6, 104th Cong. (1995) (enacted) (Sup. Docs. No. Y1.1/8:104-6). Congress
not only has periodically considered its staffing needs, but also has addressed the issue of
dominance of committee staff by committee chairs. The effort to ameliorate this problem
has involved funding minority staff positions. Thus, currently in the Senate, staff are
distributed between majority and minority members of the committee in proportion to the
majority and minority membership on any particular committee. See S. RES. 281, 96th
Cong. (1980) (enacted) (Sup. Docs. No. Y1.4/2:96-281). In the House, one third of the
statutory committee staff resources must be allocated to the minority party, and the
ranking member of each subcommittee receives one investigative staff member. See
JOINT COMM. ON THE ORGANIZATION OF CONGRESS, 103D CONG., BACKGROUND
MATERIALS: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION PROVIDED TO MEMBERS OF THE JOINT
COMM. ON THE ORGANIZATION OF CONGRESS 1380-81, 1400 (Comm. Print 1993).
However, the allocation of staff to the minority party members on committees has long
been an issue in controversy. See id. at 1381. But see RIESELBACH, supra note 166, at 167
(noting that the House majority has ignored the rule that one-third of staff must be
allocated to the minority with impunity).
311. See MALBIN, supra note 274, at 46-47, 53, 60-61, 68, 70, 74, 89; Campos, supra
note 292, at 2209 (citing WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 757-
58 (2d ed. 1995)); Ferguson et al., supra note 289, at 809, 823. As Ferguson, Hickman, and
Lubick note:
In the case of federal tax legislation, the fact that committee report language and
other legislative history is written by the staff has nothing to do with its
legitimacy. Everything authoritative in tax legislation-statute and history
alike-is written by staff, and to the extent that legislators are acting on their
understandings of particular provisions, they are relying on narrative committee
reports and colloquies rather than on statutory language.
Ferguson et al., supra note 289, at 823.
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the role of interest groups and lobbyists. If viewed as a broad
allegation that legislative history makes interest groups and their
lobbyists too powerful, the new textualist claim is highly contestable.
The proper role of interest groups and the degree of their influence
have been matters of controversy since the framing of the
Constitution 2.31  The new textualists' claim, however, should be
viewed as a more narrow and less contestable one-namely that
interest groups should not be allowed to achieve their objectives by
smuggling policies into legislative history to avoid the majoritarian
process. Yet, even this limited claim suffers from two defects. First,
the strategy of planting favorable legislative history is probably not
essential for interest groups and lobbyists. Second, it is unclear
whether the strategy is ordinarily a successful one.
First, the tactic of planting favorable legislative history is
312. James Madison thought that one of the major threats to the new Republic would
be the danger of faction, and much of the structure of government was devised to mediate
the expected problem of factions. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 10, 51 (James Madison).
Ultimately, Madison believed that the competition among interest groups would lead to
policies in the public interest. See id. The Gilded Age dominance of legislatures by
business interests lead to renewed concerns about the public interest being lost amid the
efforts of interest groups to secure favorable policies and to the Progressive Movement's
push for direct democracy and other mechanisms to secure the public interest. See
THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECr DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF INITIATIVE,
REFERENDUM, AND RECALL 44-45 (1989); FONER, supra note 112, at 465-66, 486, 493,
518-19; JAMES A. MORONE, THE DEMOCRATIC WISH: POPULAR PARTICIPATION AND
THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 107-12 (1990). Scholars, at least, became more
sanguine about interest groups in the 1950s, with advocates of pluralism arguing that
interest groups provided a manner of organizing the populace's preferences between
elections. See DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS 519-21 (1951); see
generally ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 131-35, 146,150-51
(1956) (arguing that the genius of the American system of government is that "the making
of governmental decisions is not a majestic march of great majorities" but rather "the
steady appeasement of relatively small groups"). Public choice theorists expressed some
skepticism, arguing that some groups were more likely to organize than others. See
POSNER, supra note 221, at 354-55; Easterbrook, The Court and the Economic System,
supra note 143, at 14-18. In particular, small groups, in which each member has much to
lose or to gain by supporting particular legislation, find it much easier to organize than
larger groups of more diffuse interests; thus, concentrated interests will be able to secure
policies that advance their own narrow interests at the expense of the interests of the
larger, unorganized public. See NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES:
CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 54-57, 172-73, 192
(1994); Easterbrook, The Court and the Economic System, supra note 143, at 15-16;
Macey, supra note 19, at 230-32. In addition, there has been popular concern about the
power of special interests. Certainly the popular press and the results of opinion polls,
suggest that the press and the citizenry have concluded that interest groups exercise
excessive influence. See, e.g., ALAN ROSENTHAL, THE THIRD HOUSE: LOBBYISTS AND
LOBBYING IN THE STATES 5-8 (1993); PRINCETON SURVEY RESEARCH ASSOCS.,
MONEY AND POLITICS SURVEY SUMMARY AND OVERVIEW (visited June 1, 2000)
<http:/www.crp.org/pubs/survey/s2.htm>.
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probably not a sufficiently significant weapon in the lobbyist's arsenal
to warrant judicial concern. In fact, interest groups' legislative efforts
are quite open.313 Interest groups and their lobbyists need not prevail
by subterfuge; they generally obtain favorable policies by securing
legislative votes and by persuading legislators or their staffs to
incorporate their policies into statutory text.314
Thus, some of the major popular and scholarly concerns about
interest group dominance center upon interest groups' abilities to
secure favorable statutory text and influence legislators' votes.315
313. Interest groups' efforts to influence statutes are often quite visible. Interest
groups' efforts with regard to gun control, telecommunications, and health care reform
have been quite overt. Indeed, some bills are passed only after the respective interest
groups and lobbyists agree on the substance of the bills. See Jessica D). Litman, Copyright,
Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 857, 860-61 (1987).
314. Many identify the campaign finance system as the key element of interest group
power, alleging that there is an implicit quid pro quo between campaign contributions and
legislators' votes. See PHILIP M. STERN, STILL THE BEST CONGRESS MONEY CAN Buy
69-82, 149 (1992); Center for Responsive Politics, 10 Myths About Money in Politics
(visited June 1, 2000) <http:lwww.opensecrets.orglpubs/myths/contents.htm>; Laura I.
Langbein & Mark A. Lotwis, The Political Efficiency of Lobbying and Money: Gun
Control in the U.S. House, 1986, LEGIS. STUD. Q., Aug. 1990, at 413, 434 (concluding that
campaign contributions influence congressional votes); Nancy Watzman et al., Cashing In:
A Guide to Money, Votes, and Public Policy in the 104th Congress (visited June 1, 2000)
<http://www.opensecrets.orglpubslcashingin-lO4thlcontents.html>. Comments by
members of Congress acknowledging the effect that campaign contributions have on their
votes buttress the quid pro quo theory. See ELIZABETH DREW, POLITICS AND MONEY:
THE NEW ROAD TO CORRUPTION 1-4, 38, 41, 45, 49-52, 79-81, 84 (1983); STERN, supra,
at 69-82,149; Center for Responsive Politics, supra.
The correlations between legislators' votes and campaign contributions, however,
simply may reflect contributors' ability to identify candidates and legislators that will likely
favor their interests. Thus, legislator votes may not follow the money, as the quid pro quo
theory suggests, but rather the money may follow the votes-that is, favorable voting
records attract funding from certain groups. See Smith, supra note 167, at 1067-69. Some
argue that such campaign contributions may therefore merely lead to contributors
obtaining greater access to legislators. See JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM, THE LOBBYISTS:
How INFLUENCE PEDDLERS WORK THEIR WAY IN WASHINGTON 131, 161-69 (1993);
DREW, supra, at 49, 59, 77, 79; KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY,
ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 164-65 (1986).
Still others, of course, attribute the success of various interest groups and lobbyists
to strengths unrelated to their willingness to make campaign contributions, namely their
expertise and their ability to mobilize of segments of the members' constituency. See, e.g.,
BIRNBAUM, supra, at 146-47, 269; HAYNES JOHNSON & DAVID S. BRODER, THE
SYSTEM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF POLITICS AT THE BREAKING POINT 145 (1996);
SCHLOZMAN & TIERNEY, supra, at 7-9, 297-99, 310-17; see also Langbein & Lotwis,
supra, at 413-15 (noting that "scientific research designs have produced mixed evidence
about the direct influence of money on congressional votes"). These last reasons are, of
course, quite benign reasons for the success of interest groups and lobbyists. See
BIRNBAUM, supra, at 6, 24; Peter H. Schuck, Against (and for) Madison: An Essay in
Praise of Factions, 15 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 553,583-86 (1997).
315. In addition, many make the more general complaint about their ability to block
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Members and their staff have long used bill language drafted by
lobbyists and interest groups,316 and, in fact, there has been some
recent concern about the presence of lobbyists during the drafting
process. 17 In contraposition to the assumptions of new textualists,
some public choice theorists have even suggested that interest groups
are more likely to succeed in incorporating their policies in statutory
text than in legislative history. Professor Macey, for example, argues
that legislative history is likely to outline public-regarding
justifications for legislation, whereas the statutory text will likely
reflect the interest groups' real desires. 18
None of these observations suggest that interest groups and
lobbyists need to adopt strategies of subterfuge to ensure that their
preferred interpretations escape legislators' attention. In fact, the
literature regarding interest groups does not appear to cite
influencing legislative history as a major interest group or lobbyist
tactic 19 In short, the ability to plant favorable legislative history does
not add much to the arsenals of interest groups, and they are unlikely
to resort to such strategies with a frequency that would justify
disregarding legislative history outright.
Second, planting favorable legislative history probably does not
provide a reliable method for interest groups to obtain their desired
policies absent the involvement and approval of influential legislators.
Legislators and their staffs control the production of committee
reports and other legislative history. Staff members know that
interest groups and lobbyists attempt to smuggle their policies into
legislative history and presumably are wary of such efforts. As
discussed earlier, it is not clear that staffers act in a manner that
subverts the intent of legislators when drafting committee reports and
other legislative history. 2 It also is not clear that legislative
legislation that is in the public interest.
316. See BIRNBAUM, supra note 314, at 117-21, 125-26,146-47.
317. See 141 CONG. REc. 16,820 (1995) (statement of Rep. Skaggs); ELIZABETH
DREW, SHOWDOWN: THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE GINGRICH CONGRESS AND THE
CLINTON WHITE HOUSE 116-17, 114 (1996); Stephen Engelberg, 100 Days of Dreams
Come True for Lobbyists in Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1995, at A12; Stephen
Engelberg, Business Leaves the Lobby and Sits at Congress's Table, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31,
1995, at A5; George Miller, Authors of the Law, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1995, at A21. Such
involvement does not have its genesis in the Republican control of Congress. See
BIRNBAUM, supra note 314, at 117,118.
318. See Macey, supra note 19, at 232.
319. The new textualists do not cite to the political science literature or even to major
works of journalists and others outside the academic world. My own (far from exhaustive)
reading has not uncovered much discussion about such a strategy.
320. See supra notes 298-99 and accompanying text.
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majorities will allow their wills to be routinely subverted by
misleading legislative history.32' In addition, the prospect that an
interest group and their lobbyists will succeed in planting favorable
legislative history is at least diminished by the diversity of interest
groups. The diversity of interest groups and their policy positions
provides an incentive for interest groups and lobbyists to prevent
each other from using subterfuge to establish policies that could not
gain majority approval.321
New textualists certainly have not shown that lobbyists or, for
that matter, staffers place matters in legislative history without the
concurrence or involvement of at least some key members of the
relevant committee, most notably the committee chair. This
collaboration, however, does not satisfy new textualist concerns, but
their remaining concerns cannot really be attributed to the role of
interest groups, lobbyists, or even staff. Instead, those concerns
should be attributed to new textualists' discomfort with committee
dominance of legislatures.
New textualists' concerns about committee dominance stems
from the potentially anti-majoritarian effect that committee
dominance has on the legislative process. Voting on the floor of a
legislative chamber is strictly majoritarian because each legislator's
vote counts equally. However, in the legislative process that precedes
the floor vote-especially the committee process-some legislators
have more power than others. Members of congressional
committees, and the chairs of those committees, in particular, have
greater power to influence the contours of legislation than do rank-
and-file members of the legislature. New textualists view committees
and their chairpersons as dictatorial agenda-setters who manipulate
the membership of the legislature by the manner in which they
package issues,3 3 and for interpretive purposes, new textualists
assume that floor proceedings are the only important aspect of the
legislative process.324 These concerns about the excessive influence of
committees are hardly a matter for the courts to resolve. Rather,
resolving questions regarding the proper role of committees and
321. See supra notes 276-86 and accompanying text.
322. See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 12, at 98. See generally ROSENTHAL, supra
note 312, at 216 (discussing the proliferation of interest groups with conflicting positions
and the concomitant reduction in the influence of individual interest groups). Clearly the
multitude of competing interest groups does not obviate concern about the manipulation
of legislative history because some interests are still underrepresented or not represented
at all.
323. See FARBER & FRICKEY, supra note 12, at 50.
324. For a full statement of this argument, see Bell, supra note 4, at 49-50.
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committee chairs in the legislative process should remain the province
of legislators, who are not only more competent to solve them but
also more entitled to do so.
In sum, the new textualists' argument that recognition of
legislative history enhances interest group and lobbyist influence in
troubling ways may be the least contestable of all their arguments.
Nevertheless, the ability of interest groups to manipulate legislative
history appears to be so insignificant that new textualists' fears about
interest group and lobbyist distortion of legislative history do not
justify their radical solution.
V. RESPECTING BOTH LEGISLATIVE JUDGMENTS AND NORMATIVE
PRINCIPLES: THE PUBLIC JUSTIFICATION APPROACH
As we have seen, while new textualists deploy normative
arguments in support of their approach, they dismiss reasonable
legislative judgments about contestable issues of legislative process.
Yet interpretive theory can rest on both respect for legislative
judgments and independent normative judgments about the
legislative process. I have previously proposed such a methodology-
the public justification approach to statutory interpretation.312 Unlike
the new textualist approach, my approach values some elements of
legislative history. Under my approach, statements in legislative
history are accorded significance not because they necessarily reflect
some subjective intent; rather, statements in legislative history are
accorded significance merely because they were made-much as we
accord significance to promises. Such an approach toward legislative
history rests on the twin premises that legislatures have an obligation
to justify statutes they enact and that at a minimum legislatures
should not mislead the public. Because legislatures have an
obligation to justify statutes or at least not provide misleading
justifications, portions of legislative history that provide such
explanations should not be disregarded as irrelevant, nor should they
be considered relevant only if a court can conclude that they reflect
some agreed-upon subjective intent of a majority of legislators.326
The twin premises underlying my approach are normatively attractive
and comport with congressional expectations. In this Part, I discuss
my approach's normative underpinnings as well as its consistency
with congressional judgments.
325. See id at 76-83.
326. New textualists doubt that there is such shared intent except in the most
extraordinary circumstances. See id. at 55-59.
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Congress's obligation to explain, the first of the twin premises,
rests on two propositions. First, Congress's obligation to explain
derives from the respect that government owes its citizens. In
democracies, citizens are sovereign, and legislatures merely act on the
behalf of citizens. Accordingly, legislatures owe the public a
justification for actions taken in their name. 27 Ordinarily, actors have
no obligation to explain their actions to those who are not the source
of their authority. For example, military commanders need not
explain their commands to subordinates, because they do not derive
their authority from those subordinates. Yet, because legislatures
derive their authority from the people they govern, the proper
analogy is to those relationships, such as the principle-agent
relationship, in which explanations are owed.3' Indeed, knowledge of
the rationale for an agent's action is essential to maintaining control
over the agent. Thus, knowledge of legislative rationales is critical to
the citizenry's ability to control its government.329
In addition, providing explanations to citizens affected by
governmental actions is necessary to respect their status as
autonomous human beings.30 Professor Laurence Tribe has observed
that
both the right to be heard from, and the right to be told why,
are analytically distinct from the right to secure a different
outcome; these rights to interchange express the elementary
idea that to be a person, rather than a thing, is at least to be
consulted about what is done with one.331
Similarly, Mortimer Kadish and Stanford Kadish argue that "the
principle that people must justify undertaking an action when others
are affected ... flows from an underlying commitment that other
people are entitled to be treated as autonomous and free beings
rather than manipulable things-a commitment that has informed ...
the entire Western liberal tradition. "332
327. The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 made this explicit, providing that "for the
... satisfaction of the public, the reasons and motives for making such laws shall be fully
and clearly expressed in preambles." PA. CONST. of 1776, § 15.
328. For example, shareholders have the right to demand explanations from corporate
officers for decisions those officers make in managing the corporation. See Bell, supra
note 4, at 12 & n.25. It seems an unlikely argument that the Congress would owe less
explanation to citizens than a corporation owes to its shareholders.
329. This obligation to explain is closely related to the proposition that the public must
have access to governmental information. See id. at 14-18.
330. See id, at 15-16.
331. TRIBE, supra note 64, § 10-7, at 666.
332. MORTIMER R. KADISH & SANFORD H. KADISH, DISCRETION TO DISOBEY 12-
13 (1973).
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The second of the twin premises for according legislative
explanations an independent significance is that democratic
governments have a duty not to mislead their citizens. Lying, even
more than refusing to provide an explanation, exhibits disrespect for
citizens as sovereigns. Moreover, government lies invalidate the
consent of the citizenry underlying decisions made by democratic
governments. Democracy ultimately requires the consent of the
governed, but that consent surely lacks validity if it is based on
preferences manufactured by government manipulation of
information. Thus, even if there were no affirmative obligation to
explain its actions, the government surely has an obligation to avoid
misstating the rationales for its actions. According significance to
legislative explanations discourages deceit. Interpretations that
disregard the legislative justifications may more accurately reflect the
substantive preferences of the winning legislative coalition, but only
at the expense of reducing the consequences of legislative deceit.
The legislature's obligation to explain statutes as well as to enact
them has two corollaries that inform my public justification approach.
First, the obligation to explain and the publication of explanations
requires a reconceptualization of each legislator's vote on proposed
legislation. We can no longer view such votes merely as indicating
approval of only the statutory text. Instead, we must view the
legislator's vote as a vote to approve the text of the statute as well as
its publicly proclaimed rationale. Second, we can find legal
significance in the legislative history even if legislators' subjective
reasons for casting their votes in favor of particular legislation vary,
because legislators have a duty to respond to the justification the
legislature has publicly offered.
We can see how a duty to explain forces the reconceptualization
of the meaning of legislators' votes by examining the consequences of
an acknowledged legislative duty-ensuring that statutes embody
understandable commands.33 A legislature can satisfy its duty to
provide understandable commands only if each legislator has a
corresponding obligation in casting his vote. That obligation consists
of expressing assent or dissent, in the form of his vote, to the meaning
of the proposed statute in customary English usage. A legislator who
votes based upon his own idiosyncratic use of language breaches that
obligation.
333. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453, 458 (1939); OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY,
supra note 39, at 51-52; Robert H. Jackson, Problems of Statutory Interpretation, 8 F.R.D.
121, 124-25 (1948).
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To illustrate, if each of the eleven members of a legislative body
conceptualize the term "motor vehicles" differently, a statute
prohibiting people from bringing "motor vehicles" into a park would
be unclear if the legislators' only obligation were voting based on
their own subjective use of the term "motor vehicles." Legislators
would have attained no meeting of the minds-each legislator could
insist that the courts adopt his interpretation of the language because
he had no duty to consider the ordinary meaning of the statutory text.
In contrast, the statute would have meaning, regardless of the
legislators' divergent understanding of the term "motor vehicles," if
legislators had a duty to assent or to dissent to the statute's customary
meaning. Even if no legislator understood the term "motor vehicles"
to mean motorized means of transportation, the term "motor
vehicles," as used in the statute, would assume that meaning. In
short, the legislators constructively assented to banning "motorized
means of transportation," and only such objects, from the park,
making legislators' actual subjective states of mind irrelevant.
The implications of the legislature's duty to provide public
justification can now be explored. Such a duty requires each
legislator to participate in the creation of both the statutory text and
the public justification. Then, once that public justification is
promulgated, each legislator has a duty to express assent or dissent,
by means of her vote, to both the ordinary meaning of the terms used
in the statute and the public justification provided for it. If a
legislator votes for a statute while holding a subjective view of the
statute's rationale that differs from the public justification offered by
the entire legislature, then she cannot legitimately demand that a
court honor her subjective view of the statute's rationale any more
than she could legitimately demand that a court honor her subjective
understanding of the terms in the text of the statute. Her duty as a
legislator makes her act of voting for the statute without expressing
disagreement with the publicly offered rationale irresponsible-and
in interpreting the statute, a court need not assume that legislators
behave irresponsibly. In effect, courts must reconceptualize the
meaning of legislators' votes, no longer treating those votes as
expressions of assent to merely the customary meaning of the
statutory text, but as assent to the meaning of the text and the
justification provided.
Viewing legislatures as having an obligation to explain statutes
also allows courts to rely on public justifications of statutes appearing
in the legislative history, notwithstanding legislators' varying
subjective understandings of a statute. Indeed, legislators rarely
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share a common subjective understanding of a statute's meaning.
First, most legislators do not consider statutory language in sufficient
detail to formulate a position on numerous specific issues that will
arise under it.34 Second, members follow the cues of others, such as
the relevant committee chair, party leaders, or the administration, in
casting their votes.335 Third, many members cast votes for reasons
that bear little relationship to their view of a statute's merits.336 For
example, a member might vote for a statute in exchange for a
colleague's vote on another measure or to gain favor with his party's
leadership? 37
Although new textualists highlight these matters in challenging
the concept of legislative intent, their own reliance on statutory text is
vulnerable to precisely the same challenges.38 Few, if any, legislators
read an entire statute before they vote on it; indeed, often they read
none of it.339 Many members may give little thought to the text of the
bill because they will ultimately vote based on other members'
positions.34° Moreover, even if all members read the statutory text,
they probably would understand that text differently. 4
If a legislator wishes a statute to reflect his subjective intent, he
must ensure that the statute in fact conveys that intent to the
reasonable reader. No reasonable legislator who votes for a statute
could expect the courts to give the statute the meaning he subjectively
ascribes to it if that subjective understanding departs from the
customary meaning of the words used in the statute.2 New
334. See Karkkainen, supra note 7, at 416.
335. See Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA.
L. REv. 549, 557 (1985); Evans et al., supra note 163, at 247-57.
336. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636-37 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Breyer, supra note 8, at 864-66; Diver, supra note 335, at 558; Mayton, supra note 40, at
144-45 & n.99; Shepsle, supra note 36, at 244,248,249-50.
337. See Edwards, 482 U.S. at 637 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
338. See Statutory Interpretation and the Uses of Legislative History, supra note 12, at 60
(question by Rep. Kastenmeier to Judge Buckley of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals);
Wald, supra note 12, at 307.
339. See Statutory Interpretation and the Uses of Legislative History, supra note 12, at
33, 111 (statements of then-Judge Stephen Breyer and Professor Stephen F. Ross);
Interbranch Relations, supra note 36, at 76-78 (testimony of former Rep. Robert
Kastenmeier); id. at 91 (testimony of Rep. Eleanor Holmes Norton); ARTHUR MAASS,
CONGRESS AND THE COMMON GOOD 115-16 (1983).
340. See supra note 335 and accompanying text.
341. For instance, members of a legislative body might interpret the term "motor
vehicles" to mean any one of the following: (1) all motorized vehicles; (2) all motorized
vehicles that operate on the Earth's surface, including land or water; (3) all motorized
vehicles that operate on land, but not water; (4) all motorized vehicles that operate on
land except trains; or (5) all motorized wheeled vehicles.
342. See Charles B. Nutting, The Ambiguity of Unambiguous Statutes, 24 MINN. L.
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textualists, therefore, presume that all of the legislators both knew the
meaning the reasonable person would attach to the statutory text and
voted on that basis. 43  Given their vision of legislators'
responsibilities, new textualists can treat legislators' failures to read
and to recognize the customary meaning of statutory texts as a
dereliction of duty rather than a conceptual flaw in their theory. 4
Positing a normative duty to explain statutes, a similar argument
can be advanced with respect to the legislative history that comprises
the statute's public justification. The absence of a shared subjective
intent is unimportant because that does not determine a statute's
public meaning. Moreover, a public justification is available to each
legislator, as is the text of the statute. Just as each legislator has a
duty to become aware of the statutory text and its ordinary English
meaning, under the public justification approach, each individual
legislator also has a duty to become aware of the public justification
offered for the statute and to vote on the basis of that public
justification. Accordingly, if a legislator votes for the statute without
dissenting from the public justification, he has implicitly assented to
that public justification. Legislators who fail to familiarize themselves
with the public justification of a statute or who fail to challenge any
perceived inaccuracies in it, have not fulfilled their duties as
legislators. A legislator's actual views of the statute's rationale are
thus irrelevant.
My approach requires the interpreter to examine both the
statute's text and its public justification.345 In identifying the materials
that constitute a statute's public justification, three criteria should be
employed. First, the material must be available to all legislators.
Because each legislator has a right to participate in the development
of the public justification, each legislator must have access to that
justification. Second, only material to which members can respond
before casting their votes can be considered a part of a statute's
REv. 509,516-17 (1940).
343. See United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 345 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part); Statutory Interpretation and the Uses of Legislative History, supra note 12, at 60
(colloquy between Rep. Kastenmeier and Judge Buckley of the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals).
344. See Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 528 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment) ("The language of the statute is entirely clear, and if that is not what Congress
meant then Congress has made a mistake and Congress will have to correct it." (emphasis
added)).
345. Commentary outside the public justification should not be considered binding.
Yet after examining the text and the public justifications and nonetheless finding a statute
ambiguous, a court may then want to consider outside commentary to arrive at the most
efficacious statutory interpretation.
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public justification. Of course, members cannot formally amend
much of the legislative history in the same way they can formally
amend bills under consideration. 46  Nevertheless, treating only
materials subject to formal amendment as potential elements of the
public justification is unwarranted. A document should qualify for
inclusion in the public justification if members can disavow the
document, in whole or in part, before voting. Thus, although
members cannot formally amend committee reports, a legislative
majority can disavow them 47 In particular, members may express
disagreement with committee reports on the floor of the legislature.
Third, only material considered authoritative by the legislators
themselves should gain recognition as a part of a statute's public
justification-that is, the documents should be ones that members
frequently rely upon in casting their votes. For example, Congress
delegates to committees the tasks of both reporting statutory text, in
the form of a bill, and providing an explanation of the bill that
members can consult in deciding how to vote.348 Senators and
Representatives regularly rely on such committee reports as well as
floor manager statements as authoritative expositions of statutory
meaning.349 Indeed, members have come to depend on committee
reports so heavily that they often do not consult the actual text of a
statute. Moreover, members of Congress surely realize that courts,
346. For example, floor debate is an important element of legislative history. Members
who gain recognition can shape the content of floor debate. The Congressional Record,
however, is not amended merely because a majority disagrees with the rationale for a
statute set forth on the record by some legislators.
347. See Zwirn, supra note 42, at 326 (noting that although a committee report "cannot
be formally amended by legislators who may disagree with some of its contents," there are
several informal approaches that can have the effect of amending committee reports).
Ultimately, however, this second requirement excludes little-except post-enactment
materials-because during debates members of Congress can express disagreement with
any document that discusses the statute.
348. Thus, a committee report is required by the rules of the House of Representatives,
see H.R. RULE 11, cl.2, and customarily provided in the Senate, see OLESZEK, supra note
147, at 206; Broden, supra note 115, at 215-16; Zwirn, supra note 42, at 322. Conference
reports are published in the Congressional Record and made available to each Senator or
Representative before they vote on the corresponding bill. See OLESZEK, supra note 147,
at 289.
349. See Broden, supra note 115, at 210,212.
350. See FRIENDLY, supra note 12, at 215-16; ERIC REDMAN, THE DANCE OF
LEGISLATION 140 (1973); Brudney, supra note 12, at 28, 53, 63; Farber & Frickey, supra
note 8, at 448; Zeppos, supra note 11, at 1311-14; Zwirn, supra note 42, at 320. Indeed,
there are occasions when the text of a bill has been misleading because the chamber
looked at the report, not the text of the bill. See Interbranch Relations, supra note 36, at 90
(testimony of former Rep. Robert Kastenmeier); id. at 91 (testimony of Rep. Eleanor
Holmes Norton); Statutory Interpretation and the Uses of Legislative History, supra note
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members of the public, and agencies consider such documents
authoritative.35' Conversely, statements made at hearings, set forth in
party caucus documents, or made outside Congress often are seen as
expressing only the views of individuals members (or their parties),
not necessarily that of Congress as an institution.5
With respect to the United States Congress, then, the materials
that provide the public justification of statutes are: (1) committee
reports; (2) statements of the floor manager; and (3) statements of
sponsors of an amendment or a bill, when the amendment has not
been considered by the appropriate committee 3 Thus, members of
Congress have a duty to familiarize themselves with the explanations
contained in these three types of documents.3 54 They also have a duty
to object to the explanations with which they disagree.3 5 Such an
12, at 33, 111 (statements of then-Judge Stephen Breyer and Professor Stephen F. Ross);
MAASS, supra note 339, at 115-16.
351. See JOHNSON, supra note 154, at 14 ("Committee reports are perhaps the most
valuable single element of the legislative history of the law. They are used by courts,
executive departments, and the public generally, as a source of information regarding the
purpose and meaning of the law."); Breyer, supra note 8, at 871-72.
352. This reasoning may appear somewhat circular-the public, administrative
agencies, and legislators may have begun to rely on committee reports and floor manager
statements because courts began to rely on such materials, and in turn, the widespread
reliance on such material is now being used to justify continued judicial reliance upon it.
Even assuming, however, that the judicial practice produced widespread reliance on such
documents, Congress could have expressed disapproval of the trend or even enacted a
statute precluding the consideration of legislative history. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42
U.S.C. § 1981 note (1994) (setting forth portions of legislative history to which courts may
refer); 5 U.S.C. § 801(g) (Supp. IV 1998) (providing that courts may not draw any
inference from Congress's refusal to veto a statute); Romero, supra note 21, at 213-17. So,
while the courts may have provided the initial impetus for reliance upon committee
reports and floor manager statements, the continued reliance upon such documents may
be attributed, at a minimum, to Congress's acquiescence.
353. The final category includes situations when the Senate or the House adopts an
amendment proposed by a member that changes the bill recommended by the relevant
committee. Proposal and adoption of such amendments typically occur during floor
debate. See Breyer, supra note 8, at 873.
354. Ultimately, the categories of material considered part of the institutional
justification of statutes must be somewhat limited so that legislators' duty to respond to
that justification remains manageable. Courts should not require legislators to review and
comment publicly upon numerous documents on pain of being found to have assented to
all the statements therein. However, if the legislative process is to be a discussion of policy
rather than merely a registration of preferences, legislators should have a duty to review a
limited number of documents discussing statutory rationales produced by those with
authority in the institution.
355. Requiring every member who disagrees with a statement in a public justification
to express that disagreement is unnecessary and unwise. If several legislators disavow the
offending statement, a member who agrees with them should not also need to express
disagreement with the public justification. Such a requirement would needlessly extend
debate. Thus, if several legislators argue that the statute's rationale is broader, narrower,
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expression of disagreement will probably provoke a discussion and a
clearer resolution of the issue. Several scenarios are possible. The
floor manager may provide a more thorough explanation of the
statute. That explanation might convincingly demonstrate that either
the floor manager's initial statement or the committee report
provides the best explanation of the statute. Alternatively, the
legislative body might consider amending the text of the bill.
The public justification approach has sound normative
underpinnings, and, unlike new textualism, the approach does not
conflict with Congress's conception of its responsibilities. Congress
clearly feels obligated to offer justifications for the statutes it enacts.
Often, of course, Congress declares its purposes in the form of
statutory preambles. Congress also regularly provides for the
production and publication of committee reports to explain the
rationale for legislation. Congress has recognized the use of
committee reports and has done nothing to discourage the practice.
Indeed, members of Congress appear to believe that courts should
rely upon legislative history in interpreting statutes."6  More
generally, Congress has required agencies, in promulgating
regulations, to provide a justification for those regulations.35 7 Indeed,
Congress has recognized openness in government as a normative
ideal. In the Government in the Sunshine Act,358 Congress declared it
"the policy of the United States that the public is entitled to the
fullest practicable information regarding the decisionmaking process
of the Federal Government." '359 Congress has legislated to satisfy that
policy by enacting the Freedom of Information Act 60 and the Federal
or simply different than that identified in the public justification, other members need not
add their voices in support.
Nevertheless, the statement of one legislator should not lead a court to question
the public justification, as it does not suggest substantial disagreement with the public
justification. The public justification should be questioned only if several members
disavow it, because vocal dissent may suggest a significant difference of opinion within the
legislative chamber. The position stated by those challenging the public justification
should not be accepted by the interpreter as the statute's rationale. Rather, such a dispute
means only that the court will have to resolve textual ambiguities without reliance upon
the text of the explanatory materials.
356. See supra note 61.
357. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). See
generally i § 555(e) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (requiring that a decision in an agency
adjudication that denies relief must be accompanied by "a brief statement of the grounds
for denial").
358. Id. § 552(b) (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
359. 1d.
360. Id. § 552.
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Advisory Committee Act 6' Consistent with this philosophy, the
House and Senate have adopted rules opening committee
proceedings to the public. 62 In short, the public justification
approach, which accords significance to some legislative history, has
both a strong normative underpinning and is generally consistent with
Congress's own views about the manner in which it legislates.
The public justification approach provides a novel perspective on
two notable Supreme Court cases. The first case, the Court's recent
five-to-four decision in Department of Commerce v. United States
House of Representatives,3 raises interpretive questions that not only
have importance in their own right, but that also typify interpretive
issues involved in attempting to draw inferences from legislative
silence. In such cases, the public justification approach has particular
power because it provides an alternative justification for according
significance to congressional silence. The second case, the classic
Rector of Holy Trinity Church v. United States,311 involves a more
conventional interpretive problem-interpreting a statute when the
rationale provided in the legislative history arguably limits the
breadth of the statute suggested by the plain meaning of the statutory
text.
A. Using Sampling to Conduct the Census: Department of
Commerce v. United States House of Representatives
In its last term, the Supreme Court considered whether federal
law allows the Census Bureau to employ sampling techniques in
determining each state's populations for purposes of apportioning
seats in the House of Representatives .36  Historically, the federal
government based the population count on direct contact with every
household included in the census, accomplished either by census
takers' personal visits to dwellings or the households' return of census
361. 5 U.S.C. app. (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
362. See S. RULE 26.5b; H.R. RULE X, cl. 4(a)(1)(A); H.R. RULE XI, cI. 2(g)(1). The
1976 rule changes that opened committee proceedings were adopted because Congress
believed that citizens were not merely entitled to knowledge of statutory enactments, but
also entitled to know the reasons for those statutory enactments. See S. REP. No. 94-354,
at 5-6 (1975) (Sup. Docs. No. Y1.1/5:94-354), reprinted in SENATE COMM. ON GOV'T
OPERATIONS & HOUSE COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS, GOVERNMENT IN THE
SUNSHINE Acr SOURCE BOOK: LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, TEXTS, AND OTHER
DOCUMENTS 200,200-01 (1976).
363. 525 U.S. 316 (1999).
364. 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
365. See Department of Commerce v. United States House of Representatives, 525
U.S. 316,320 (1999).
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forms by mail.31 The resulting population figures significantly
undercounted the population-particularly urban dwellers and racial
minorities.36 7 The Census Bureau's plan to use statistical sampling in
conducting the 2000 Census to address the undercount resulted in a
lawsuit that required the courts to determine whether the Census Act
authorized sampling.36 In resolving that question, the Court revisited
a methodological issue that has arisen previously: what inference
should be drawn from legislative silence?36
9
At the center of the case was whether the Census Bureau
possessed the legal authority to use sampling to adjust census figures
that would be used in apportioning the House of Representatives
under the Census Act of 1957. Section 141(a) of the Act, which had
been added by Congress in 1976, authorized the Secretary of
Commerce to take a decennial census of the population "in such form
and content as he may determine, including the use of sampling
procedures.""37 Section 195 of the Act, which had been amended in
1976, provided that "[e]xcept for the determination of population for
purposes of congressional apportionment, the Secretary shall, where
he deems it appropriate, authorize the use of statistical sampling in
carrying out the Census Act. '371 The House of Representatives and
366. See MARGO J. ANDERSON, THE AMERICAN CENSUS: A SOCIAL HISTORY 201
(1988). Until 1950, the census was conducted exclusively by census takers who visited
households. After 1950, the Census Bureau began using forms that were mailed to
households, completed, and returned. See id.
367. See Samuel Issacharoff & Allan J. Lichtman, The Census Undercount and
Minority Representation The Constitutional Obligation of the States to Guarantee Equal
Protection, 13 REV. L1TIG. 1, 6-9 (1993); Sheldon T. Bradshaw, Note, Death, Taxes, and
Census Litigation Do the Equal Protection and Apportionment Clauses Guarantee a
Constitutional Right to Census Accuracy?, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 379, 386-88 (1996).
The undercount of African-Americans goes back to at least the 1870s. See ANDERSON,
supra note 366, at 89.
36& See Department of Commerce, 525 U.S. at 324.
369. See infra notes 382-411 and accompanying text.
370. In 1976, Congress amended the Census Act, changing the word "may" to "shall."
See Act of Oct. 17, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-521, § 195, 90 Stat. 459, 464 (1976) (codified at 13
U.S.C. § 195 (1994)). In 1976, Congress also amended § 141(a) of the Act, which, in
revised form, provides:
The Secretary shall, in the year 1980 and every 10 years thereafter, take a
decennial census of population as of the first day of April of such year, which
date shall be known as the "decennial census date," in such form and content as
he may determine, including the use of sampling procedures and special surveys.
13 U.S.C. § 141(a) (1994).
371. As originally enacted, § 195 of the Act provided that: "Except for the
determination of population for purposes of congressional apportionment purposes, the
Secretary may, where he deems it appropriate, authorize the use of ... statistical ...
'sampling' in carrying out the [Act]." 13 U.S.C. § 195 (1958) (current version at id, § 195
(1994)) (emphasis added).
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several voters residing in states that stood to lose seats in the House
challenged the Census Bureau's plans to use sampling to derive state
population figures in the 2000 Census, arguing that the Census Act
barred the use of sampling for purposes of reapportioning the
House.372 In response, the Census Bureau argued that the Act
authorized sampling even for reapportionment purposes.3 73
In support of their respective positions, each party advanced
textual arguments. Significantly, two textual approaches supported
conflicting interpretations. One approach focused on the current text
of § 195 .3 4 The phrasing of this section suggests that sampling is
prohibited for purposes of reapportionment. In particular, a proviso
preceding a mandatory prescription (i.e., a sentence using the
"except/shall" structure used in § 195) ordinarily means that one rule
applies to matters generally covered by the prescription and that
matters within the proviso must be treated differently. For example,
suppose one instructed a person named Jane controlling a gate to a
park as follows: "Except for purposes of maintaining public safety,
you shall not allow any motor vehicle into the park." The most
natural reading of the order, the argument goes, is that generally Jane
must not allow motor vehicles to enter the park, but that for
situations covered by the proviso-when furthering public safety-
Jane must allow motor vehicles to enter.
What qualifies as the most natural reading of the "except/shall"
formulation is contestable, as the Census Bureau argued. In
particular, a proviso to a mandatory prescription may signify that
matters covered by the mandatory prescription should be dealt with
in a particular manner and that the person to whom the mandatory
prescription is directed has discretion to treat matters covered by the
proviso either similarly or differently. In effect, the proviso does not
compel different treatment, but confers discretion on a
decisionmaker. Thus, in my example of the instruction to Jane at the
park gate, the instruction might be interpreted to mean that Jane
cannot ordinarily permit motor vehicles into the park, but she has
discretion on whether to admit motor vehicles that seek to enter to
maintain public safety. The parties provided conflicting examples of
the usage of the "except/shall" formulation in the United States
Code.375 Nevertheless, one of the two district judges who addressed
the issue found the "except/shall" structure dispositive in holding for
372. See Department of Commerce, 525 U.S. at 328.
373. See Brief for the Appellants at 25-39, Department of Commerce (No. 98-404).
374. See id. at 27-39.
375. See Department of Commerce, 525 U.S. at 339.
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the plaintiffs.3 76 The other district judge concluded that, while not
dispositive, the "except/shall" structure weighed in favor of the
plaintiffs' argument that the Census Bureau lacked authority to
employ sampling for reapportionment purposes. 7
The Census Bureau relied upon a second textual argument,
focusing on the 1976 change in the language of § 195 of the Census
Act. 78 Until 1976, § 195 provided that statistical sampling may be
used for purposes other than congressional apportionment.3 79 The
statute unquestionably precluded the Census Bureau from employing
sampling for apportionment purposes, by permitting the Bureau to
use sampling (i.e. "the Secretary may ... authorize the use of
statistical sampling") except for determining the apportionment of
representatives. By changing the word "may" to "shall" in 1976 and
not otherwise modifying § 195 to reaffirm explicitly the ban on the
use of sampling for apportionment purposes, Congress, in effect,
revised the ban by changing a provision clearly banning the use of
sampling for apportionment to one that arguably does not.
Moreover, the general policy of encouraging sampling, embodied in
the 1976 amendments to the Census Act, further supports such a
reading.3
In Department of Commerce, none of the Justices was willing to
place exclusive reliance on such textual arguments.38 1 Accordingly,
the case turned on other considerations, bringing the issue of the role
of legislative intent to the fore. A majority of Justices attempted to
determine the 1976 Congress's intent: did Congress intend to allow,
but not require, sampling for apportionment, while requiring
376. See Glavin v. Clinton, 19 F. Supp. 2d 543, 552-53 (E.D. Va. 1998), affd by
Department of Commerce v. United States House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316
(1999).
377. See United States House of Representatives v. Department of Commerce, 11 F.
Supp. 2d 76, 99-100 ("An exception from a command to do 'X' more often than not
represents a prohibition against doing 'X' with respect to the subject matter covered by
the exception."), appeal dismissed, 525 U.S. 316 (1999).
378. Act of Oct. 17,1976, Pub. L. No. 94-521, § 195, 90 Stat. 459,464 (1976) (codified at
13 U.S.C. § 195 (1994)).
379. See 13 U.S.C. § 195.
380. The text of the 1976 amendment clearly embodied a view that sampling should be
used more frequently. The change in § 195 mandated that the Secretary use sampling
when feasible. The legislative history also sets forth Congress's pro-sampling policy. See,
e.g., S. REP. No. 94-1256, at 4 (1976) (Sup. Docs. No. Y1.1/5:94-1256) (noting that § 141 as
amended was intended to "encourage the use of sampling and surveys in the taking of the
decennial census").
381. However, Chief Judge Hilton of the District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia, in resolving the challenge to the Census Bureau's plans brought in that court,
found the statutes unambiguous and thus dispositive. See Glavin, 19 F. Supp. 2d at 552-53.
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sampling to the extent feasible for all other purposes? Alternatively,
did Congress merely intend to compel the use sampling for
nonapportionment purposes while leaving the prohibition on the use
of sampling for reapportionment purposes intact? Congress did not
address these questions directly, so the Court had little or no
legislative history to guide its decision. The Justices debated the
inferences that can be drawn from congressional silence, a topic the
Court has discussed on several occasions in recent years? 82
Ultimately, the Supreme Court split four ways on the
interpretive question. Only three of the four positions staked out-
those presented in the opinions of Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and
Stevens-merit discussion here?3" Justice O'Connor announced the
opinion of the Court, but only Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Kennedy fully concurred in her analysis. She frankly acknowledged
that, as a matter of textual interpretation of the type that Justice
Scalia employs, the question before the Court could be resolved in
either party's favor."8 She reasoned that the tradition of using direct
contact to produce census figures for purposes of reapportionment
suggested that the statute required the Census Bureau to continue
that tradition.?8 In addition to relying on tradition, Justice O'Connor
382. See Bell, supra note 4, at 91. The District of Columbia District Court judge had
relied on such silence to draw the inference that Congress meant to leave the prohibition
of sampling unchanged, invoking the Supreme Court's favorite analogy for this type of
situation, "'the dog that did not bark,'" from one of Sir Arthur Conan Doyle's Sherlock
Holmes mysteries. United States House of Representatives, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 100-02
(quoting Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 396 n.23 (1991) (referencing Sir Arthur Conan
Doyle, Silver Blaze, reprinted in SHERLOCK HOLMES: THE COMPLETE NOvEL AND
STORIES (1986))). In Silver Blaze, Holmes determined the murderer's identity by noting
that the victim's dog did not bark on the night of the murder. See Doyle, supra, at 471-72.
Holmes inferred that the murderer was someone with whom the dog was familiar. The
district court concluded that given the importance of apportionment, some legislator
surely would have objected if members of Congress had understood the statute to allow
sampling. See United States House of Representatives, 11 F. Supp. 2d at 101-02. Moreover,
the oblique nature of the change in § 195's text surely did not alert members of Congress
that the statute would make such a momentous change in the law.
383. Justice Breyer argued that the Act authorized the Census Bureau's plans because
§ 195(a) merely prohibited using sampling as a "substitute" for direct contact (whether by
dwelling visits or by mail) rather than as a "supplement" for direct contact, which § 195(a)
did not prohibit. Department of Commerce, 525 U.S. at 349-50 (Breyer, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). Because the Census Bureau's proposal merely used sampling
to supplement calculations based upon direct contact, Justice Breyer argued, the Bureau's
plan was permissible. See id. at 350 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
384. See id. at 339 ("Absent any historical context, the language in the amended § 195
might reasonably be read as either permissive or prohibitive with regard to the use of
sampling for apportionment purposes.").
385. See id. at 340. Justice Scalia joined this portion of the opinion. See id. at 344
(Scalia, J., concurring in part).
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relied on inferences about Congress's intent-inferring that Congress
did not intend to change the apportionment proviso from a
prohibitory to a permissive clause. In particular, she noted that "[a]t
no point during the debates over these amendments did a single
Member of Congress suggest that the amendments would so
fundamentally change the manner in which the Bureau could
calculate the population for purposes of apportionment. '386 Justice
O'Connor posited that if members of Congress had understood the
Act to authorize the Census Bureau to use sampling for
apportionment purposes for the first time in the nation's history,
some member of Congress would have voiced an objection to the
amendment. Justice O'Connor based her inference on three factors:
(1) the profound effect such sampling could have on the
apportionment of seats among states and on the district lines within
states; (2) the momentous nature of the change, which Justice
O'Connor described as "arguably ... the single most significant
change in the method of conducting the decennial census since its
inception;" 387 and (3) the subtlety of the change in the statute's
phraseology that allegedly produced such a momentous change s.3
Justice Scalia also concluded that the statute did not remove the
prohibition on sampling for apportionment purposes, but dismissed as
foolhardy any attempt to construe legislative silence.38 9 In so doing,
he adhered to his position in Chisom v. Roemer,390 where he argued
that drawing inferences from congressional silence is normatively
illegitimate because Congress need not proclaim its actions. 91 In
Chisom, Justice Scalia also noted his unwillingness, as an empirical
matter, to assume that everything of significance was noted in
legislative history or would have sparked debate .3
In Department of Commerce, Justice Scalia parsed the statutory
text with extreme precision, reasoning that the statutory mandate
generally requiring the Census Bureau to use sampling is subject to
386. I. at 342.
387. Id. at 343.
38& See iL
389. See id. at 344 (Scalia, J., concurring).
390. 501 U.S. 380,404-17 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
391. See id. at 417 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In Chisom, Justice Scalia explained that
reasoning based on inferences from legislative silence rests upon the erroneous
proposition that "Congress cannot be credited with having achieved anything of major
importance by simply saying it, in ordinary language, in the text of a statute 'without
comment' in the legislative history." Id. at 406 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
392. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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two exceptions. 393 The first exception is obvious-the mandate does
not apply to apportionment. 3 94  The second is more subtle-the
Census Bureau is excused from the mandate if it considers sampling
infeasible. 395 Justice Scalia presumed that the exceptions should be
construed similarly-either they both permit, but do not mandate
sampling, or they both preclude sampling. 6 Because Congress surely
did not intend the Census Bureau to engage in sampling when
infeasible, he reasoned that the exceptions must preclude sampling in
the situations they cover. Thus, under Justice Scalia's reading of the
text, sampling is also precluded for apportionment.39
In addition, Justice Scalia drew inferences from the structure of
the Census Act. He noted that § 181 of the Act, governing the
compilation of certain nonessential data, limits the Secretary's ability
to use sampling data to situations in which the Secretary could
determine that it will produce "current, comprehensive reliable
data. '398 If §§ 141(a) and 195 were read to allow the Census Bureau
complete discretion regarding sampling for reapportionment, Justice
Scalia argued, the Act would place fewer constraints on the Census
Bureau in performing the central function of apportionment than in
performing the "useful but hardly indispensable function" of
compiling annual and biennial interim data.3 99 Justice Scalia thus
refused to read into the statute a meaning that, in his words,
"swallows a camel and strains out a gnat."40
To the extent that the statutory text did not resolve the
argument, Justice Scalia resorted to an argument based on
constitutional considerations. He reasoned that the Constitution's
Census Clause, which requires Congress to prescribe the manner in
which an "actual enumeration" of the population is to occur,401 raises
a substantial doubt as to the constitutionality of employing
393. Department of Commerce, 525 U.S. at 344-49 (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
394. See id at 344-49 (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
395. See id at 344-46 (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
396. See id. at 346 (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
397. See id. (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
398. Id (Scalia, J., concurring in part) (quoting 13 U.S.C. § 181(a) (1994)).
399. Id (Scalia, 3., concurring in part).
400. I& (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
401. Article I, Section 2, Clause 3 of the Constitution provides:
Representatives ... shall be apportioned among the several States ... according
to their respective Numbers .... The actual Enumeration shall be made within
three Years after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and
within every subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law
direct.
U.S. CONST. art I, § 2, cl. 3.
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apportionment-related samping.4 2 His rationale stemmed largely
from the colonial-era meaning of the word "enumeration," which he
derived by consulting dictionaries extant at the time.4°3 Additionally,
he argued that requiring population counts to reflect direct contact
with every household, whether in person or by mail, serves a
structural function. This direct-contact mandate precludes elected
officials from protecting their positions by manipulating the
population counts that determine the composition of electoral
districts.4 4 Consequently, Justice Scalia concluded that because the
constitutional status of sampling was questionable, the statute should
be construed to prohibit it.405
Justice Stevens, in a dissent joined by Justices Souter and
Ginsburg, found the arguments based on legislative silence
inapposite.406 In fact, Justice Stevens argued that Congress had not
been silent-it had amended the relevant statutory provision and
proclaimed its desire to encourage sampling.4 7 He noted that the
Senate report on the 1976 amendments states that the amended
§ 141(a) was intended to "encourage the use of sampling and surveys
in the taking of the decennial census." 48 Nevertheless, the dissent's
reasoning is not flawless.
For starters, the report's language does not reference § 195, in
which the proviso regarding the use of sampling for apportionment
appears. In addition, while the decennial census produces population
figures, it also produces other information. Thus, the passage in the
Senate report may indicate little more than Congress's desire to
encourage sampling for purposes other than reapportionment.
Justice Stevens acknowledged the lack of any other specific reference
to the use of sampling in conducting the decennial census, but he
instead relied upon more general statements in the legislative history
402. See Department of Commerce, 525 U.S. at 346 (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
403. See id at 346-47 (Scalia, J., concurring in part) (quoting the definition of
"enumeration" as iterated in dictionaries published in 1828, 1773, and 1796).
404. See iL at 347 (Scalia, J., concurring in part).
405. See id. at 346-48 (Scalia, J., concurring in part). See generally NLRB v. Catholic
Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979) (stating that statutes should be construed to avoid
constitutional doubt).
406. See Department of Commerce, 525 U.S. at 357 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice
Stevens asserted that Justice O'Connor did not use such an approach. See id. at 360
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor did, however, use such reasoning but refrained
from explicitly referencing the well-worn analogy to the Sherlock Holmes mystery. See id.
at 342; see also supra note 382 (discussing the use of the Sherlock Holmes story).
407. See Department of Commerce, 525 U.S. at 357-58 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
40& Id. at 359 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting S. REP. No. 94-1256, at 4 (1976) (Sup.
Docs. No. Y1.1/5:94-1256)).
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that advocated the use of sampling whenever possible. Justice
Stevens presumed that Congress understood the statutory text and
legislative history, and he found it unsurprising that no legislator
would object to the potential use of sampling for reapportionment
purposes. He suggested that Justice O'Connor's view of the change
as controversial was colored by the political disagreements over the
reliability of sampling that have emerged since 1976, and he argued
that the current controversy surrounding sampling "sheds no light on
the views of the legislators who enacted the authorization to use
sampling in 1976." 9 He also noted that in contrast to the lack of
protest about use of sampling in the census, opposition to the use of
mid-decade census figures for reapportionment purposes was clearly
expressed in the legislative history.410 Although his inference remains
unstated, implicit in Justice Stevens's opinion is the conclusion that
members of Congress knew that sampling-based figures could be
employed for reapportionment purposes, but they were concerned
only about such use in the context of mid-decade census figures.
Furthermore, Justice Stevens refused to view the 1976 amendment of
§§ 195 and 141(a) as an indirect means of granting the Census Bureau
the authority to use sampling in connection with the census. Thus,
Justice Stevens concluded that the prohibition had been lifted, and he
disagreed with Justice O'Connor's assessment of the scant evidence
she cited to support her position4 "
My public justification approach would acknowledge the pre-
1976 prohibition on sampling in apportionment and would accord
significance to Congress's failure to discuss or explain the ending of
that prohibition and the lodging of discretion in the Census Bureau.
Given the obligation to explain statutes, courts sometimes should find
Congress's silence dispositive. When Congress fails to mention a
change supposedly mandated by ambiguous statutory text, courts
sometimes should conclude that such silence alone justifies a refusal
to give the ambiguous statutory text such a broad meaning. However,
Congress surely must not be held to the obligation of anticipating
every potential application of statutory language; such an approach
would often unduly restrict statutory language.
Of course, changes of a certain magnitude should not be
presumed to have been made merely on the basis of ambiguous
statutory language. A decision about which applications of a
409. IM (Stevens, J., dissenting).
410. See id at 361 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
411. See id. at 361-62 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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statutory change are of sufficient magnitude to call for congressional
explanation cannot rest on legislative intent or inferences about
legislators' subjective states of mind, but rather must rest on the
court's own analysis of the issue's importance. It requires the exercise
of judicial judgment informed by a variety of factors. Justice
O'Connor's judgment about the significance of a potential change in
the legitimacy of sampling for apportionment purposes, while sound,
ultimately cannot be traced to any real evidence about legislators'
states of mind in 1976. Rather, because a change in the prohibition is
substantial and significant, making such changes without explanation
is insufficient. The departure from tradition and the significant
implications of sampling suggest that Congress should be expected to
explain or discuss the issue. The determination that this is the type of
change that must be explained is a question for the courts rather than
a conclusion somehow compelled by legislative intent.
Justice O'Connor's approach is flawed. She attempts to relegate
her inferences regarding legislative intent to a secondary role, relying
instead on tradition. Her effort to invoke tradition, however, fails.
Tradition has little relevance if detached from both Justice Scalia's
constitutional argument and Justice O'Connor's own inferences about
Congress's intent based on its silence.412 Reliance on tradition as an
interpretive tool makes little sense in analyzing a statute that clearly
alters tradition.4 3 Justice O'Connor cannot and does not explain the
logic behind giving more weight to the traditional manner of
conducting the census than to Congress's expressed desire to change
that tradition. When a statute mandates changes in traditional
practices, tradition is interpretively important only as a basis for
inferring that the statute did not change certain aspects of tradition,
as Congress would not have done so without clearly and
unambiguously stating its intent.
412. Justice O'Connor probably separated her discussion of tradition from her
discussion of drawing inferences regarding legislative intent from silence because Justice
Scalia would not concur in any discussion of legislative intent. See Kenneth R. Dortzbach,
Legislative History: The Philosophies of Justices Scalia and Breyer and the Use of
Legislative History by the Wisconsin State Courts, 80 MARO. L. REV. 161, 182 (1996);
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Should the Supreme Court Read The Federalist but Not Statutory
Legislative History?, 66 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1301,1306 (1998).
413. In many ways such an approach resembles the approach of construing statutes in
derogation of common law narrowly, see supra note 129, which Professor Pound critiqued
at the turn of the twentieth century and which the courts have largely abandoned. See
ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 311, at 656-57 (noting that courts have largely
abandoned the interpretive canon that statutes in derogation of common law should be
construed narrowly); POUND, supra note 112, at 47, 61 (critiquing the approach); Pound,
Spurious Interpretation, supra note 129, at 386 (critiquing the approach).
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Justice O'Connor's reliance on legislative intent is flawed
because she presents little support for the inferences she draws from
congressional silence. It is difficult to distinguish between Justice
O'Connor's own beliefs regarding the types of changes warranting
explanation from what she concludes about the 1976 Congress's
beliefs regarding the types of changes warranting explanation. She
offers no real evidence to suggest that eliminating the prohibition on
sampling for reapportionment was an issue that Congress thought
worthy of discussion or explanation.4 14 In light of the limited evidence
of any subjective intent by any member of the legislature, the debate
between Justice Stevens and Justice O'Connor over "legislative
intent" has a rather anemic quality, and Justice Scalia indeed seems to
have a point about the ephemeral nature of evidence of "legislative
intent."
Justice Stevens's approach is also problematic because he ignores
the absence of any stated intent to revoke the prohibition on
sampling for reapportionment purposes or to grant discretion over
such matters to the Census Bureau. General statements regarding
the benefits of sampling do not convincingly establish a congressional
intent to make the purported change. More importantly, even if we
magically learned that a majority of legislators subjectively believed
that they were allowing sampling for reapportionment purposes, we
nevertheless should disregard such information because such a
significant change should be made explicitly rather than obliquely.
Congress fails in its normative duty when it makes changes of such
consequence without explanation or debate. While the judiciary
should enforce changes of such magnitude if they are made clearly in
414. The tepid quality of Justice O'Connor's argument regarding legislative intent is a
bit paradoxical. In Department of Commerce, she dealt with one of the subjects about
which members of Congress are likely to have an intense self-interest, based upon their
interest in retaining their legislative positions and promoting the power of their political
parties or states. Census figures are not only used to apportion seats in the House of
Representatives among the states, but to construct electoral districts both for the House
and for state legislatures. See Benjamin J. Razi, Comment, Census Politics Revisite&
What to Do When the Government Can't Count, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1101, 1102 (1999). As
Margo Anderson shows, reapportionment of the House of Representatives frequently has
been a political issue, and, indeed, it took Congress until July 1929 to enact a
reapportionment bill after the 1920 Census indicated the electoral implications of
population shifts. See ANDERSON, supra note 366, at 149-56. In this case, then, an
observer may have particularly strong reasons to surmise that no change in any matter
having such electoral implications could be accomplished without a fight. Interestingly,
however, Justice O'Connor did not rely heavily on members of Congress's electoral
interests-her mention of those interests is oblique; she merely notes that the change in
the manner of compiling census figures would likely change the configuration of
congressional districts. See Department of Commerce, 525 U.S. at 343.
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the text of a statute, when in doubt, courts should construe language
conservatively when Congress fails to explain the significance of the
statutory language.
Justice Scalia errs in refusing to accord significance to the
absence of any legislative history regarding use of sampling for
reapportionment purposes. As I have argued above, Congress has a
duty to explain major statutory changes.415 Courts should not
invalidate statutes merely because Congress fails to explain their
rationale. Courts, however, should consider a legislative failure to
acquit the legislative duty to explain statutory changes when called
upon to construe that statute. Accordingly, courts should only
reluctantly conclude that statutory text works major changes in the
law that have not been identified in the statute's legislative history.416
Justice Scalia's strained textual arguments also show the onerous
nature of the duty new textualism places on legislators who draft
statutes. No doubt few, if any, legislators parsed the statutory text as
finely as Justice Scalia did in his opinion. Legislators should not be
required to pursue the type of precise analysis that Justice Scalia
applies on pain of having the statute misconstrued by the courts.
Furthermore, Justice Scalia's reliance on the Census Clause to
interpret the scope of the Census Act is misplaced. His textualist
argument, which focuses on the use of the word "enumeration," is not
compelling because one can locate other dictionaries that give
different definitions of "enumeration." For instance, the Oxford
English Dictionary gives the primary definition of the word
"enumeration," as "the action of ascertaining the number of
something; esp[ecially] the taking [of] a census of population. 4 17 In
arguing on behalf of the Census Bureau, the Solicitor General not
only noted the different definitions of "enumeration" and explained
that the word had been used in both ways since 1577,418 but he also
noted that the definition that Justice Scalia relied upon was a
secondary definition.419
Justice Scalia's construction of the Census Clause in such a way
as to cast doubt upon the constitutionality of the Census Act as
415. See supra notes 325-44 and accompanying text.
416. In addition, Justice Scalia's dismissal of the inference that the legislature rarely
does anything important without explanation conflicts with Congress's view of its
practices. Members of Congress appear to believe that they have an obligation to explain
the important aspects of statutes in the legislative history to guide those who must follow
as well as apply the law. See supra notes 356-62.
417. 5 OXFORD ENGLISH DICriONARY 311 (2d ed. 1989).
418. Brief for the Appellants at 40, Department of Commerce (No. 98-404).
419. See id.
1350 [Vol. 78
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
interpreted by the Department of Commerce is problematic for other
reasons. Surely nothing in the Census Clause validates a census
because of the manner in which it is taken. Given the purpose of the
Clause-allocation of representation to the states-the accuracy of
the numbers produced would seem to be more important than the
method used to produce those numbers. Indeed, the text of the
Constitution left broad discretion to Congress regarding the manner
in which the census was to be conducted.42
Moreover, the Constitution's specific delegation of the authority
to determine the manner of enumeration surely includes the
discretion to decide that "actual enumeration" means a determination
of the population figures either by sampling or by individual
counting.42' Indeed, the Constitution specifically delegates the task to
Congress, by providing that Congress shall prescribe the manner in
which the census is conducted. Surely such discretion includes the
power to adopt methods that differ from those used traditionally.
Although the risk exists that elected officials would frustrate the
influence of newly emerging majorities by manipulating population
counts, this concern by itself should not deprive the politically
accountable branches of government of the power to make such
decisions. Indeed, individual counting poses many of the same risks
of unfairly entrenching incumbent officeholders. For example,
undercounts of black citizens in the South during the 1870s were
intended to reduce their political influence.4n In fact, congressional
Republicans' current resistance to sampling appears motivated, in
large part, by a desire to retain the majority status that would be
imperiled if urban areas gained increased representation.
The structural issues are more complex than Justice Scalia
acknowledges.4  The historically undercounted-racial minorities,
420. Interestingly, in 1782, five years before the Constitutional Convention, Thomas
Jefferson provided an official estimate of Virginia's population using a rudimentary type
of statistical sampling. See HYMAN ALTERMAN, COUNTING PEOPLE: THE CENSUS IN
HISTORY 168-70 (1969).
421. See Wisconsin v. City of New York, 517 U.S. 1,19 (1996).
422. See ANDERSON, supra note 366, at 89 (reporting that blacks in the South in 1870
were egregiously undercounted). Periodically, complaints have been raised about biased
counting, such as the allegations made in the 1920s. See id. at 151.
423. Moreover, Justice Scalia's structural analysis cannot be grounded in the Framers'
conceptions. The Framers realized that population numbers could be manipulated; they
did not put their faith in the particular manner in which the census was conducted. See,
e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 54 (Alexander Hamilton). Rather, the Framers tied both a
significant benefit and a significant burden to each state's respective population figures.
Not only would the size of a state's constitutional delegation turn on its population, but its
tax burden would as well. See id.; ALTERMAN, supra note 420, at 167, 186, 191. That
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the homeless,4 4 and recent immigrants-are likely to suffer at the
hands of majoritarian institutions. Such groups may qualify as
"discrete and insular" minorities whose position in majoritarian
bodies warrants heightened protection. 425 On the one hand, sampling
may decrease the probability that those holding political power can
entrench themselves regardless of population changes. On the other
hand, the uncounted are presumably less likely to vote than those
who are counted because people who do not respond to census
surveys as a result of time constraints, lethargy, fear, or some other
circumstance4 6 are probably less likely to vote than those who do
respond. Thus, the undercounted increase their neighbors' electoral
power and entitlement to representation without diluting the weight
of their neighbors' votes.4 7 This situation might provide a form of
constructive representation by giving greater power to voters who
sympathize with and who benefit from such populations.4z Creating
structural protection has eroded. Taxation is no longer allocated on the basis of a state's
population. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XVI; ANDERSON, supra note 366, at 111. In
addition, many programs that provide grants-in-aid to states and localities for various
purposes are now tied to the census-thus, there is an added incentive to increase an
area's population figures. See ANDERSON, supra note 366, at 203-04, 210. Thus, the
structural protections that the Framers envisioned no longer exist.
424. See National Law Ctr. on Homelessness & Poverty v. Kantor, 91 F.3d 178, 179
(D.C. Cir. 1996).
425. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938); see ELY,
supra note 67, at 151-70. The homeless make up another such group. See, e.g., Carolene
Prods. Co., 304 U.S. at 179.
426. See Tucker v. United States Dep't of Commerce, 958 F.2d 1411, 1418 (7th Cir.
1992).
427. See id. at 1418-19. A prime historical example was the apportionment of
Representatives at the end of Reconstruction. White southerners stood to gain
representation based on the sizeable number of newly freed slaves, even though they
excluded blacks from voting. See ANDERSON, supra note 366, at 72-82. To address that
problem, Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment provided that
when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and
Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive
and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is
denied to any male inhabitants of such State being twenty-one years of age, and
citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged except for participation in
rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in
the proportion which the number of such .male. citizens shall bear to the whole
number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. The quoted portion of Section 2 has never been enforced.
See ANDERSON, supra note 366, at 82. Later, complaints were made about northern states
counting resident non-naturalized aliens, who were not entitled to vote. See i., at 156
n.31.
428. See Tucker, 958 F.2d at 1418-19 (observing that "a census undercount may reduce
the voting power of voters who are the natural allies of the undercounted, since an
adjustment might give more representation to voters in states in which the undercounted
are concentrated"); Dennis L. Murphy, Note, The Exclusion of Illegal Aliens from the
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districts having unusually high numbers of the historically
undercounted, however, may simply enhance the power of those who
have little sympathy for, or who are actively hostile to, their political
interests. Such a state of affairs could result if such people form a
majority of the district into which the historically undercounted are
placed.4 29
In the final analysis, my public justification approach allows
resolution of the Department of Commerce even though Congress did
not speak to the key issue, chronic undercounting of sub-populations.
My public justification approach also avoids the problems introduced
by positing and trying to discern some legislative intent shared by a
majority of the legislators.
B. Revisiting an Old Chestnut: Rector of Holy Trinity Church v.
United States
My public justification approach also may change our perspective
on more conventional interpretive issues, such as those arising in the
classic Rector of Holy Trinity Church v. United States.430 The statute
at issue in Holy Trinity prohibited anyone from assisting in the
immigration of any alien who had, before immigrating, contracted to
"perform labor or services of any kind.""43 The United States sued
Holy Trinity Church, which had hired an English cleric as its rector.4 32
The Supreme Court was forced to decide whether such employment
constituted the performance of "labor or services of any kind" under
the statute. As the Court noted, the text of the provision seemed to
encompass such employment.4 33 However, the Court focused on
Reapportionment Base: A Question of Representation, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 969, 991-
92 (1991) (discussing constructive representation).
429. Moreover, because states need not include some categories of people who either
are ineligible to vote or have a tenuous connection with the locality, historically
undercounted groups, such as illegal aliens, could be used to increase a state's
congressional delegation, but could not be taken into account when the state fashions
congressional districts. See Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 534-35 (1969)
("[A]ssuming without deciding that apportionment may be based on eligible voter
population rather than total populations."); Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 92 (1966)
(stating that the Court has never "suggested that the States are required to include aliens,
transients, short-term or temporary residents, or persons denied the vote for conviction of
crime, in the apportionment base by which their legislators are distributed and against
which compliance with the Equal Protection Clause is to be measured").
430. 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
431. Alien Contract Labor Laws of 1885, ch. 164, 23 Stat. 332, 332 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 2164 (1901) (repealed 1952)).
432. See Holy Trinity Church, 143 U.S. at 457-58.
433. See id. at 458. The plain meaning argument was strengthened by the statute's
explicit exemption of some professionals, including actors, artists, lecturers, singers, and
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congressional intent, asserting its belief that Congress did not intend
to prohibit transactions between churches and rectors.4m4 The Court
explained: "It is a familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter
of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its
spirit, nor within the intention of its makers."435 The Court held that
the statutory phrase "labor or service of any kind" covered only
manual labor, relying on its knowledge of the circumstances
surrounding the statute's enactment, the problems that prompted
Congress to act,436 and the statute's legislative history, which focused
on immigrants who engaged in physical labor.437 The Court noted
that the relevant Senate committee realized that the text of the
statute might include immigrants other than manual laborers and yet
had refused to narrow the statute's language.43 The committee had
explained that it did not wish to delay the bill by redrafting it and
expressed its confidence that the courts would interpret the bill to bar
only manual laborers.439
Although no Justice dissented in Holy Trinity, Justice Kennedy
criticized the Holy Trinity Court's approach almost a century later in
his concurrence in Public Citizen v. United States Department of
Justice.44  Justice Kennedy argued that legislative materials are
unauthoritative and that judicial "rummag[ing] through" legislative
history does not further "democratic exegesis.""' He also observed
that the determinations of legislative intent generally rest on so little
evidence that judges' conclusions about legislative intent often reflect
their own views rather than those of the enacting legislature. 2
Justice Kennedy's dissent offers telling criticisms to the extent
domestic servants. See Alien Contract Labor Laws of 1885, ch. 164, § 5, 23 Stat. at 333;
Holy Trinity Church, 143 U.S. at 45&
434. See Holy Trinity Church, 143 U.S. at 459.
435. Id (emphasis added).
436. See icL at 463-64. In the Court's view, the problem Congress sought to remedy
was big business's use of imported labor to depress wages. See id.
437. See id& at 464-65.
43& See id. at 464.
439. See id. at 464-65. The Court also expressed concern about the statute's impact on
religious freedom and said that it did not believe Congress meant to inhibit the practice of
religion. See it at 471-72.
440. 491 U.S. 440, 467 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring). In a recent essay, Justice
Scalia echoed Justice Kennedy's criticisms of Holy Trinity Church. See Scalia, supra note
44, at 18-23.
441. Public Citizen, 491 U.S. at 473 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
442. See i. (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Kennedy, analogizing efforts to
determine legislative intent to seances, quipped: "The problem with spirits is that they
tend to reflect less the views of the world whence they come than the views of those who
seek their advice." Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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that the Holy Trinity Court professed to use legislative history to
determine the actual intent of a legislative majority. The factual basis
for a conclusion that most of the members in Congress that enacted
the immigration bill intended the statute to apply only to manual
labor does not seem fully convincing, and it may, in fact, reflect the
views of the judges more than it reflects any serious factual inquiry
into the intent of the enacting majority.443
On the other hand, the new textualist approach, as exemplified
by Justice Kennedy's argument in Public Citizen, inappropriately
discounts the importance of public justification. Because a majority
vote on the general text is not the only relevant part of the legislative
process, Justice Kennedy's view is too restrictive. Contrary to his
conclusion, the public justification for the statute is an appropriate
source to use in determining the scope of the statute. Judges must
acknowledge that this determination is not a factual inquiry into
intent. Rather, courts must determine the proper scope of the statute
in light of the public justification provided for it; the scope of the
statute will broaden or contract depending on the public
justification.444 Thus, judges will have to acknowledge their own
discretion; they will have to acknowledge that their interpretations
are not merely the interpretations that some amorphous legislative
intent compels them to accept, but are chosen based on an
interpretation of the statute's text and the public justification
provided.
CONCLUSION
New textualists have mounted a two-pronged attack on the
conventional view of statutory interpretation. They have argued that
statutory text provides the only legitimate basis for statutory
construction, relying heavily on the importance of the rule of law.
That aspect of their theory is not new, though perhaps the public
choice insight about the irrationality of group choice and the Supreme
Court's emphasis upon the central nature of presentment 445 add some
443. See Gerald C. MacCallum, Jr., Legislative Intent, 75 YALE L.J. 754, 778 (1966)
("While judges and administrators obviously utilize evidence of the intentions of various
individual legislators, they make no serious attempts to discover the actual intentions of
the voting majorities.").
444. Given the use of general language in a statute's text, such a statute clearly cannot
be interpreted to cover only the specific matters or situations addressed in the public
justification. See Win-Chiat Lee, Statutory Interpretation and the Counterfactual Test for
Legislative Intention, 8 LAW & PHIL. 383,389-90,403-04 (1989).
445. See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983).
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weight to the argument. The second prong of the new textualists'
challenge consists of instrumentalist arguments founded upon their
observation of pathologies in contemporary legislative processes-the
incentives to enact vague statutes, the use of legislative history to
distort majority desires, the excessive influence of staff members who
never face an electorate, and the opportunities that the use of
legislative history provides interest groups. They would have us
believe that all of these pathologies would somehow be diminished
simply by embracing the new textualists' nostrum-disregarding
legislative history.
While the new textualists' intrinsic argument that text provides
the only legitimate basis for interpreting statutes lacks merit, 4 6 my
arguments in this Article have focused on the new textualists'
instrumentalist challenge. In making their challenge, new textualists
face a dilemma. On the one hand, they seek to impose their view of
the ideal legislative process on Congress, albeit by the subtle
approach of using statutory interpretation. On the other hand, the
new textualists' challenge is vulnerable to many of the same claims
about the lack of judicial authority and competence that many new
textualists interpose when they challenge other theories of
constitutional interpretation.
Those who believe that legislative history has an important
function in the interpretation of statutes, either because they take an
intentionalist approach of seeking to find legislative intent or because,
like me, they value certain aspects of legislative history independent
of any attempt to determine legislative intent, should reject the new
textualists' other attacks, even if on balance they find them
persuasive. That rejection should rest on the principle of according
appropriate respect to the legislature's judgment about the
appropriate manner of fulfilling its constitutional duties.
446. See Bell, supra note 4, at 48-49.
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